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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 
  
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht das Ein- und Austrittsverhalten von 
Unternehmern bzw. Unternehmen. Hierbei wird in der Einleitung ein Überblick über 
die ökonomischen Auswirkungen von Unternehmensgründungen bzw. 
Firmeneintritten in Märkte sowie von Unternehmensaufgaben und Firmenaustritten 
diskutiert. Weiterhin behandelt das erste Kapitel individuelle und 
Umweltbedingungen, die Unternehmensgründungen begünstigen oder erschweren. 
Auch werden Faktoren untersucht, die zu Unternehmensaufgaben führen. Eine 
zentrale Rolle für Firmenein- und austritte spielt der Industrielebenszyklus. Die 
Ansätze Technologiemanagement, Evolutionsökonomik und Organisationsökologie 
und deren Erklärung für die Anzahl der Unternehmen in einer Industrie über die Zeit 
werden am Ende des ersten Kapitels dargestellt.  
 Kapitel 2 besteht aus einer Studie zum Grad der Marktneuheit von 
Kleinunternehmen im Hochtechnologiebereich bei der Unternehmensgründung. Das 
Konstrukt „Marktneuheit“ basiert hier auf einem theoretischen Fundament, dass 
Märkte aus prozeduraler Sicht betrachtet. Dementsprechend besitzen Märkte in 
bestimmten Entwicklungsstadien charakteristische Attribute, welche sich im 
Zeitablauf verändern. Auf der anderen Seite findet in der derzeitigen 
Gründungsforschung eine Diskussion statt, ob unternehmerische Opportunitäten von 
Unternehmern geschaffen oder entdeckt werden. In unserer Studie nehmen wir an, 
dass bei relativ neuen Märkten eher Opportunitäten geschaffen werden und über die 
Marktentwicklung hinweg mehr und mehr die Entdeckung von Opportunitäten eine 
Rolle spielt. Diese These nutzen wir um unsere Hypothesen bezüglich der 
Determinanten der Marktneuheit von Gründungen zu entwickeln.  
Die Gründungsforschung sieht hier einen Zusammenhang von 
unternehmerischer Erfahrung und Marktneuheit vor. Außerdem impliziert die 
Theorie einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Marktneuheit und 
industrieähnlicher Erfahrung. Ein unternehmerisches Persönlichkeitsprofil trägt in 
der Theorie zur Schaffung neuer Märkte bei. Schlussendlich wird aus einer 
prozeduralen Marktperspektive ein unterschiedliches Innovationsverhalten von 
Unternehmern wahrscheinlich. Folglich herrscht in jungen Märkten eine reine 
Produktinnovationsstrategie vor. Reifen Märkte dann weiter kommt mehr und mehr 
ein stabiles Produktdesign auf und eine Produkt- sowie Prozessinnovationsstrategie 
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ist am vielversprechendsten. In Märkten mit hoher Reife existiert ein stabiles 
Produktdesign. Aus diesem Grund werden Produktinnovationen überflüssig und eine 
reine Prozessinnovationsstrategie ist am sinnvollsten für Gründer.  
Wir entwickeln eine „Marktneuheits-Skala“ bestehend aus 4 Items. Die 
verwendeten Daten der Untersuchung sind Bestandteile der Thüringer Gründerstudie. 
Die Thüringer Gründerstudie ist eine Befragung von Firmengründern in Thüringen, 
die in Industrien operieren, in welchen durchschnittlich mehr als 3,5% des Umsatzes 
für Forschung und Entwicklung ausgegeben wird. Um die oben beschriebenen 
Zusammenhänge zu testen, verwenden wir eine Quantile-Regression, da die 
Verteilung der Marktneuheitsskala schief ist.  
Wir finden, dass Marktneuheut von Gründungen nicht mit unternehmerischer 
Erfahrung zusammenhängt, jedoch negativ mit industrieähnlicher Erfahrung. 
Weiterhin ist ein unternehmerisches Persönlichkeitsprofil positiv korreliert mit der 
Marktneuheit von Unternehmen. Allerdings, hält diese Beziehung nur in den 
obersten Quantilen von Marktneuheit. Wie erwartet, gibt es unterschiedliche 
Innovationsstrategien in Abhängigkeit der Marktneuheit. So nutzen 
Unternehmensgründer eine reine Produktinnovationsstrategie bei hoher 
Marktneuheit, eine Produkt- sowie Prozessinnovationsstrategie bei mittlerer 
Marktneuheit und keine oder eine reine Prozessinnovationsstrategie bei geringer 
Marktneuheit. 
Kapitel 3 behandelt das Ein- und Austrittsverhalten von Firmen über den 
Lebenszyklus einer Industrie. Es wird angenommen, dass sich unterschiedliche 
Unternehmensresourcen und Fähigkeiten auf den Erfolg vor und nach 
(technologischen) Strukturbrüchen auswirken. Demzufolge ist der Firmeneintritt eine 
endogene Entscheidung und das Überleben in einer Industrie die Folge des 
Zusammenpassens zwischen benötigten und vorhandenen Firmenresourcen und –
fähigkeiten.  
Wir testen diese Fragestellung mithilfe der deutschen Traktorenindustrie. 
Hierfür würden die Ein- und Austrittszeitpunkte aus der Industrie von insgesamt 246 
Produzenten erhoben. Weiterhin konnte die Branchenerfahrung (vor dem Eintritt) 
und der Standort ermittelt werden. In der deutschen Traktorenindustrie entstand ab 
1927 ein neuer Nischenmarkt für den Allzwecktraktor auf kleinen 
Landwirtschaftsgütern.  Dieser entwickelte sich zum dominanten Markt, da 
insbesondere nach dem ersten und zweiten Weltkrieg in Deutschland große 
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Landwirtschaftsgüter wegfielen und kleinere Güter in Süddeutschland die 
Nahrungsmittelproduktion in Deutschland sicherstellen mussten. Aus diesem Grund 
eignet sich die deutsche Traktorenindustrie als Exempel um den Effekt von 
Strukturbrüchen auf das Ein- und Austrittsverhalten von Firmen zu untersuchen.  
Wir verwenden eine Hazard-Rate-Regression in Kombination mit einem 
Propensity-Score-Weighting um für die Endogenität des Firmeneintritts zu 
kontrollieren. Wir können zeigen, dass nach der Entstehung des neuen 
Nischenmarktes für den Multifunktionstraktor vermehrt auch Unternehmen aus 
Süddeutschland, welche die lokalen und kulturellen Gegebenheiten kennen, in den 
deutschen Traktorenmarkt eintreten. Weiterhin besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen 
dem Eintritt nach 1927 und einem Hintergrund in der Produktion von 
Landmaschinen. Nach der Kontrolle des endogenen Eintritts können wir zudem 
feststellen, dass diejenigen Unternehmen nach 1927 länger überleben, welche aus 
Süddeutschland stammen und einen Hintergrund in der Produktion von 
Landwirtschaftsmaschinen besitzen.  
In Kapitel 4 wird unternehmerisches Scheitern bei hochinnovativen 
Unternehmen untersucht. Die Operationalisierung von Scheitern stellt in den meisten 
Studien ein Problem dar. Aus diesem Grund verwenden wir zum Teil externe Daten 
inwiefern die untersuchten Unternehmen Insolvenz angemeldet haben. Zum anderen 
wurden die jeweiligen Unternehmer gefragt, ob sie Ihre Unternehmen aufgrund 
ökonomischer Ursachen verlassen haben. Durch diese Prozedur stellen wir sicher das 
erfolgreiche Austritte ausgeschlossen werden. Ein anderes potentielles Problem 
speziell bei Untersuchungen zur Innovationstätigkeit stellt die Selbstselektion von 
Unternehmern in die Innovationstätigkeit dar. Um Selbstselektions-Bias zu 
verringern, verwenden wir einen Propensity-Score Ansatz. Wir verwenden wieder 
Unternehmer Daten aus der oben beschriebenen Thüringer Gründerstudie. 
Wir testen verschiedene Einflussfaktoren auf das Scheitern. Verschiedene 
Studien über unternehmerisches Scheitern heben unternehmensexterne sowie interne 
Scheiten-Faktoren hervor. Einen prominenten externen Aspekt für Scheitern stellen 
industriespezifische Kosten und Einnahmeschocks dar. Wir testen diesen 
Zusammenhang und finden wie erwartet einen negativen Zusammenhang. Da sich 
die Studie insbesondere mit innovativen Unternehmern auseinandersetzt, testen wir 
die Relation von Innovation und Scheitern. Wie theoretisch erwartet, verringert eine 
Innovationsstrategie die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu Scheitern bei den 
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unternehmensinternen Faktoren.  
Ein weiterer wichtiger unternehmensinterner Gesichtspunkt ob innovative 
Unternehmungen Scheitern ist die Gründerpersönlichkeit. Wir nehmen an, das diese 
insbesondere die erfolgreiche Implementierung von Innovationen und somit auch das 
unternehmerische Scheitern beeinträchtigt. Um die Gründerpersönlichkeit zu messen 
nutzen wir das Big-Five-Persönlichkeits-Inventar (Extraversion, Verträglichkeit, 
Gewissenhaftigkeit, Offenheit, Neurotizismus). Theoretische Studien legen nahe, 
dass von den Big-Five Persönlichkeitsdimensionen insbesondere Offenheit, 
Extraversion und Gewissenhaftigkeit die erfolgreiche Implementierung von 
Innovationen beeinträchtigen können.  
Wir finden, in Übereinstimmung mit unseren Hypothesen, dass Offenheit die 
erfolgreiche Implementierung von Innovationen erschwert und es somit einen 
positiven Moderationseffekt von Offenheit auf den Zusammenhang von Innovation 
auf Scheitern gibt. Dieser Effekt kann dadurch erklärt werden, dass sehr offene 
Unternehmer eher auf den Neuartigkeitsaspekt als auf das Generieren von 
finanziellen Überschüssen fokussiert sind. Weiterhin finden wir einen negativen 
Moderationseffekt von Extraversion auf den Zusammenhang von Innovation auf 
unternehmerisches Scheitern. Wir erklären dieses Ergebnis mit der Fähigkeit von 
extravertierten Unternehmern, ihre Kommunikationsstärke auszuspielen und so 
vergleichsweise leichter an finanzielle Ressourcen gelangen. Außerdem sind 
extrovertierte Unternehmer besser in der Lage, die Innovation gegenüber Kunden 
erfolgreich zu kommunizieren. Entgegen unserer Hypothese, trägt 
Gewissenhaftigkeit nicht zur erfolgreichen Implementierung von Innovationen bei. 
Vielmehr besteht ein positiver Moderationseffekt von Gewissenhaftigkeit auf die 
Innovation-Scheitern Relation. Dieses Resultat erklären wir damit, dass 
Gewissenhaftigkeit die Anpassungsfähigkeit sowie die Kreativität von Unternehmern 
möglicherweise einschränkt. Diese Eigenschaften sind jedoch erforderlich um 
Unsicherheiten zu überwinden, die bei der Implementierung von Innovationen zum 
Scheitern führen können. 
Das Hauptaugenmerk von Kapitel 5 liegt Verhältnis von verschiedenen 
Austrittsmotiven und der Unternehmerpersönlichkeit. Neben unternehmerischen 
Scheitern gibt es noch andere Gründe für einen Austritt des Unternehmers. In der 
vorliegenden Studie wird in persönliche, firmeninterne und finanzielle 
Austrittsmotive unterschieden. Genauer wird in Austritt wegen (1) Überinvestierung 
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ihrer finanziellen Mittel, (2) Austritt wegen der Unzufriedenheit mit der 
Unternehmertätigkeit, (3) Austritt wegen Spannungen im Gründerteam und (4) 
andere Austrittsmotive. Ich nehme an, dass die Unternehmerpersönlichkeit eine 
tragende Rolle bei der Erklärung der unterschiedlichen Austrittsmotive spielt. Es 
wird wiederrum auf das Big-Five-Persönlichkeitsinventar (Extraversion, 
Verträglichkeit, Gewissenhaftigkeit, Offenheit, Neurotizismus) zurückgegriffen um 
die Persönlichkeit des Unternehmers zu messen. Die Daten zur Verwirklichung 
dieser Untersuchung stammen wieder aus der oben bereits beschriebenen Thüringer 
Gründerstudie.  
Um den Zusammenhang zwischen Unternehmerpersönlichkeit und 
unterschiedlichen Austrittsmotiven zu testen, wurden die Unternehmer nach Ihren 
Austrittsmotiven befragt, wobei mehrere Antworten möglich waren. Es wird ein 
stratifiziertes Cox-Modell verwendet um ökonometrische Robustheit zu 
gewährleisten, da sich die Austrittsmotive z.T. überschneiden.  
Es wird theoretisch angenommen, dass Neurotizismus die Wahrscheinlichkeit 
eines Austritts wegen Überinvestition finanzielle Mittel verringert, das neurotische 
Unternehmer risikoaverser sind und grundsätzlich weniger unter Unsicherheit 
investieren. Diese Annahme kann auf Basis der vorhandenen Daten nicht bestätigt 
werden.  
Im Zusammenhang mit dem Austritt wegen der Unzufriedenheit mit der 
Unternehmertätigkeit legt die Literatur nahe, dass sich Extraversion als auch 
Neurotizismus positiv auf dieses Austrittsmotiv auswirken. Extraversion führt zu 
positiver Emotionalität und bei Unzufriedenheit zu einem schnelleren Austritt. 
Demgegenüber führt Neurotizismus über negative Emotionalität und einem höheren 
Auftreten von Unzufriedenheit im Beruf, was die Austrittswahrscheinlichkeit erhöht. 
Ich finde beide Hypothesen in den Daten bestätigt. 
Austritte wegen Spannungen im Gründerteam können aus theoretischer Sicht 
durch Neurotizismus und Verträglichkeit hervorgerufen werden. Neurotische 
Unternehmer neigen zu negativer Emotionalität und zu kontraproduktiven 
Verhaltensweisen bei der Arbeit. Auf der Anderen Seite führt Verträglichkeit zu einer 
besseren Leistung in Teams und zu einem besseren Kooperationsverhalten. In der 
Datenauswertung zeigt sich allerdings nur ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen 
Verträglichkeit und Austritt wegen Spannungen im Gründerteam. 
Die Arbeit schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung und Implikationen für die 
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zukünftige Forschung ab. Hervorzuheben ist hier insbesondere, dass die vorliegende 
Arbeit die Wichtigkeit der Multidimensionalität von Ein- und Austrittsvariablen 
heraus hebt. Die Nichtbeachtung dieses Phänomens kann sowohl in der Forschung 
als auch bei politischen Maßnahmen, die auf eindimensionalen Ein- und 
Austrittsvariablen besteht, zu falschen Schlussfolgerungen oder Maßnahmen führen. 
Weitere wichtige Implikationen für die Wissenschaft betreffen die Endogenität von 
unternehmerischem Eintritt. Hier kann eine Nichtberücksichtigung zu Verzerrungen 
im Schätzer und somit zu falschen Ergebnissen führen.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
XV 
 
When you cut into the present, the future leaks out. 
 
William S. Burroughs  
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1 Chapter: Introduction  
1.1 Economic relevance of entrepreneurial entry and exit 
The present thesis deals with entrepreneurial entry and exit. Within this thesis, 
I treat the individual and the firm perspective on entrepreneurial entry and exit.  
Since the seminal work of Schumpeter (2002), entrepreneurial entry and exit 
at the firm-level is attributed to be a phenomenon of „creative destruction“, which 
indeed describes two dimensions in the development of economies. On the one hand, 
entry leads to the creation of entirely new markets or industries, and is the foundation 
for their evolution (Gort and Klepper, 1982), which in turn drives economic growth 
(Metcalfe et al., 2006). Firm entry also stimulates competition, productivity and 
innovation. And, most importantly, entry positively affects employment in the long 
run. All these phenomena are not only caused by new entrants, but also by 
incumbents reacting to new competitors (Fritsch, 2008).  
On the other hand, firm exit is associated with structural breaks like industry 
shakeouts (Klepper and Simons, 2006; Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 2009; Buenstorf 
and Klepper, 2010a) and all their socio-economic consequences, like unemployment, 
relocation, obsolete skills, obsolete organizational forms and reallocation of 
resources.  
If individual entrepreneurs or their firms are investigated, entrepreneurial 
entry is connected with the creation of markets (Dew et al., 2011), the development 
of individual capabilities (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), employment and 
productivity growth, innovation and a higher life satisfaction for the entrepreneur 
(van Praag and Versloot, 2007). Regarding the last point, individuals identify with 
their business in a similar way to parents with their children and find meaning in 
entrepreneurship (Cardon et al., 2005, see also Cardon et al., 2009). Despite those 
positive side effects, entrepreneurs on average earn less than employees (Hamilton, 
2000) and positive growth and employment effects are only realized by fast growing 
firms but not by entrepreneurship per se (Wong et al., 2005).  
In contrast with individual entrepreneurial entry, exiting a business may entail 
emotional costs (Gimeno et al., 1997), especially when entrepreneurs fail (Shepherd 
et al., 2009). Moreover, in case of entrepreneurial failure, individuals may be 
constrained in founding a new business and obliged to find employment. Another 
implication from business failure is the learning effect. Such learning includes a 
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broader scope of behavior, a deeper understanding of the entrepreneurial process and 
changes in operations (Cope, 2011). As a result of exit because of business failure, 
exit from a well running firm can generate liquidity for entrepreneurs, allowing them 
to start new ventures (DeTienne, 2010). Thus, exiting entrepreneurs may promote 
regional growth by reprocessing their learned abilities, social capital and financial 
resources (Mason and Harrison, 2006). 
 
1.2 Thesis motivation 
Despite there exists a broad knowledge about entrepreneurial entry and exit, 
some facets of it are sparsely investigated. In more detail, entry and exit are mostly 
treated as one dimensional variables. However, entry and exit decisions are rather a 
multidimensional phenomenon. For instance, regarding individual entrepreneurial 
entry, entrepreneurs may be innovative or not. Similarly, different natures of 
opportunities exist which entrepreneurs pursue when they start up a firm (Dosi, 1997; 
Buenstorf, 2007a; Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). Looking at individual 
entrepreneurial exit, various exit reasons may exist beyond entrepreneurial failure, 
like retirement or problems with other founder team members (Ronstadt, 1986). 
Those problems are sparsely investigated. 
The same logic holds true for firm entry and exit decisions too. 
Correspondingly, firms may enter into certain industries at specific points in time 
according to their capabilities (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Technological 
discontinuities may lead to the obsolescence of firm capabilities and changing entry 
patterns (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). But also the exit motives of firms may 
differ and not only hinge on a poor economic performance. A firm may exit an 
industry, for example, because it needs liquidity to invest in more promising 
industries.  
Thus, treating entrepreneurial entry and exit as a one dimensional 
phenomenon falls short in grasping the whole picture of the effects and determinants 
of it. In addition, when it comes to the relationship between multidimensional entry 
decisions and exit, the issue of sample selection bias is widely neglected. However, if 
self selection is not considered in econometric analysis, estimators may be biased 
(Deheija and Whaba, 2002; Imbens, 2004). In turn, those drawbacks may lead to 
wrong implications for managers, entrepreneurs, firm stakeholders or policy makers. 
3 
In conclusion, there exists a lack of insights with respect to determinants and 
consequences of various modes of entrepreneurial entry and exit. 
It is therefore useful to investigate entrepreneurial entry and exit while 
acknowledging the multidimensionality of those constructs. Consequently, this thesis 
sheds some light on determinants and consequences of entrepreneurial entry and exit. 
Moreover, entry and exit variables are treated as multidimensional constructs and 
self-selection bias is addressed if theory suggests endogeneity. The main questions of 
the thesis therefore are as follows: (1) “What determines the market novelty of 
entrepreneurial firms?”, (2) “Is there a link between endogenous firm entry timing 
and firm survival in the face of technological discontinuities?”, (3) “What is the link 
between innovation, personality and individual entrepreneurial failure?” and (4) 
“What is the link between personality traits and various motives of individual 
entrepreneurial exit?”.  
It is shown in the main chapters that (1) entrepreneurial entry patterns differ 
regarding the degree of market novelty. (2) Firm entry into industries may be 
dependent on endogenous entry-timing, which accords to the firm knowledge. On the 
other hand, firm exit is determined by the match between firm capabilities and entry 
timing. (3) Innovation degreases the likelihood of a particular kind of individual 
entrepreneurial exit, namely failure. Moreover, the relationship between innovation 
and failure is moderated by the personality of the lead founder. (4) Personality is 
related with various (non-economic) motives of individual entrepreneurial exit. 
In the next section, I provide definitions of entrepreneurial entry and exit. A 
broad knowledge on entrepreneurial entry and exit patterns already exists, which I 
briefly summarize. Particularly, in Section 1.4, I discuss determinants of individual 
entrepreneurial entry and exit. Besides, in Section 1.5, I treat factors affecting entry 
and exit patterns of (entrepreneurial) firms. This part of the thesis gives a rough 
overview about the recent state in research on entrepreneurial entry and exit. An 
overview of the main chapters is provided in Section 1.6. 
 
1.3 Definition of entrepreneurial entry and exit 
 In this thesis I examine entrepreneurial entry and exit from two perspectives. 
The first refers to entry and exit of firms into markets. Accordingly, Helfat and 
Lieberman (2002, p. 726) describe firm entry into a market as the “... initial 
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production of a product or provision of a service...” while Siegfried and Evans (1994, 
p. 121) define firm exit “...when it (the firm) [S.W] stops producing a product 
entirely or discontinues selling in a particular market.”  
 The second perspective is given by the individual entrepreneur, which often 
corresponds to the firm level. Entrepreneurial entry on the individual level thus might 
be defined through the fact that an individual starts a business. In line with Cantner 
and Stützer (2010, p. 16), a business is set up “...when accounting started either 
because of obligations from the commercial register or because of first revenues.” In 
contrast, individual entrepreneurial exit refers to “…the process by which the 
founders of privately held firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby 
removing themselves…from the primary ownership and decision-making structure of 
the firm.” (De Tienne, 2010, p. 204).  
 
1.4 Determinants of individual entrepreneurial entry and exit 
1.4.1 Determinants of individual entrepreneurial entry 
 With regard to the individual or team level, there is an ongoing controversy 
on whether entrepreneurial entry is mainly affected by individual or environmental 
factors (Aldrich, 1999; Shane, 2003). At the macro level, environmental 
circumstances like small government size and freedom from corruption foster 
entrepreneurial entry (Aidis et al., 2010). Moreover, taxation policies can have a 
considerable effect on entrepreneurial entry behavior. For instance, income tax with a 
convex shape reduces entrepreneurial entry rates significantly, compared with a 
linear tariff (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). Other important institutional aspects which 
promote entrepreneurship are an entrepreneurial friendly bankruptcy law (Peng et al., 
2010; Lee et al., 2010), ample borrowing constraints (Cagetti and di Nardi, 2006), a 
deregulated banking sector (Kerr and Nanda, 2009) and administrative simplicity 
(Klapper et al., 2006; Grilo and Thurik, 2009). Regional peculiarities such as 
entrepreneurial organizations which serve as role models or the availability of 
resources and appropriate networking partners may also trigger individual start-up 
decisions (Sorenson and Audia, 2000).   
Effects of the micro environment on individual entry 
At the micro level, family and educational background are essential 
sociological conditions backing up entrepreneurial entry decisions. Entrepreneurial 
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orientations are promoted if parents are self-employed, have a high occupational 
status, are well educated and receive high incomes. It is also shown that more 
schooling years relate to higher preferences for entrepreneurship (Halaby, 2003). In 
addition, personal wealth is linked with the decision to found a firm, or, put 
differently, financial constraints hamper entrepreneurial entry (Evans and Jovanovic, 
1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Other environmental circumstances, which 
trigger entrepreneurial activities, are employment in non-bureaucratic young firms 
(Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sørenson, 2007) small firms (Elfenbein et al., 2010) or 
simply unemployed (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Workplace peers likewise may 
have an effect on individual engagements into entrepreneurship. In this regard, 
Nanda and Sørenson (2010) find that co-workers who possess entrepreneurial 
experience serve as role models for potential entrepreneurs. But it is not only co-
workers who affect entrepreneurial entry. Also the information and information 
potential of social networks increases the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry (De 
Carolis et al., 2009). 
Individual peculiarities as individual entry determinants 
Besides environmental factors, individual peculiarities play a role in 
explaining why some people become entrepreneurs and others do not. Individual 
factors may be broadly distinguished into personality traits and characteristic 
adaptations
1
, which are rather cognitive in their nature (McCrea and Costa, 1999; for 
a general theory of personality see McAdams and Pals, 2006). Cognitive factors 
affecting entrepreneurial entry are, for instance, the ability to run an entrepreneurial 
firm, while the expectancy of the entrepreneurial outcome is less important 
(Townsend et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the expectancy of having sufficient 
capabilities for starting-up a business might be due to overconfidence instead of 
substantial expertise and knowledge (Koellinger et al., 2007; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 
2007), although entrepreneurial human and social capital predict entry (Stam et al., 
2008). Furthermore, opportunity alertness or pattern recognition are important 
mindsets that trigger entrepreneurial activity (Baron, 2007).  
                                                 
1
 Due to McAdams and Pals (2006, p. 207) “Personality traits provide a rough outline of human 
individuality, a first cut, a recognizable signature that a person tends to express in a range of situations 
(though not in all) and over a relatively long period of time (though not necessarily forever)“, whereas 
“Characteristic adaptations include motives, goals, plans, strivings, strategies, values, virtues, 
schemas, self-images, mental representations of significant others, developmental tasks, and many 
other aspects of human individuality that speak to motivational, social-cognitive, and developmental 
concerns.“ (McAdams and Pals, 2006, p.208) 
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Knowledge and experience are also suggested to affect entrepreneurial entry. 
More precisely, managerial experience and higher education fuel the decision to set-
up a firm (Kim et al., 2006). With respect to skills, a relatively balanced skill set is 
characteristic for entrepreneurs (Lazear, 2004). And finally, individual motivations 
are strongly related to the tendency for entrepreneurial entry. For instance, the need 
to change society or the status quo are basic motives to found new firms (Carrol and 
Hannan, 2000). 
There is an ongoing debate about whether personality traits are related to the 
tendency to become an entrepreneur. This controversy is moreover linked to the 
question of whether broad traits, like the Big Five consisting of conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, openness, extraversion and neuroticism (see Costa and McCrea, 
1992), or narrow traits, like Self-Efficacy (see Bandura, 1977) reveal a better 
predictive power (Rauch and Frese, 2007a). Recently, meta-analytical evidence 
suggest that firstly, personality traits have a relationship with entrepreneurial entry. 
Secondly, narrow traits have a higher predictive validity in explaining entrepreneurial 
entry, especially if the respective traits are linked to entrepreneurial task 
requirements (Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Rauch and Frese, 2007b).  
Narrow traits which predict entrepreneurial status are the need for 
achievement, self-efficacy, innovativeness, stress tolerance, the need for autonomy, 
and proactive personality (Rauch and Frese, 2007b). Moreover, entrepreneurs have a 
higher risk propensity than managers (Stewart and Roth, 2001). Among the Big Five 
personality traits, compared to managers, entrepreneurs score higher in 
conscientiousness and openness, but lower in neuroticism and agreeableness (Zhao 
and Seibert, 2006).  
The relationship between innate personality traits and entrepreneurial activity 
suggests that genetic factors may play a role in the question of why some people 
engage in entrepreneurship and others do not. Twin studies indeed imply that 
entrepreneurial entry is at least in part genetically determined (Nicolaou et al., 2008). 
Similarly, employees who have a predisposition for working in the public sector are 
less likely to become entrepreneurs. On the other hand, people with a predisposition 
for entrepreneurship are more likely to leave the public sector for entrepreneurship 
compared to workers predisposed to be public sector employees (Özcan and 
Reichstein, 2009).  
Future research directions concerning individual entrepreneurial entry 
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decisions are moderators and mediators which affect the personality entrepreneurial 
status relationship (Zhao and Seibert, 2006). For instance, a recent study shows that 
the risk propensity entrepreneurial status relationship is mediated by rule breaking 
behavior in adolescence (Zhang and Arvey, 2009). Moreover, relatively little 
evidence exists regarding the relationship between individual factors and the nature 
of opportunities which entrepreneurs pursue (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). 
 In particular, determinants of the market novelty of entrepreneurial firms are 
sparsely investigated and thus chapter 2 of the present thesis addresses this issue. 
 
1.4.2 Determinants of individual entrepreneurial exit 
At the individual level, research on entrepreneurial exit is scarce (DeTienne 
and Cardon, 2010). A controversial issue in entrepreneurship research concerns the 
question of whether entrepreneurial exits are mainly driven by economic 
considerations. Gimeno et al. (1997)‟s model suggests that entrepreneurial exit 
decisions are determined by both a poor economic venture performance and a low 
psychic income from entrepreneurship. The chapters 4 and 5 deal with this topic. 
Non economic reasons for individual exits 
Empirical evidence shows that one third of all business are closed while they 
can be categorized as economically successful. The reasons for successful closure are 
given with better job opportunities outside of the business (Headd, 2003; DeTienne, 
2010). Additionally, personal problems with the family, health problems, time 
constraints or legal issues may lead to “successful” entrepreneurial exit (Ronstadt, 
1986). Likewise, risk aversion, pension without a succession, friction in management 
or death are other reasons why economically successful entrepreneurs exit (Egeln et 
al., 2010; DeTienne, 2010). Entrepreneurial exit can be considered as a strategic 
choice. Put differently, some entrepreneurs start-up in order to sell their firms with 
high profits through an IPO or acquisition (DeTienne and Cardon, 2010; DeTienne, 
2010; Wennberg et al., 2010).  
Empirical studies of successful entrepreneurial exit underline the importance 
of entrepreneurial experience, age and education (Wennberg et al., 2010, see also De 
Tienne and Cardon, 2010).  
Individual exit because of a poor firm performance 
Despite the fact that entrepreneurs leave successful firms, a main reason for an 
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entrepreneurial exit is poor economic firm performance. Reasons for entrepreneurial 
failure are manifold. In general, new firms suffer from their liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Liability of newness is manifested in production uncertainty, 
uncertainty in management and customer ignorance (Shepherd et al., 2000). Beyond 
liability of newness, entrepreneurs may fail because of high levels of competition, 
depreciation of debt claims, cost shocks, economic downturns and friction within the 
management team (Egeln et al., 2010). 
 
1.5 Determinants of entrepreneurial entry and exit at the firm 
level 
1.5.1 Entrepreneurial entry from a firm level perspective 
 In this section, the determinants of firm entry are discussed. In chapter 3 this 
topic is picked up again. In comparison to entrepreneurial entry at the individual 
level, firm entry into a market is not necessarily equal with starting up a new firm 
(Buenstorf, 2007a). For example, established firms may diversify out of their 
ancestral industries into other markets or industries (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
Likewise as at the individual level, firm entry decisions are influenced by 
environmental factors and firm level determinants.  
Environmental aspects of firm entry 
Environmental conditions in the target market affect firm entry. For instance, 
growing markets promise firm success and therefore firm entry is more likely 
(Schwalbach, 1987; Siegfried and Evans, 1994). But not only growing markets 
increase the incentive to enter. Even technological opportunities, like a growing field 
of applicability pave the road to entry (Utterback and Suarez, 1993). Similarly, if the 
expected rate of return in a market is relatively high then firm entry is more likely 
(Schwalbach, 1987). Industry R&D intensity, industry capital intensity and market 
concentration serve as entry barriers especially for small firms. Moreover, small firm 
entry is hampered when industries are dominated by powerful unions and economies 
of scale (Acs and Audretsch, 1989). In general, firm entry rates are strongly 
correlated with exit rates (Geroski, 1995). Interestingly, even competition within 
local financial markets may have an effect on firm entry through the availability of 
financial resources (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006).  
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Firm heterogeneity as an entry determinant 
Besides environmental circumstances, firm heterogeneity is a crucial cause of 
entry. In this vein, Helfat and Lieberman (2002) claim that entry is determined by a 
firm‟s pre-entry endowment with capabilities and resources. Hence, the more a firm‟s 
qualities are linked with requirements of the target industry, the higher the likelihood 
of entry. In case firms possess an excess of financial resources, entry into unrelated 
industries becomes more likely (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). However, a 
peculiar resource base can also hamper entry. Accordingly, the threat of challenging a 
well established brand or the necessity to build up new capabilities may affect 
decisions to diversify (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Another influential factor on 
entry are high sunk costs of capital goods (Mata, 1993). Finally, a product innovation 
strategy has the potential to overcome scale disadvantages of small firms, which then 
encourage entering decisions (Acs and Audretsch, 1989).   
  
1.5.2 Entrepreneurial exit from a firm level perspective 
Two prominent reasons exist why firms exit industries (Cefis and Marsili, 
2006). One is the discrepancy between firm size and the industry specific efficient 
scale economies (Audretsch, 1997). However, knowledge and resource heterogeneity 
among firms is the most prominent cause of exits (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; 
Loasby, 1999; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Malerba, 2006). Knowledge differences 
are more crucial than in non-innovative industries than in highly innovative 
industries (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1993).  
Firm heterogeneity and exit: pre-entry experience 
Firms with a broader capability and resource base are less likely to fail. 
Appropriate capabilities that encourage firm entry are usually also helpful in 
avoiding firm exit. Related and relevant firm capabilities are crucial when radical 
technological changes occur. Nonetheless, incumbent market leader are often locked-
in by their existing knowledge base if radical innovations emerge. Thus, they are 
forced to exit. Blindness about existing knowledge gaps induced by past success is 
one significant reason for this phenomenon. It should be noted that in new industries 
in which uncertainty is high, relevant capabilities and resources are more difficult to 
predict (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
In an empirical study, pre-entry experience measured in an experienced labor 
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force is beneficial for firm survival (Dahl and Reichstein, 2007). Cross sectional 
evidence on pre-entry experience and firm survival is scarce, however. Most 
evidence about pre-entry experience and survival stems from narrowly defined 
industries, which are treated in the next section. This evidence shows that pre-entry 
experience is an important aspect of firm survival.  
Firm heterogeneity and exit: post-entry experience 
 Despite the impact of pre-entry capabilities and resources, even post-entry 
experience is related to a firm‟s survival. Agarwal and Gort (2002) identify two kinds 
of crucial post-entry knowledge. The first knowledge type was originally identified 
by Jovanovic (1982) and concerns passive learning about the firms‟ own capabilities 
in the respective market contexts. Besides passive learning, firms build up post-entry 
knowledge through active learning. Active learning involves knowledge 
accumulation through R&D and experiences with customers, production processes or 
competitors (see Pakes and Ericson, 1998). Furthermore, post-entry knowledge may 
even stem from mergers and acquisitions (Agarwal and Gort, 2002).  
Empirical studies of the post-entry experience firm survival relationship are 
ambiguous. Some studies posit a positive relationship (see eg. Mata and Portugal, 
1994; Agarwal, 1997; Cefis and Marsili, 2005; Geroski et al., 2010), while others do 
not (see Harhoff et al., 1998). Additionally, in a study of cross-country differences in 
the post-entry experience exit relationship, Bartelsman et al. (2005) find varying 
effects. However, those contradictions may have their origin in other factors that 
interact with a firm‟s age. For instance, firm size, entry mode (Hannan et al., 1998), 
radical innovative changes, (see Tushman and Anderson, 1986) or differing market 
and institutional conditions may affect the firm age survival relationship.  
Firm heterogeneity and exit: innovations 
 Innovations are another essential source of firm heterogeneity which affect 
firm survival (Utterback and Suarez, 1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; 
Klepper, 1996). The reasons why innovations are beneficial for firm survival are 
manifold. They establish monopolies which assure above average profits 
(Schumpeter, 1911) and thus may work against firm exits. Unique assets built up 
through innovations are hard to copy and create competitive advantages (Teece et al., 
1997). Furthermore, after radical technological changes and the emergence of new 
market segments, innovative activities help to adjust or shape a new paradigm, which 
in turn ensures firm survival (Christensen et al., 1998). Finally, for industry 
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incumbents it is imperative to introduce incremental product innovations in order to 
increase market shares and survival chances (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995).  
  Empirical studies corroborate the above suggestions. As the meta-analysis of 
Rosenbusch et al. (2011) indicates that innovativeness increases the performance in 
SMEs, it is not surprising that, especially for small firms, innovativeness is seen as a 
way of preventing exits (Audretsch, 1991). Moreover, innovativeness is linked to 
firm survival in Dutch manufacturing firms in general (Cefis and Marsili, 2005), and 
this effect increases over time (Cefis and Marsili, 2006).  
 
1.5.3 Entrepreneurial entry and exit throughout the industry life 
cycle 
The above discussion has mainly concentrated on cross sectional 
entrepreneurial entry and exit determinants. Industrial dynamics research puts the 
idea that entry and exit patterns change over the evolution of industries center stage. 
The seminal work of Gort and Klepper (1982) describes the archetypical 
development of the number of firms within an industry as an inverted-U-shape. In 
the first stage of the industry life-cycle
2
, a surge of entry takes place and the number 
of producers rises. In this phase, many product versions exist, the product innovation 
rate is high and the market leadership is unstable. The second stage is exemplified by 
a drop in firm entry and a strong increase in firm exits. This pattern is also described 
as a shakeout. Structurally, at this stage, the product design stabilizes and the rate of 
product innovation decreases, while process innovations become more and more 
prevalent. Furthermore, the market shares of incumbent firms stabilize. Finally, at the 
third stage, industries are dominated by a small but stable number of producers, 
which produce a highly standardized product on a large scale (Klepper and Graddy, 
1990; Klepper, 1996; Klepper, 1997).  
There are three main approaches that explain the above described life-cycle 
pattern, namely Evolutionary Economics, Technology Management and 
Organizational Ecology (Agarwal et al., 2002).  
Evolutionary Economics 
Models developed under the Evolutionary Economics paradigm stress the 
importance of innovations, firm capabilities and accumulated knowledge for the 
                                                 
2
 In the introduction of this thesis it is distinguished between three different life cycle stages, whereas 
originally Gort and Klepper (1982) figure out five. 
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interrelationship of industrial dynamics and firm survival. Prominent models from 
this branch were constructed by Klepper (1996; 2002) Klepper and Thompson (2006) 
and Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper (2009). Klepper (1996) proposes that the early 
entrants that best perform product innovations attract comparably more customers in 
the early stages of the industry. In later stages of the industry life-cycle, process 
innovations remunerate the scale advantages of those early performers through 
higher overall cost-reductions and force firms with a lower scale to exit and deter 
potential entry. An alternative to this model introduced by Klepper (2002) brings a 
firms‟ pre-entry experience center stage. Experience is then assumed to increase the 
efficiency of how the process of R&D is performed. Again, earlier entrants with 
experience which more efficiently decreases their costs through the R&D process 
benefit as a result of scale advantages in the later stages of industry evolution. As a 
consequence, those firms outperform inexperienced early entrants and experienced as 
well as inexperienced later entrants.  
However, not all industries pass through a shakeout (Gort and Klepper, 1982; 
Klepper, 1997), as in the German machine tool industry (see Buenstorf and Guenter, 
2011), or the shakeout follows a comparatively long period of growth in the number 
of producers, as in the US laser industry (see Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 2009). 
Also, the above described first mover advantages are not always observable 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Olleros, 1986; Christensen, 1993; Buenstorf, 2007b). 
The common explanation in Evolutionary Economics for such departures is the 
emergence of new submarkets, which encourage new firm entries. If the economies 
of scope do not effectively serve heterogeneous demands and technological 
requirements within a broader product class, the shakeout may not occur (Klepper 
and Thompson, 2006; Buenstorf, 2007b; Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 2009). Several 
submarkets may then simultaneously or subsequently exist (Windrum, 2005).  
The disappearance of first mover advantages and shakeouts is reasoned by the 
emergence of new submarkets, which gain dominance (Klepper and Thompson, 
2006; Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 2009). Firm survival in this framework is 
similarly explained as in the above introduced models due to Klepper (1996; 2002). 
Early entering product innovators outperform other entrants through process R&D 
and scale advantages within dominance gaining submarkets (Bhaskarabhatla and 
Klepper, 2009).  
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Technology Management 
Closely related to the concept of submarket emergence, the Technology 
Management approach ascribes the entry and exit behavior of entrepreneurs to 
socioeconomic factors, organizational behavior and technological phases (Agarwal et 
al., 2002). Accordingly, industrial evolution is characterized by incremental 
technological advancement and technological discontinuities. Technological 
discontinuities hence correspond to major breakthroughs induced by product or 
process innovations. Those breakthroughs are competence enhancing or competence 
destroying for (potential) entrants and industry incumbents. Competence enhancing 
discontinuities represent significant product or process improvements within a 
segment, which are in concert with existing accumulated individual and 
organizational capabilities, knowledge and resources of incumbents or potential 
entrants. In contrast, competence destroying discontinuities render existing 
accumulated competencies and resources of industry incumbents or (potential) 
entrants obsolete. In-between technological discontinuities, marginal technological 
progress mainly concentrates on efficiency gains (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
Subsequent to technological discontinuities, competition for a dominant 
design ignites entry and an ample variation in product designs. The dominant design 
then gradually becomes visible as a result of customer preferences, feasibility or 
political interventions. After the stabilization of the dominant design, industry 
incumbents compete for the efficient provision of the product (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). The selection process resulting in industry shakeouts hinges on the 
ability of producers to adjust to the dominant design. Adjustment is more likely if 
firms possess capabilities and resources, which allow them to streamline their 
processes and organization in order to provide the dominant design more efficiently. 
Firms which are not able to deliver products embodying the dominant design tend to 
exit. Furthermore, entry drops because market experimentation is restricted and entry 
with product innovation is not promising (Utterback and Suarez, 1993).  
The idea that a major technological breakthrough triggers the industrial life-
cycle pattern is formalized by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994). The authors assume 
that equally capable firms need to innovate in order to enter into a market. In the 
second period of the model, firms face a major product invention. In case firms 
randomly innovate on the fundament of this invention, they can extent their output 
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and revenues. Non-innovative firms are disadvantaged as the increasing market 
volume decreases the product price, while fix-costs have to be financed. In 
conclusion, firms which innovate quickly and adjust to the external technological 
shock are not sorted out by the market and survive the shakeout. However, despite 
the fact that this model explains industry shakeouts with the help of technological 
developments, firm adjustments are assumed to be random. 
Organization Ecology 
The third explanation for the industry life-cycle pattern is Organization 
Ecology. In this paradigm, the number of firms in a market causes the industry life-
cycle. The industry shakeout is reasoned with firm peculiarities, which are imprinted 
when firms enter into an industry (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Carroll, 1997; Carroll 
and Hannan, 2000). When a new industry is initiated, organizations usually lack 
legitimacy. Consequently, the more organizations are involved in a market, the higher 
the entering firm‟s legitimacy. Market entry is determined by the degree of 
legitimacy divided by the level of market competition. Competition thus serves as an 
entry barrier. Legitimacy and competition are hence dependent on the level of market 
density, which is defined as the number of firms in a market. The effect of legitimacy 
and competition on entry is modeled so that the relationship between entry rate and 
the number of firms in a market has an inverted-U-shape. On the other hand, a firms‟ 
mortality rate is proportional to competition and is conversely proportional to 
legitimacy. This results in a U-shaped relationship between density and exit. In spite 
of the formal attractiveness of this model, it does not predict the industry shakeout is 
not predicted. Market density in this set-up oscillates narrowly around the peak and 
no shakeout occurs (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; see also Carroll, 1997).  
Hence, several explanations linked with organizational endowments are 
provided in order to explain the archetypical industry life-cycle model. In the 
“liability of resource scarcity” rational, limited firm resources at high degrees of 
market density account for shakeouts. Therefore, if organizations enter into industries 
with high levels of competition they will face resource scarcities. Thus, when high 
market densities prevail, firms struggle to build up sustainable structures, processes 
and institutions. In turn, in case those firms survive, they face higher exit hazards at 
every stage, which leads to density delay.  
Another explanation for density delay is “tight niche packing”. Accordingly, 
if many firms are in a market, only a small amount of opportunities remain 
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unfulfilled. Especially highly competitive markets leave only mediocre market 
segments to entrants, as the most profitable resources are already exploited by 
established incumbents. In the long run, switching from niches to more prolific 
opportunities demands substantial investment. Entry during a phase with high market 
density thus results in higher exit hazards at all stages and corresponds to density 
delay.  
Finally, the “trial by fire” explanation links firm hazard rates with competitive 
selection forces. Certain firms are frailer than others and thus more likely to exit. In 
highly competitive environments, frailer firms are more likely to be forced to exit in 
comparison with more friendly circumstances. Entry cohorts exposed to higher 
densities therefore consist in later stages of comparably less frail firms. In 
conclusion, the “trial by fire” approach explains industry shakeouts with higher 
mortality rates of frail firms at times when high market densities prevail (Carroll and 
Hannan, 1989).  
While much of the literature focuses on the entry and exit behavior of 
entrepreneurial firms, studies of individual entrepreneurial entry and exit over the 
industry life-cycle remain scarce. However, Buenstorf (2007a) concludes that 
investigating the interrelationship between individual entrepreneurial entry and 
industry evolution is a promising field of research. In more detail, with regard to the 
evolution of industries, differing entrepreneurial entry behaviors or determinants of 
entry may be observed. For instance, entrepreneurs who establish entirely new 
markets or industries cannot draw on existing organizational forms but have to create 
them from scratch (Alvarez et al., 2010). Moreover, individual entry into established 
industries is more likely with the possession of industry related knowledge. In 
contrast, profound industry related knowledge is detrimental to the creation of 
entirely new industries (Aldrich and Kenworthy, 1999).  
Even though some theoretical foundations of the relationship between 
individual entrepreneurial characteristics and industry evolution exist, little empirical 
evidence on this topic is available. Similarly, the linkage between individual 
entrepreneurial exit decisions and industry evolution is not well understood.   
 
1.6 Thesis composition and chapter summary 
 The discussion in the above sections concentrates on general patterns of 
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entrepreneurial entry and exit decisions. While Chapter 2 differentiates between 
varying entry conditions, Chapter 3 treats the link between entry timing and firm 
exits over the industry life-cycle in German farm tractors. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with 
the divergent exit reasons of start-up entrepreneurs. Chapter 3 investigates 
entrepreneurial firms as units of observation. In contrast, the Chapters 2, 4 and 5 
focus on individual entrepreneurs.  
 The link between Chapters 2-5 is the phenomenon of different facets of 
entrepreneurial entry and exit. Additionally, in Chapters 2, 4 and 5, data from the 
Thuringian Founder Study is employed. This is a dataset consisting of highly 
innovative entrepreneurs from the German Federal State of Thuringia (see Section 
2.5.1 for a detailed overview). The data on German farm tractor producers from 1896 
till 2007 utilized in Chapter 3 was collected by the author of this thesis (see Section 
3.4. for a detailed overview).  
 The following four chapters are founded on research papers which have been 
presented on workshops of the DFG research training group “The Economics of 
Innovative Change“ and several international conferences.3 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
co-authored work. Chapter 2 was written with Prof. Dr. Uwe Cantner and Dr. 
Maximilian Göthner. Chapter 3 is a collaborative work with Prof. Dr. Guido Bünstorf 
and Dr. Christina Günther. Chapter 4 is jointly written with Prof. Dr. Uwe Cantner 
and Prof. Dr. Rainer K. Silbereisen. In all of the co-authored chapters, each of the 
authors contributed equally to the work.  
 In the following subsections, the main chapters of the thesis are summarized 
in order to provide a brief overview.   
  
1.6.1 Determinants of market novelty of entrepreneurial firms 
The next chapter concerns entrepreneurial entry. Research into the nature of 
the opportunities which entrepreneurs pursue when they found a business is scarce 
(Dalqvist and Wiklund, 2012). We can use the concept of market novelty to assess 
                                                 
3
 The papers were presented at the 2012 EARIE Conference (Rome, Italy, 2nd-4th September), the 
2012 Schumpeter Society Conference (Brisbane, Australia, 2nd-5th July), the 2012 DRUID 
Conference (Copenhagen, Denmark, 19th-21st January), the 2012 IECER Conference (Regensburg, 
Germany, 15th-17th February), the 2012 DRUID Academy Winter Conference (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom, 18th-21st January), the 2011 RENT Conference (Bodo, Norway, 16th-18th November), the 
2011 DIME Final Conference (Maastricht, Netherlands, 6th-8th April), the 2011 DRUID Academy 
Winter Conference (Aalborg, Denmark, 20t-22th January) and the 2010 EEFS Conference (Athens, 
Greece, 3th-6th June). 
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the nature of opportunities. Moreover, we develop a theoretical framework which 
integrates the concepts of opportunity creation and discovery within an evolutionary 
market perspective. Accordingly, opportunity creation mainly takes place when 
markets are characterized by a high degree of novelty. If markets are in rather a 
mature state, opportunity discovery is suggested to be the prevailing foundation of 
entrepreneurial behavior.  
We examine the relationship between entrepreneurial characteristics and the 
degree of market novelty of their firms. The dataset which is utilized to check our 
hypotheses was provided by the Thuringian Founder Study. This consists of 
entrepreneurs who started up in the German Federal State of Thuringia. All of the 
entrepreneurs in the employed dataset started up in industries in which, on average, 
more than 3.5% of the turnover is spent on R&D. With regard to missing data, we 
can draw on 469 observations. Market novelty is measured in terms of 4 Items. We 
will use a quantile regression approach, as the distribution of market novelty is 
skewed in our sample.  
Generally, industry related experience is hypothesized as diminishing the 
degree of market novelty. Our findings indicate that this suggestion holds true. The 
expectation that entrepreneurial experience increases market novelty is not supported 
by our data. In contrast, we find that an entrepreneurial personality profile of the lead 
founder increases the market novelty of their firms. This result, however, only holds 
true at the upper quantiles of market novelty. Thus, we show that for 
entrepreneurship with a high degree of market novelty, personality plays a 
considerable role. Nevertheless, in case of a low degree of market novelty, the effect 
of personality becomes insignificant. Innovations are important for market evolution. 
Thus we also test the relationship between innovation strategy and market novelty. 
The findings indicate that entrepreneurial firms with a sole product innovation 
strategy have a higher degree of market novelty. On the other hand, a sole process or 
non-innovation strategy leads to a lower degree of market novelty. The comparison 
group consists of entrepreneurial firms with a product as well as process innovation 
strategy. 
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1.6.2 Technological discontinuities, endogenous entry timing and 
firm performance 4 
The question of how firm capabilities ensure firm survival over the course of 
industry evolution has still not been finally answered. There is an ongoing debate 
about whether first mover or late comer advantages pay for firm survival. In this 
regard, in Chapter 3 the proposition of Helfat and Lieberman (2002) regarding the 
relationship between firm capabilities, entry timing and firm survival is investigated. 
More precisely, the study probes the effect of pre-entry experience on firm survival 
in the presence of technological discontinuities (see Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Accordingly, we argue that it is not first mover or latecomer advantages that explain 
firm survival, but the “right” entry timing regarding firm capabilities. As a case study 
we focus on the German farm tractor industry.  
In the German farm tractor industry, motor plows designed for large scale 
croplands have dominated the market. However, through several major design 
innovations and the abolition of large East German croplands as an effect of World 
War I, a new submarket gained dominance around 1927. The multipurpose small 
scale farm tractor started its triumphal progress mainly in Southern Germany and 
crucially forced the mechanization of German agriculture. We use this example of the 
emergence of a dominance gaining submarket in order to test our hypotheses. 
Altogether we identify the pre-entry experience of 246 German farm tractor 
producers from the inception of the industry in 1896 until 2007.  
We found that firm entry behavior is endogenous. Thus, after the emergence 
of the new submarket, mainly producers from Southern Germany with pre-entry 
experience in agricultural implements production entered the market. In the Southern 
German area, agriculture was hardly mechanized before 1927. On the other hand, 
after controlling for endogenous entry through propensity score weighting, we find 
that even those producers performed better after the emergence of the new 
submarket. Moreover, after taking account of endogenous entry behavior, cohort 
effects disappeared. Consequently, this study shows that first mover or latecomer 
advantages may not always be decisive for industry dynamics, but that matching firm 
capabilities and resources with market requirements is very important.         
 
                                                 
4
 A presentation of an earlier paper version of this chapter at the EARIE 2012 Conference in Rome, 
Italy, was granted with the Presentation Award of the Verein für Socialpolitik (sponsored by 
Schweizerische Nationalbank). 
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1.6.3 Innovation, personality traits and entrepreneurial failure  
Chapter 4 deals with innovation and entrepreneurial failure. Studies on 
entrepreneurial failure are rare (Cardon et al., 2011). In general, entrepreneurial 
failure is attributed to firm external factors, like industry cost or revenue shocks, or 
firm internal factors, like the human capital (Hall, 1992; Everett and Watson, 1998; 
Watson and Everett, 1999). The relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial 
failure is not well investigated. However, the answer to the question whether an 
innovation strategy is promising for starting-up entrepreneurs or not has important 
implications for entrepreneurs and policy makers. Consequently, the relationship 
between innovation and failure is of interest for research, entrepreneurs and policy 
makers. On the other hand, some studies suggest that the personality of entrepreneurs 
may have an effect on the effectual implementation of innovations (Rank et al., 2004; 
Bledow et al., 2009). As a personality measure we utilize the Big Five given by 
extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, openness and conscientiousness (Digman, 
1990). Some theoretical studies suggest that extraversion and conscientiousness 
strengthen, while openness weakens the negative effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure. Consequently, the research questions of this study are (1) 
“Which effect has innovation on entrepreneurial failure if observed endogeneity is 
considered?” (2) “Which Big-Five personality traits moderate the effect of 
innovation on entrepreneurial failure?”  
The data which we use to answer our research question stems from the 
Thuringian Founder Survey, which is briefly described above. With the help of the 
dataset, we assess the Big Five personality traits of the investigated entrepreneurs 
and whether they introduced an innovation while starting up. In order to address the 
issue of sample selection bias into innovative business venturing, we employ 
stratification on the propensity to innovate (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984; Stukel et 
al., 2007) in combination with a Cox regression. 
We refer to failure if an entrepreneur exits his firm because of economic 
reasons. With the purpose in mind to assess failure adequately, we utilize Gaskill and 
Van Auken (1993, p. 21) definition of business failure as “…wanting or needing to 
sell or liquidate to avoid losses or to pay off creditors or general inability to make a 
profitable go of the business”. Correspondingly, from the 425 firms in our data we 
identified 98 entrepreneurial exits. We also figure out which of the 98 entrepreneurial 
exits are due to economic reasons. In accordance with the definition of 
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entrepreneurial failure, we classified entrepreneurial exits as failure, either if (1) the 
left firms went bankrupt (external data), (2) the entrepreneur exited because he or she 
“lost too much money” (self-report) or (3) “an inability to make a go of the business” 
(self-report). 
Our findings suggest that external cost and revenue shocks have an effect on 
entrepreneurial failure. Also, if sample selection bias is considered, we find that 
innovation negatively relates to entrepreneurial failure, which accords to our 
hypothesis. Likewise, our results indicate that personality moderates the effect of 
innovation on entrepreneurial failure. In more detail, extraversion strengthens the 
negative effect of innovation on failure. In contrast, both, openness and 
conscientiousness weaken the negative effect of innovation on entrepreneurial 
failure. While the first two effects are in line with our hypotheses, the latter contrasts 
our expectations. 
 In summary, innovation seems to be a promising strategic choice to avoid 
entrepreneurial failure. Moreover, the personality of entrepreneurs moderates the 
negative effect of innovation on entrepreneurial failure.  
 
1.6.4 For whom the bell tolls – personality and various motives of 
entrepreneurial exit5 
Entrepreneurial exit is widely understudied (DeTienne and Cardon 2010), 
especially in highly innovative environments. Chapter 5 deals with various reasons 
of entrepreneurial exit. In particular, research into entrepreneurial exits mainly 
recognizes economic factors that determine exit decisions (see Wennberg et al. 
2010). However, as Gimeno et al. (1997) claim, entrepreneurs partly at least rely on 
their psychological income when it comes to exit decisions, and even non economic 
forces may lead to exits. These non-economic factors, such as relationships and 
emotional health, are may be useful to investigate (Cardon et al. 2005, DeTienne and 
Cardon 2010), because entrepreneurial exit has a strong impact on the entrepreneur, 
the firm, industry dynamics and the whole economy through the reallocation of 
resources (DeTienne 2010). Also, entrepreneurs with certain qualities design their 
firms and their firms‟ environments (Sarasvathy 2004), which may have an impact on 
                                                 
5
 An earlier paper version of this chapter was granted with the „Bent Dalum PhD Award“ in the 
context of the 2012 DRUID Academy Conference in Cambridge, United Kingdom, for the most 
promising and innovative research project.  
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their propensity to exit. But what are these factors? One very promising approach to 
explain entrepreneurial exit are the Big Five personality traits, consisting of 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness and neuroticism (Digman 
1990). So far, no study links the Big Five to various exit motives, which are in part 
based on non-economic factors. Therefore in this paper I pose the question: “Are the 
Big Five personality traits differently related to various entrepreneurial exit motives 
in highly innovative industries?”  
In order to answer my research question, I use data from the Thuringian 
Founder Survey consisting of 423 entrepreneurs from the German federal state of 
Thuringia. This survey is an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of 
team- or solo-entrepreneurs in the East German state of Thuringia. The entrepreneurs 
that are investigated in this study operate in innovative industries according to Centre 
for European Research (ZEW) classification “advanced technology” and 
“technology-oriented services” (Grupp and Legler 2000). 98 of the 423 (co-) 
founders ceased their entrepreneurial activity. From these 98 discontinuances, I could 
also identify four specific reasons for discontinuance. Multivariate Cox-regressions 
(Wei, Lin and Weissfeld 1989) are employed to trace the possible link between the 
entrepreneur‟s Big Five personality traits and the three above introduced reasons to 
exit, namely (1) overinvestment of personal resources, (2) low job satisfaction, and 
(3) problems with other team members, given a founder team exists, and (4) other 
reasons with the help of a competing risks framework.  
In contrast with my hypothesis, I find no relationship between neuroticism 
and exit due to overinvestment. Moreover, exit because of problems with other 
founder team members negatively relate to agreeableness. Finally, I find that exit due 
to job dissatisfaction positively relates to extraversion and neuroticism, while it 
negatively relates to agreeableness.  
The results imply that entrepreneurial exit is not only affected by economic 
considerations, but also by other motives, such as well being, relationships and risk 
taking preferences. Viewing strategic exit decisions only from the point of economic 
firm performance may hence fall short of tackling the issue of entrepreneurial exit. 
This finding suggests that psychological income may play an important role in 
entrepreneurial exit decisions, as proposed by Gimeno et al. (1997). As a 
consequence, individual differences in explaining entrepreneurial exit decisions are 
not only related to human capital, opportunities or demographic factors (see 
22 
Wennberg et al. 2010), but also by the personality of entrepreneurs.  In conclusion, 
investigating factors that affect various exit motives might be a more fruitful 
approach to understanding exit decisions than only consider exit as a one 
dimensional phenomenon.  
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2 Chapter: Determinants of market novelty of 
entrepreneurial firms 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Schumpeter (2002), entrepreneurs are agents of economic 
change who, through setting up new business ventures, create “something not yet 
being created on a regular basis in the static state of the economy” (pp. 409-410). In 
doing so, entrepreneurs contribute to the emergence and evolution of new markets 
(Metcalfe et al., 2006). If new markets are seen as the seed of individual firms, rather 
than the whole social construction of institutional relationships and boundaries (see 
Fligstein, 2001), contrasting views exist about how entrepreneurship is related to 
market novelty.  
In general, market novelty mirrors the nature of opportunities entrepreneurs 
pursue (Dosi, 1997; Buenstorf, 2007; Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). We define an 
opportunity in the following according to Alvarez et al. (2010, p. 25) as “…a market 
imperfection.” While some authors link the emergence of novel markets with the 
discovery and exploitation of previously untapped, yet already existing, 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012), others claim that new 
markets are set up as a result of entrepreneurial action upon newly created 
opportunities (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005; Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Dew et al. 
2011). Finally, a third view exists that integrates both creation and discovery of 
entrepreneurial opportunities into an evolutionary framework of market development. 
In more detail, in this approach opportunities are always created to some extent by 
entrepreneurs but are experimented against an intersubjective reality, namely by the 
market demand. Thus, in the latter sense, opportunities are also discovered and 
objective (Buenstorf, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2010; Alvarez et al., 2012). 
Correspondingly, the more a market matures, the more opportunities become 
objective, which for instance may crystallize in a dominant design (Geroski, 2003). 
Drawing on established research in economics (Williamson, 1975; Gort and 
Klepper, 1982; Jovanovic, 1982; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1997; 
Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Geroski, 2003), as well as on management (Agarwal et al., 
2002; Agarwal and Bayus, 2002) and organizational studies (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989; Carroll, 1997; Carroll and Hannan, 2000), we use the evolutionary framework 
of market development in order to relate the concept of market novelty to the nature 
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of opportunities entrepreneurs pursue. We therefore propose that in emerging markets 
creational efforts to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities are prevailing. As markets 
mature, opportunity discovery within existing markets becomes the basis for 
entrepreneurial behavior. Put differently, in case of high market novelty, 
opportunities are more likely to be created based on knowledge outside of markets. 
On the other hand, in established markets (i.e., low market novelty), opportunities are 
more likely to be exploited with the help of actual market knowledge (see Buenstorf, 
2007; Alvarez et al., 2010; Alvarez et al., 2012).  
Previous research on market newness of new ventures (i.e., Dahlqvist & 
Wiklund, 2012; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012) focuses on the discovery of 
entrepreneurial opportunities but disregards theories on opportunity creation. 
Furthermore, market novelty is defined in terms of geographic expansion of markets 
rather than from a process perspective of market development. Against this backdrop, 
previous literature is only able to provide a limited understanding of the determinants 
of strategic entrepreneurial choices in the context of new business creation. An 
evolutionary market perspective however, allows for predictions about the innovation 
behavior of entrepreneurs across different stages of market development (Utterback 
and Abernathy, 1975), a topic which is not yet well understood (Dahlqvist and 
Wiklund, 2012).  
This paper applies the evolutionary market development perspective to better 
understand “when and how opportunities are found and created” (Short et al., 2010, 
p. 54). In particular, we propose that the newness of markets which entrepreneurs 
enter mirrors the nature of opportunities they pursue. We develop and empirically 
test a model of individual and firm-level determinants of market novelty in new 
ventures on the basis of opportunity creation and discovery. Using a dataset of 455 
German start-ups, our results suggest that the emergence of new markets is an 
endogenous phenomenon driven by entrepreneurs and that an evolutionary 
economics perspective on opportunity formation might be a promising field for 
future research. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 
the concept of market evolution as a nexus of market novelty and maturity. Section 
2.3 focuses on the relationship between entrepreneurial characteristics and market 
novelty. Section 2.4 introduces our dataset and empirical strategy. Our results are 
presented in Section 2.5. The paper concludes with a discussion of our results.   
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2.2 The evolution of markets and entrepreneurial opportunities 
2.2.1 Market evolution and entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship can be defined as the “nexus between enterprising 
individuals and valuable opportunities” (Shane, 2003, p. 9). Entrepreneurship 
research so far pays little attention to the nature of opportunities entrepreneurs 
exploit (Grégoire and Shepherd, 2012). In this respect, there is an ongoing 
controversy over whether market novelty is represented through opportunity 
discovery or opportunity creation (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005; Alvarez and Barney, 
2007; Short et al., 2010; Dew et al. 2011). Some scholars suggest that the nature of 
opportunities changes with the evolution of markets (Dosi, 1997; Klepper, 1997; 
Buenstorf 2007; Alvarez et al., 2010). Moreover, entrepreneurial opportunities have 
their origin either within or outside existing markets (Buenstorf 2007; Alvarez et al., 
2010). On the other hand, from an evolutionary perspective
6
, markets not only 
function as an institution coordinating competition and product allocation, but they 
are also seen as a process. Here, the development of markets can be categorized into 
different phases with corresponding characteristics (Williamson, 1975; Dosi, 1982; 
Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1997; Geroski, 2003; Buenstorf, 2007). 
Thus, we suggest that novel markets are shaped by entrepreneurs who create 
opportunities. In contrast, when markets gain maturity, opportunity discovery within 
an established market becomes the prevalent entrepreneurial behavior. Consequently, 
akin to Gruber et al. (2008), we assume that there exists a continuum describing the 
opportunities that are pursued by entrepreneurs through founding a new venture. This 
continuum ranges from (co-)creating novel markets by creating opportunities (high 
market novelty) through starting-up in established markets and discovering 
opportunities (low market novelty).  
 In the following, the archetypical and contrasting types of enterprising 
behavior, opportunity creation and discovery, are introduced and linked with the 
evolution of markets. This characterization is important, as it allows the drawing of 
conclusions about entrepreneurial determinants of market novelty.  
 
                                                 
6
 For an overview of the theoretical implications of evolutionary economics see Dosi (1997) and Witt 
(2003). 
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2.2.2 High market novelty: opportunity creation 
An established, though not generalizable pattern of the evolutionary process 
of market development views the birth point of a market at the time of the first 
commercial introduction of a new product. This might be fulfilled through one or 
even several firms simultaneously (Williamson, 1975; Gort and Klepper, 1982; 
Klepper, 1997). The initiation is followed by a second stage of market evolution 
which entails a surge of firm entry into the newly established market. In these first 
two stages, new entrants compete through different product set-ups, introducing 
product innovations into the young industry. At this point, product output grows, 
uncertainty is high, production methods are unspecialized and the product design is 
simple (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Klepper, 1997; 
Agarwal, 1998). 
From the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, novel markets are shaped by 
opportunity creation instead of opportunity discovery. The role of entrepreneurs is 
acting instead of passively observing the environment (Sarasvathy, 2001; Baker and 
Nelson, 2005; Alvarez and Barney, 2007). The development of novel markets 
premises that entrepreneurs intentionally bypass the institutional status-quo and 
iteratively develop new solutions through a trial-and-error process (Baker and 
Nelson, 2005). Nevertheless, this process is not simply a randomized recombination 
of existing ideas, resources or processes. Rather, entrepreneurs utilize heuristics and 
involve other stakeholders in order to reduce complexities. Hence, high market 
novelty is characterized by interdependent stakeholders and competitors, who bring 
in their characteristic preferences, values, capabilities and knowledge (Sarasvathy 
and Dew, 2005; Dew et al., 2011).  
 There is much more room in novel markets for creating than discovering 
opportunities. Novel markets are characterized by true uncertainty. Products are 
prone to error, preliminary and not coming up in an objectively accepted dominant 
design. Moreover, in new markets consumer needs are usually undefined (Geroski, 
2003). Thus, entrepreneurs shaping novel markets encounter a future in which 
outcome distributions are not existent or not ascertainable at all (Dew et al., 2008; 
Klein, 2008). The utility of products and services develops over time through 
learning-by-using (Rosenberg, 1982). In that sense, objective opportunities emerge 
ex-post and are not given, as through lock in-effects even comparably inefficient 
solutions may become dominant (David, 1985). Thus, one may hardly argue that in 
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novel markets objective opportunities exist, which makes it difficult for opportunities 
to be discovered or ratable ex-ante.  
 
2.2.3 Low market novelty: opportunity discovery  
If markets mature, a drop in firm entry and an increasing number of exiting 
firms can be observed. Usually, the net number of firms in a market peaks at this 
stage. Furthermore, the tendency of firms to produce product innovations decreases 
as the product design stabilizes. This in turn leads to more automatized production 
methods. Correspondingly, process innovations become more important the more 
markets mature (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1997; Agarwal, 1998, Geroski, 
2003). Finally, market development undergoes a shakeout followed by a stabilization 
of the number of firms in the market, often characterized by an oligopoly, strongly 
standardized product design, economies of scale and high entry barriers (Dosi, 1982; 
Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1997, Geroski, 2003).   
Within matured markets, the concept of opportunity discovery presumes that 
the entrepreneur is a discovering profiteer through arbitrage or scale economies. 
Opportunities for entrepreneurial profits emerge from market imperfections or 
disequilibria, which always exist because of uncertainty, bounded rationality of 
actors and imperfect information within existing markets. Under these circumstances, 
external shocks, such as technological advancements, changes in preferences or 
resource scarcities may also serve as a source of opportunities. Put differently, 
entrepreneurs act as discoverer of unmatched needs or imperfectly exploited left 
opportunities. Opportunity discovery hence serves to approach new equilibriums as 
an adjustment to external shocks (Kirzner, 1997; Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Klein, 
2008). However, the concept of opportunity discovery assumes that entrepreneurs are 
not the creators of opportunities and innovations are treated, as a driver of market 
novelty, exogenous (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). Therefore, opportunity 
discovering entrepreneurs are no market (co-) creators. 
Regarding the relation of opportunity discovery and market development, in 
matured markets the number of product variants consolidates which actually 
“…define(s) the market” (Geroski, 2003; p. 102). Then a dominant design unifies 
different tastes of plenty of customers, which have a proper idea about the utility of 
the product, their expected performance and the value of the product (Geroski, 2003). 
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Thus, only when a market has a certain establishment, something like objective 
discovery opportunities may start to exist (Alvarez et al., 2012). Put differently, 
arbitrage, even in an intertemporal sense that resources are combined to a new 
product which can be sold at a higher price than its components (Buenstorf, 2007), 
requires that there exists knowledge about reservation prices or clearly defined 
preferences.  
Accordingly, opportunity discovery implicitly assumes that choosing 
entrepreneurs face an environment in which distributions of future events are known 
or at least are assessable. Hence, opportunity discovery is rather a dominant strategy 
in established markets in which bounded rationality and imperfect information leads 
to arbitrage possibilities (Chandler et al., 2003; Alvarez and Barney, 2007). 
 
2.3 Determinants of market novelty 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurial characteristics as predictor of market novelty  
The conceptual distinction between opportunity discovery and opportunity 
creation is important because both result from different entrepreneurial 
characteristics (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005; Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Dew et al. 
2011). The above introduced evolutionary framework considers this matter. For 
example, individual or organizational tacit knowledge and routines are generally hard 
to copy but constitute important factors shaping new opportunities (Buenstorf, 2007). 
Regarding organizational knowledge, we test the relationship between industry 
related experience and market novelty. Other research found social interrelations of 
entrepreneurs to predict the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities and new 
markets (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). In the following, we test this prediction. Finally, 
differences in individual and organizational behavior are regarded as crucial drivers 
of new market creation (Aldrich and Kenworthy, 1999). Innovations represent a 
divergent organizational behavior and may predict market novelty (Dahlqvist and 
Wiklund, 2012). Thus, different innovation strategies (i.e., the introduction of 
product or process innovations) on the degree of market novelty are probed. Taken 
together, we expect that idiosyncrasies of the entrepreneurs and their organization 
may explain different propensities for entering into existing or (co-)creating novel 
markets.  
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2.3.2 Industry-related knowledge and expertise 
 In the framework of opportunity creation, novel markets are usually not 
developed out of prior existing markets, because the attributes of newly created 
opportunities are hardly ascertainable ex-ante (Dosi, 1982; Alvarez and Barney, 
2007; O‟Connor and Rice, 2012). An entrepreneur‟s industry-related knowledge 
and expertise allows dealing with the tasks and problems specific to the industry the 
new venture is operating in. Theoretical arguments also suggest that existing 
knowledge decreases the effort to change capabilities, while it also reduces the 
stimulus to create new opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Aldrich and Kenworthy, 1999; Danneels, 2007). The engagement of 
entrepreneurs in creating new opportunities nevertheless depends on the learning 
endeavors in direction to them (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). For instance, expertise 
in related industries may lead to a strong reliance on experience knowledge about 
customer needs. In turn, this reliance narrows the view of decision-makers on the 
applicability of business solutions instead of novelty and innovativeness (Christensen 
and Bower, 1996; Im and Workman, 2004; Danneels, 2007). Consequently, 
entrepreneurs with existing customer relationships should have a lower tendency to 
create new markets (Dew et al., 2008).  
 Another argument for a strong link between lower levels of industry-related 
knowledge and new market creation is the lack of knowledge regarding existing 
routines and operational practices (Aldrich and Kenworthy, 1999). As a consequence, 
lower levels of industry experience should increase the likelihood of setting up a 
market creating firm instead of copying a business idea from an established market. 
Summing up, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Industry-related knowledge and expertise is negatively related to 
market novelty.  
 
2.3.3 Entrepreneurial experience 
 According to the entrepreneurship literature, experience gained during earlier 
entrepreneurial episodes increases the likelihood of creating an entirely new market 
with the current entrepreneurial project (Sarasvathy and Dew; 2005; Alvarez et al., 
2010; Dew et al., 2011). In particular, experiential knowledge about acting under 
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uncertainty may be helpful in shaping entirely new entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Alvarez et al., 2010). Such knowledge allows us to recognize meaningful patterns 
and problem solutions in a fuzzy setting (Baron and Ensley, 2006), which may be 
particularly prevalent when a newly created entrepreneurial opportunity is being 
exploited. Moreover, opportunity creation requires leadership as this enterprise is 
hardly fulfilled by a single actor. Consequently, because efficient leadership emerges 
from experience, experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to create ventures which 
establish in novel markets (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Firm founders with previous 
start-up experience may also have developed networks of contacts to potential 
stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, financiers). The involvement of these 
networks in developing the architecture of new markets entails establishing 
partnerships and commitments. These institutional settings are dependent on many 
parties beyond the individual entrepreneur. Thus, the variety of new knowledge 
which comes into the opportunity creation process through network ties of 
experienced entrepreneurs is comparably higher. Taken together, experienced 
entrepreneurs are more likely to attain a higher degree of market novelty when 
setting up new firms (Sarastvathy and Dew, 2005; Dew et al., 2011). Hence, the 
following hypothesis applies: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurial experience is positively related to market novelty. 
 
2.3.4 Entrepreneurial personality 
 To Schumpeter (2002, p. 417), the entrepreneur in his role as the creative 
destructor “…uses his personality and nothing but his personality”. In fact, there is a 
well-established literature linking personality with entrepreneurial status (Zhao and 
Seibert, 2006; Rauch and Frese, 2007; Zhao et al., 2010), and hence may be 
associated with the nature of opportunities entrepreneurs pursue too (Short et al., 
2010). Furthermore, in order to exploit created opportunities, oftentimes charismatic 
leadership is necessary to fill other stakeholders with enthusiasm and to acquire 
resources for highly uncertain endeavors (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Charismatic 
leadership decreases the perceived costs of followers under uncertainty and thus 
encourages them to invest in opportunity creation, which is highly uncertain (Alvarez 
and Barney, 2005). In turn, the realization of projects with a high degree of market 
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novelty becomes more likely. However, charismatic leadership not only hinges on 
experience or expertise (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Leadership is in fact related to 
an entrepreneurial personality profile
7
 (Schmitt-Rodermund, 2004). We therefore 
expect the lead founders‟ charismatic leadership to be more pronounced if he 
possesses an entrepreneurial personality. On this ground, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: An entrepreneurial personality profile of the lead-founder is 
positively related to market novelty. 
 
 Looking at the nature of opportunities, Shane (2003) argues that personality is 
not related to opportunity discovery. As we suggested that matured markets are 
predestined for opportunity discovery rather than creation, we expect an 
entrepreneurial personality profile not to be influential at the lower tail of the market 
novelty distribution. In contrast, at higher degrees of market novelty, personality is a 
crucial ingredient which is beneficial for creative destruction (Schumpeter, 2002; 
Alvarez and Barney, 2007). We therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: An entrepreneurial personality profile has an effect at the upper but 
not at the lower quantiles of market novelty. 
 
2.3.5 New ventures’ innovation strategy: product and process 
innovation 
The evolutionary perspective on market development allows us to link the 
degree of market novelty of an entrepreneurial venture with its innovation strategy. 
An illustration of this relationship can be drawn from Figure 2.1.  
 
                                                 
7
 Schmitt-Rodermund (2004) suggests that an entrepreneurial personality is characterized by low 
agreeableness, high conscientiousness, high extraversion, low neuroticism, and high openness. 
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between the rate of innovation and market novelty (adapted 
from Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) 
 
 At the starting point of market evolution, the development of underlying 
technologies is usually indeterminable. Uncertainty and multiple possible 
technological directions encourage and enable the entry of new businesses 
introducing competing product solutions (Dosi, 1982). At this stage, newly created 
markets are best circumscribed as being “fluid” with product designs and production 
processes being far from stable and well founded. Within these markets even the 
demand side is characterized by uncertainty. Competitive advantages are derived 
from product performance and differentiation (instead of a superior cost structure). 
Therefore, the dominant strategy for market entry is exploiting product innovations 
rather than process innovations (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Clark, 1985; 
Klepper, 1997).  
Over the course of market evolution, however, markets act as selection 
mechanisms and narrow down the scope of design alternatives as well as the 
possibilities and incentives for entrepreneurs to realize product innovations (Dosi, 
1982, 1988; Klepper, 1997). Market selection becomes possible after the initial stage, 
because producers and users accumulate knowledge in the production process and 
consumption within a market, which defines a certain range of competing products. 
Even though competition in this stage of market evolution still takes place through 
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different product attributes and minor product innovations, several stable product 
designs emerge. Accordingly, customers gain familiarity with products as well as 
narrowly defined preferences. In turn, this leads to more customized marketing and 
production. Consequently, product innovation opportunities decrease whereas 
process innovations become increasingly important. At this stage of market 
evolution, the rate of product and process innovation within the market is similarly 
high (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975; Clark, 1985; Klepper, 1997). Hence, entering 
entrepreneurs are most likely to perform product as well as process innovations. 
 As customers and producers are increasingly familiar with the emerging 
dominant product design through the evolution of markets, market uncertainty 
diminishes. Unit output increases and process innovations outperform product 
innovations with respect to competitive advantages for entering entrepreneurial firms 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1975; Clark, 1985, Klepper, 1997). A driving force in this 
respect is the technological lock-in effects. In more detail, knowledge accumulation 
increases the efficiency of exploiting one technological solution over the other 
through economies of learning. As a result, market forces ruled out most of the 
competing product innovations. Moreover, the introduction of new product 
innovations through entering entrepreneurs becomes inefficient and thus hardly 
occurs (Dosi, 1988; Arthur, 1989).  
 In the last stage of market evolution, the product has a dominant design. 
Thus, production on a large scale in a systemic production process takes place. 
Competition among firms is conducted by costs and product prices. Under these 
conditions, production is highly capital intensive and major changes in product 
features or production processes are highly expensive and neither efficient nor 
effective. Innovative activities are now rather observable outside of the market by 
suppliers of production technologies (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975). Hence, the 
rate of innovation within the market is rather low and entering entrepreneurs are 
neither expected to introduce product nor process innovations. 
 Correspondingly, we expect that a new venture pursuing a product innovation 
strategy is more likely to create a novel market than a new venture pursuing another 
innovation strategy (i.e., process innovation strategy, product and process innovation 
strategy, non-innovation strategy). Accordingly, we formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 4: Compared to a start-up based on a product and process innovation, a 
pure product innovation strategy is positively related to market novelty. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Compared to a start-up based on a product and process innovation, a 
pure process innovation strategy is negatively related to market novelty. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Compared to a start-up based on a product and process innovation, a 
non- innovation strategy is negatively related to market novelty. 
 
2.4 Data and Methods 
2.4.1 Data 
The data for our analysis stems from the Thuringian Founder Study (TFS), an 
interdisciplinary research project on determinants of successful entrepreneurship in 
Germany. The dataset drew from the German trade register (Handelsregister) for 
commercial and private companies, recording 2971 technology-oriented or 
knowledge-based start-ups (according to ZEW classification; Grupp et al., 2000) 
founded between 1994 and 2006 in Thuringia, Germany. From this list of firms, the 
research team of the TFS selected a random sample of 2604 start-ups. Founders of 
these firms were contacted by mail and telephone in order to recruit one founder per 
start-up, resulting in a response rate of 24.5% (based on the number of start-ups). 
Note that an important advantage of this recruitment procedure is the possibility to 
interview founders whose companies were already closed down. Hence, there is no 
bias toward surviving or particularly successful firms. Finally, 639 structured face-to-
face interviews were carried out by the research team of the TFS in 2008. On 
average, an interview took one and a half hours. A key-informant approach was 
employed to collect the data. In case of a team start-up, the lead-entrepreneur 
provided information on skills and prior experiences of each team member as well as 
the characteristics of the business start-up.  
Some of the collected data refers to retrospective information (e.g., earlier 
events in the entrepreneur‟s life and business history) which can be subject to 
memory decay (Davidsson. 2008). To ensure data validity, the research team of the 
TFS employed the Life History Calendar (LHC) method (see Caspi et al., 1996 for a 
detailed description of the LHC method). Broadly speaking, the LHC employs 
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mnemonic techniques using cognitive and visual memory anchors and retrieval cues. 
This method has been shown to collect more valid and reliable retrospective data 
than traditional questionnaires (Belli et al., 2004).  
Overall, 133 cases had to be excluded either due to missing data or because 
they turned out not to be genuine new start-ups but subsidiaries of existing 
companies. This leaves us with a final sample of 455 valid cases. 
 
2.4.2 Dependent variable: Market novelty 
The few existing measures of the novelty of entrepreneurial markets 
(Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012) strongly rely on the work of Kirzner (1997), which 
posits that opportunities for entrepreneurial action are exogenously given (rather than 
endogenously created). Since we assume a continuum between creating new markets 
and entering into existing ones, such an operationalization of market novelty would 
be prone to measurement error. 
In the present paper, we extend previous work and measure the novelty of 
entrepreneurial markets from an evolutionary perspective of market development. 
Start-ups‟ market novelty is captured with four five-point bipolar scales (Item 1: 1 = 
“The target market was an established market” vs. 5 = “The target market was a 
young and strongly growing market”; Item 2: 1 = “The founding product targeted an 
established demand” vs. 5 = “The founding product created an entirely new market”; 
Item 3: 1 = “On the target market, there existed many competitors” vs. 5 = “On the 
target market, there existed no or just a few competitors”; Item 4: 1 = “The business 
model is not new” vs. 5 = “The business model is entirely new to the world”). Items 
1-3 are motivated by theoretical arguments put forward in the previous parts of the 
paper. Item 4 is derived from the literature which emphasizes business models as the 
architecture in which a new venture exploits its underlying business opportunity 
(George and Bock, 2011). On the one hand, established business models can hinder 
the creation of breakthrough opportunities and new markets. On the other hand, 
innovative business models are established simultaneously to the creation of new 
markets (O‟Connor and Rice, 2012) or new markets are created by innovative 
business models (Holloway and Sebastiao, 2010). Thus, the novelty of a business 
model can be an important indicator of market novelty of the respective company. 
A confirmatory factor analysis indicates significant factor loadings (p < .001) 
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of the four market novelty items, ranging from .48 to .61 (χ² (2) = 10.306, p = .006, 
CFI = .948, RMSEA = .095). We z-standardized and averaged the four market 
novelty items, resulting in the final variable market novelty (α = .63). 
 
2.4.3 Independent variables 
We measured industry experience with a dummy variable indicating whether 
at least one founder of the start-up had acquired experience in the new venture‟s 
industry within the three years prior to the first steps in the venture creation process 
(0 = no, 1 = yes).  
Entrepreneurial experience was measured with a dummy variable indicating 
whether at least one founder of the start-up had launched another start-up prior to the 
first steps in the venture creation process (0 = no, 1 = yes). 
The measure of an entrepreneurial personality is based on the Big Five model 
of personality which was assessed using a well-validated German 45-item 
questionnaire (Ostendorf, 1990). Agreeableness (e.g., “good-natured vs. cranky”), 
conscientiousness (e.g., “lazy vs. diligent”), extraversion (e.g., “uncommunicative vs. 
talkative”), neuroticism (e.g., “vulnerable vs. robust”), and openness (e.g., 
“conventional vs. inventive”) were measured by nine bipolar items each with 
answers ranging from (0) to (5). Cronbach‟s α coefficients exceeding 0.6 for all five 
traits indicating the internal consistency of the scales. Following previous research 
(Schmitt-Rodermund, 2004, 2007), we defined an entrepreneurial reference type with 
the highest possible score (5) in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness, and 
the lowest possible score (0) in agreeableness and neuroticism. We then calculated an 
index for an individual‟s fit with this reference type. First, we estimated each 
interviewee‟s squared differences between the reference values and the personal 
values on each of the five scales. For example, if a person scored a 3 in neuroticism, 
the squared difference is 9 (because the reference value is 0). Second, the five 
squared differences were summed up for each person and, third, the algebraic sign of 
this sum was reversed (e.g., a value of 5 became -5). The resulting value served as 
the final variable entrepreneurial personality. The closer to 0 the values in this 
variable, the better the fit between an individual‟s Big Five personality profile and 
the defined entrepreneurial reference type.  
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With respect to venture type in terms of innovativeness, we differentiated 
whether the start-up‟s business idea was based on a product innovation (“Compared 
to your competitors, is your business idea based on a product or service that is new or 
qualitatively better?”; 0 = no, 1 = yes), a process innovation (“Compared to your 
competitors, is your business idea based on a product or service that has a higher 
value or could be faster or cheaper produced?”; 0 = no, 1 = yes), product and process 
innovation (0 = no, 1 = yes, control group) or no innovation (0 = no, 1 = yes).  
 
2.4.4 Controls 
The empirical analysis is controlled for a number of factors which fall outside the 
purview of this study‟s theoretical focus, yet might potentially affect market novelty 
when setting up an entrepreneurial firm.  
With respect to founder-specific control variables, we controlled for the 
number of founding partners at the time of new venture creation. We also took 
account of founders‟ formal education (highest educational attainment of the 
founders: 0 = none, 1 = university degree, 2 = doctorate).  
Referring to firm-specific control variables, we capture a start-up‟s 
technological endowment using two variables, patent stock (number of patents which 
the founder(s) applied either as inventor or applicant within the last two years prior 
to venture set-up) and prototype (indicating whether the start-up possessed a 
prototype of their core product at the time of new venture creation). The variable 
start-up capital indicates the total amount of financial resources available at the time 
of venture set-up. We also controlled for whether the entrepreneurial firm is an 
academic spin-off (0 = no, 1 = yes).  
Finally, we capture industry-specific and year-specific effects on market 
novelty of entrepreneurial firms. Industry peculiarities are accounted for with five 
sector-dummies (industry sector of the start-up following NACE classification, 
recoded into dummy variables: (1) chemical industry, metalworking industry and 
engineering, (2) electrical engineering, fine mechanics and optics, (3) wholesale and 
retail, (4) ICT, research & development and services, (5) other sectors). In order to 
control for possible temporal influences in the analyses, three year-dummies are 
included (start of the first business year, recoded into dummy variables: (1, control 
group) 1994-1998, (2) 1999-2001, (3) 2002-2008). 
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2.4.5 Estimation strategy 
 The evolutionary market process framework suggests that at earlier 
developmental market stages only a few firms create opportunities, while at later 
market stages many more entrepreneurial firms strive to discover opportunities. 
Therefore, an OLS regression might be inappropriate to grasp predictors of market 
novelty, because the distribution of market novelty is skewed. This supposition is 
supported by the Lorenz curve in Figure 2 and the histogram (with kernel density 
estimation) in Figure 3. The appropriate alternative to account for a skewed 
distribution in regression analysis is a quantile regression (Coad and Rao, 2008). The 
semi-parametric quantile regression approach remedies the problem of outliers and 
skewed distributions. Furthermore, a quantile regression allows for the 
acknowledgement of varying effects of predictors at different points of the 
distribution of the dependent variable (Buchinsky, 1994; see Buchinsky, 1998 for an 
overview).  
According to Koenker and Basset (1978), market novelty iy  of firm i relates 
to vector ix  of 1K  explanatory variables at the sample quantile   in the following 
way: 
 
.)(, ''   iiiiii xxyQuantuxy       (1) 
 
In (1) )( ii xyQuant represents the conditional quantile of iy conditional on .ix In 
order to derive the estimator , the error term iu  may be minimized with the help of 
linear programming. The linear estimator of   is then a result of all observations, 
which are weighted by the ratio   for those observations below the quantile   and 
(1-  ) for those observations above it (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
 
2.5 Results 
Correlation coefficients presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 depict summary 
statistics of our final dataset. Table 2.3 shows the results of our regression analysis. 
The dependent variable is market novelty. Figure 4 depicts the coefficients of the 
quantile regression over the distribution of market novelty. Hypothesis 1 predicts that 
a founder teams experience in related industries decreases the degree of a start-up 
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respective market novelty. Our results corroborate this hypothesis, i.e. in case one 
founder team member possesses experience in related industries, the degree of 
market novelty is decreased by 0.32 (p<0.01), in comparison to a totally non-
experienced founder team. This result holds true for the upper quantiles when a 
quantile regression is employed, as for the .25, .5, .75 and .9 quantile we estimate a 
significantly negative effect. Entrepreneurial experience of the founder (team) was 
suggested to be positively related with market novelty (Hypothesis 2). The 
coefficients of both, of the OLS and of the respective quantile regressions, are non-
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected. Hypothesis 3a presupposes a 
relationship between an entrepreneurial personality profile and market novelty, while 
Hypothesis 3b claims that this result holds true only for the upper tails of the market 
novelty distribution. The result of the OLS regression supports Hypothesis 3a. 
Moreover, considering the results from the quantile regression, excepting the .9 
quantile, the effect of the lead founder‟s entrepreneurial personality fit on market 
novelty is insignificant. Correspondingly, Hypothesis 3b is supported as well. 
Regarding firm innovativeness, we test whether certain innovation strategies are 
linked with market novelty. The comparison group is a product as well as a process 
innovation strategy for business start-up. Our results corroborate hypotheses 4-6. 
Particularly, in contrast with both a product and process innovation strategy, 
entrepreneurs who rely on a sole product innovation strategy reveal on average a 
0.289 higher degree of market novelty (p<0.01). In line with our argumentation 
above, entrepreneurs who either decide to start-up without innovation (p<0.01) or 
solely process innovation (p<0.01) enter on average into markets that have a lower 
degree of novelty, 0.465 and 0.468, respectively. Excepting in cases of a sole product 
innovation strategy for the .1 and .25 quantile, those effects are significant over 
different quantiles of the market novelty distribution. 
 
40 
 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
1. market novelty 1
2. product innovation 0.28* 1
3. process innovation -0.28* -0.22* 1
4. no innovation -0.28* -0.18* -0.28* 1
5. entrepexp 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 1
6. industrexp -0.18* -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02 1
7. epersonality 0.10 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 1
8. number of founding partners 0.18* 0.08 -0.13* -0.03 0.25* 0.07 -0.02 1
9. formal education 0.20* 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 0.14* 0.11 -0.11 0.33* 1
10. academic spin-off 0.28* 0.06 -0.07 -0.17* 0.02 -0.06 -0.13* 0.38* 0.39* 1
11. start-up capital 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.12* 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.14* 0.02 1
12. patent stock 0.32* 0.17* -0.13* -0.20* 0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.09 0.23* 0.23* 0.18* 1
13. prototype 0.17* 0.06 -0.04 -0.19* -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.14* 0.14* 0.02 0.21* 1
14. nace2 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.14* 0.04 0 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.19* 0.05 0 1
15. nace3 0.14* 0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.24* 0.08 -0.30* 1
16. nace5 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.16* -0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.03 -0.13* -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.13* -0.13* 1
17. nace7 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.14* -0.18* -0.09 0.03 -0.42* -0.41*  -0.18* 1
18. 1999-2001 -0.04 0 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 1
19. 2002-2008 0.09 0 -0.01 -0.16* -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0 0.20* 0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.11 -0.37* 1
*p<.01
  
Table 2.1: Correlation coefficients
41 
Mean SD Min Max
market novelty 0.00 0.70 -1.14 1.70
product innovation 0.13 0.33 0 1
process innovation 0.25 0.43 0 1
no innovation 0.19 0.39 0 1
entrepexp 0.42 0.49 0 1
industrexp 0.89 0.32 0 1
epersonality -21.53 5.71 -57.81 -6.49
number of founding partners 2.29 1.16 1 5
formal education 1.06 0.63 0 2
academic spin-off 0.16 0.37 0 1
start-up capital 3.35 1.33 1 7
patent stock 0 1 -0.15 18.92
prototype 0.18 0.38 0 1
nace2 0.24 0.43 0 1
nace3 0.23 0.42 0 1
nace5 0.05 0.23 0 1
nace7 0.37 0.48 0 1
1999-2001 0.26 0.44 0 1
2002-2008 0.28 0.45 0 1  
 
Table 2.2:  Summary statistics 
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Dep. Var: market novelty OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
product innovation 0.289*** 0.192 0.210 0.395** 0.318*** 0.220*
(0.0926) (0.166) (0.160) (0.158) (0.119) (0.130)
process innovation -0.468*** -0.372*** -0.416*** -0.478*** -0.472*** -0.469***
(0.0701) (0.0938) (0.0934) (0.0973) (0.121) (0.149)
no innovation -0.465*** -0.338*** -0.448*** -0.496*** -0.583*** -0.313*
(0.0758) (0.110) (0.108) (0.103) (0.140) (0.176)
entrepexp -0.00858 0.0495 0.0516 -0.0490 0.00136 0.0865
(0.0571) (0.0794) (0.0769) (0.0850) (0.0852) (0.120)
industrexp -0.320*** -0.0819 -0.398** -0.447*** -0.384*** -0.399**
(0.0932) (0.205) (0.159) (0.129) (0.146) (0.155)
epersonality 0.0118** 0.00478 0.00956 0.00944 0.0145 0.0200**
(0.00463) (0.00575) (0.00632) (0.00744) (0.00891) (0.00988)
number of founding partners 0.0226 0.0232 -0.00324 0.0372 0.0287 0.0155
(0.0260) (0.0381) (0.0373) (0.0413) (0.0396) (0.0479)
formal education 0.119** 0.0574 0.148** 0.156** 0.179* 0.105
(0.0516) (0.0610) (0.0723) (0.0733) (0.0962) (0.0925)
academic spin-off 0.287*** 0.196 0.346** 0.307** 0.163 0.232*
(0.0950) (0.155) (0.171) (0.144) (0.141) (0.137)
start-up capital 0.00148 -0.00697 0.00531 0.00160 -0.000756 0.0530
(0.0224) (0.0299) (0.0323) (0.0315) (0.0364) (0.0441)
patent stock 0.00268 0.0216 -0.00399 -0.0170 0.0924 0.0389
(0.0259) (0.0965) (0.0924) (0.104) (0.0839) (0.0688)
prototype 0.0988 0.215* 0.146 0.113 0.00335 -0.0407
(0.0708) (0.114) (0.112) (0.106) (0.114) (0.134)
nace2 0.281*** 0.198 0.225* 0.238 0.304** 0.381**
(0.0938) (0.127) (0.122) (0.146) (0.154) (0.180)
nace3 0.286*** 0.170 0.180 0.246 0.319* 0.327
(0.0990) (0.122) (0.128) (0.157) (0.163) (0.200)
nace5 0.202 0.128 0.216 0.179 0.160 0.0557
(0.124) (0.153) (0.151) (0.193) (0.213) (0.244)
nace7 0.218** 0.0871 0.195* 0.0979 0.270** 0.288*
(0.0883) (0.123) (0.116) (0.143) (0.137) (0.158)
1999-2001 -0.0262 0.0299 -0.0376 -0.0228 -0.0460 -0.0789
(0.0645) (0.0871) (0.0939) (0.107) (0.108) (0.116)
2002-2008 0.0126 0.00311 -0.00700 -0.0267 0.0434 0.130
(0.0688) (0.0902) (0.109) (0.0954) (0.111) (0.139)
_cons 0.252 -0.715** -0.119 0.265 0.734** 1.043***
(0.178) (0.306) (0.252) (0.243) (0.301) (0.329)
N 455 455 455 455 455 455
R2 0.3451 0.1723 0.1871 0.2235 0.2234 0.2213
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1,  ** p<.05,  *** p<.01
 
Table 2.3: Regression analysis 
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study probes entrepreneurial determinants of market novelty of 
entrepreneurial firms. We find that industry related founder team experience is 
negatively linked with market novelty (Hypothesis 1). However, a founder teams‟ 
entrepreneurial experience is not related with market novelty and hence Hypothesis 2 
was not supported by our results. The above estimations also suggest a positive 
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relationship between an entrepreneurial personality profile and market novelty 
(Hypothesis 3a). The quantile regression shows only a significant effect in the upper 
tail of the market novelty distribution, which corroborates Hypothesis 3b. With 
respect to the innovative activities, our results show that a sole product innovation 
strategy is linked with a higher degree of market novelty (Hypothesis 4). In contrast, 
starting-up in established markets accompanies with a non-innovation strategy 
(Hypothesis 5) or a sole process innovation strategy (Hypothesis 6).   
 The result that founder team experience in related industries negatively 
corresponds to market novelty and provides some evidence that building up new 
organizational forms or capabilities is contradicted by existing cognitive frameworks 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2007). At present, relatively little evidence exists for this 
relationship. So far, only case study evidence by O‟Connor and Rice (2012) provides 
some insights in this regard. They show that relying on existing customer 
relationships, markets or alliances decreases the market novelty of innovations. The 
answer to the question why some entrepreneurs perhaps rely more on their existing 
capabilities when it comes to business start-up might be given by past success in 
related markets (see Audia et al., 2000; Gupta et al., 2006). An interesting finding 
concerns the insignificant effect of industry related experience at the .1 quantile.  
This finding might be explained by the fact that very low degrees of market novelty 
represent start-ups like franchise firms.  
 Entrepreneurial expertise was not related with market novelty. This 
contradicts existing evidence (Dew et al., 2011). However, experienced entrepreneurs 
may have a better understanding how prospective a novel market is (Baron and 
Ensley, 2006). For instance, Ucbasaran et al., (2009) find that experienced 
entrepreneurs generally identify opportunities with higher wealth creation potential. 
Further research may examine whether expertise with innovative entrepreneurship 
leads to higher degrees of market novelty. In addition, the interaction effect of market 
novelty and entrepreneurial expertise on venture performance is a fruitful future 
research avenue.   
 We find that an entrepreneurial personality profile, on average, increases the 
inclination to start up in rather novel markets. Looking at different points in the 
distribution, this effect vanishes at very low degrees of market novelty. This finding 
corresponds with the nature of opportunities at different developmental market 
stages. At low degrees of market novelty, rather opportunity discovery is prevailing 
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and thus cognition rather than personality traits may become important when 
opportunities are exploited (see Shane, 2003). In contrast, the creation of new 
markets requires entrepreneurial creativity (Amabile, 1996). And creativity is 
associated with personality (Feist, 1998; Zhao and Seibert, 2006). Future studies may 
focus on more narrow personality traits which can explain the creation of new 
markets, as narrow traits are suggested to be better predictors of entrepreneurial 
outcomes (Rauch and Frese, 2007a, 2007b). In a similar vein, personality might 
moderate the effect of market novelty on entrepreneurial performance. With respect 
to the creation of markets, entrepreneurial idiosyncrasies beyond the personality 
traits of entrepreneurs may be important. For example, Amabile (1996) proposed that 
intrinsic motivation promotes entrepreneurial creativity and the creation of novel 
markets, whereas extrinsic motivation is inimical. Therefore, these constructs ought 
to be taken into consideration in future studies on market novelty. 
 As expected by our hypotheses, innovation strategies pursued by 
entrepreneurial start-ups explain whether new markets are created or entry into 
established markets takes place. This finding underlines the important interplay 
between market development, technology and innovative entrepreneurship 
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Dosi, 1988; Klepper, 1997). However, at present, 
evidence on innovative entrepreneurship and market evolution is scarce and the 
present study provides some insights in this regard. Thus, we follow the call of 
Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2012), who stressed the importance of acknowledging 
different kinds of innovations for market novelty. Accordingly we distinguish 
between a product and process innovation strategy.  
Interestingly, at the .1 and .25 quantile the effect of product innovation on 
market novelty is not significant. However, our innovation measure does not grasp 
the radicalness of innovations. In this regard, breakthrough product or process 
innovations might be crucial for a high degree of market novelty (Tushman and 
Anderson; 1986; Olleros, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; O‟Connor and Rice, 
2012). Minor innovations maybe not have this effect. Hence, future research may 
also concentrate on the relationship between the radicalness of innovations and 
market novelty. 
 Our study provides several contributions. In general, the relationship between 
the nature of opportunities and entrepreneurial characteristics is a widely 
understudied field, and the present paper offers some additional insights. First of all, 
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we show that the degree of market novelty when entrepreneurial firms start up is 
negatively related with market related knowledge. Secondly, our results show that the 
personality of the lead founder of entrepreneurial firms affects entry into highly 
novel markets. Third, we find that the innovation strategy corresponds to the degree 
of entrepreneurial firms. Moreover, we draw on a model that integrates the 
evolutionary market theory with the nature of opportunities. This framework handles 
markets not only from a coordinating point of view, but rather from a process 
perspective. The advantage of this approach, in comparison to Dahlqvist and 
Wiklund (2012), is that the relationship between innovation strategies and market 
novelty can be explained.  
 Despite these contributions, our study has several limitations. One limitation 
refers to our data, which is restricted to entrepreneurs starting-up in highly innovative 
industries, while most of them are innovative. Nevertheless, the majority of business 
founders in Germany are non-innovative (Hagen et al., 2011). Therefore, 
generalizing our results to all kinds of business founders might be misleading. Future 
research might investigate a representative subsample of the whole population of 
business founders in order to achieve more generalizable results. Another limitation 
concerns our measure for product and process innovation. A measure acknowledging 
the radicalness of innovations may lead to further insights. Additionally, we only 
consider start-ups in investigating the determinants of entrepreneurial market 
novelty. Market entry and the pursuit of opportunities, however, may to a much 
larger extent take place from already existing firms through diversification 
(Buenstorf, 2007). A promising future research gap is the examination of market 
novelty determinants of both diversifier entrants and business start-ups. Finally, the 
creation of novelty markets and their evolution is a sociological phenomenon, which 
is hardly fulfilled by a single entrepreneurial firm (see Fligstein, 2001). Therefore 
other studies may investigate the interplay between different actors when it comes to 
the emergence and evolution of markets.  
 In conclusion, Buenstorf (2007) proposes that evolutionary economics is a 
promising approach in entrepreneurship research in order to explain the nature of 
opportunities which entrepreneurs pursue. The evolutionary approach stresses the 
importance of entrepreneurial idiosyncrasies, like the knowledge constituting 
organizations or the experience of the individual lead founder. Moreover, from the 
evolutionary perspective, the rate of innovation is important in explaining the stage 
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of market development. These suppositions are mirrored by our results and therefore 
entrepreneurship research may be informed from insights of the evolutionary 
economics branch. 
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3 Chapter: Technological discontinuities, endogenous 
entry timing and firm performance8  
3.1 Introduction 
In the literature on industry evolution, scholars have established two major 
empirical findings that help explain the success of individual firms. First, in many 
industries differences in firm survival are systematically related to the time of entry 
into the industry. More specifically, early entry into an industry frequently leads to 
higher survival prospects than delayed entry (Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Agarwal, 
1997; Klepper, 2002a; Peltoniemi, 2011 for a review), and  though it may depend on 
the speed of market evolution as well as the development of technology, these first-
mover advantages may be muted (Robinson et al, 1992; Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007; 
Peltoniemi, 2011 for a review). Second, pre-entry experience, especially from related 
industries, increases the survival chances of diverse entrants as compared to de novo 
entrants (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Klepper, 2002a; Agarwal et al.; 2004; Buenstorf, 
2007). It seems that diversifying firms can transfer at least part of their previously 
developed capabilities to a new industry setting (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; 
Farjoun, 1994; Tanriverdi and Venkataraman, 2005).  
The relationship between both these empirical regularities is much less well 
understood. However, particularly for diversifying entrants, the timing of entry into a 
new industry is a strategic decision-making variable. On the one hand, observing 
advantages of early entry may reflect that superior firms entered first. On the other 
hand, potential diversifiers may decide to delay entry until competence requirements 
in the new industry change to become a better match for their own resource and 
capability endowments. If these considerations are empirically relevant, entry timing 
cannot therefore be considered an exogenous variable. In turn, empirically 
observable cohort differences in firm survival (Klepper, 2002a) may not actually be 
caused by differences in entry timing, but may simply reflect the changing 
composition of the population of entrants in terms of capabilities and how well these 
match the competence requirements prevailing in the industry at any given time.  
The present paper aims to help provide a better understanding of how entry 
                                                 
8
 A presentation of an earlier paper version of this chapter at the EARIE 2012 Conference in Rome, 
Italy, was granted with the Presentation Award of the Verein für Socialpolitik (sponsored by 
Schweizerische Nationalbank). 
48 
timing and different types of pre-entry experience are interrelated and thereby jointly 
influence post-entry performance in industry evolution. We build on the seminal 
theoretical work of Helfat and Liebermann (2002) and argue that, as an industry 
evolves, different types of firms are attracted respectively different capabilities are 
required to enter the market successfully. Consequently, the decision to enter an 
industry at a specific point in time relies on the matching of the entrant‟s set of 
capabilities and the prevailing market requirements, as does their subsequent 
performance. This becomes especially apparent in times of disruptive technological 
change (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Sosa, 2013), or during the emergence of new 
submarkets, when we can observe new (types of) entrants joining the market while 
incumbents are leaving. However, present studies of industry evolution do not 
consider the issue of self selection into an industry and argue that it is not apparent 
(see Bayus and Agarwal, 2007; Franco et al., 2009), although the respective 
justifications are not satisfying.
9
 Moreover, some scholars particularly emphasize the 
importance of endogenous market entry (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Boulding and 
Christen, 2003; Lee, 2008). 
Using empirical methods, we analyze a unique dataset tracing the long-term 
evolution of the German farm tractor industry (1896-2006) to study the interrelation 
between entry timing, pre-entry experience and firm performance. Following the lead 
of Helfat and Liebermann (2002), the focus of the analysis is on the endogeneity of 
entry time. We first show that the emergence of a new tractor submarket after 1927 
induced a new wave of entry, which was predominately composed of diversifying 
firms with suitable backgrounds to succeed in the newly emerging submarket. Using 
a propensity score matching approach in discrete-time hazard models, we then show 
                                                 
9
 Bayus and Agarwal (2007, p. 1898) find that in the US,  personal computer industry entrants with 
technical or technical as well as marketing experience have survival advantages, although those 
advantages diminish for later entrants. They use a Cox regression in which the entry time represents 
the spell in order to test for endogenous entry. The authors then wrongly interpret a positive 
coefficient of the hazard rate for successful entrants with technical experience as an indication for late 
entry. As a consequence, they reject the problem of firm selection into the industry. However, a higher 
hazard rate of entry time indicates an earlier entry for successful firms with technical experience, 
which actually argues in favor of endogenous entry. This contradiction was confirmed by Agarwal 
(2013, personal communication).  
Franco et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between technological capabilities, market 
pioneering and firm survival. They find that technological capabilities positively affect the survival of 
market pioneers. On the other hand, the authors argue that technological capabilities not affect 
pioneering market entry, but are thus also against endogeneity. This conclusion is drawn from t-tests 
and Granger causality tests. Although the tests are not significant, this evidence is not quite 
convincing, as the authors compare respectively 11 pioneering new industry entrants and 10 
pioneering incumbents with the other entrants, which is a quite low number of observations.  
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that statistical associations for entry timing and firm performance are sensitive to 
(not) controlling for the endogeneity of entry timing. We moreover find that the 
competitive relevance of specific types of pre-entry experience changes over time. 
This allowed the post-1927 entrants to take over industry leadership from the early 
entrants.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the 
theoretical background and develops testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. 
In Section 3.3 we provide an overview of our empirical setting, the German farm 
tractor industry. Data and empirical methods are introduced in Section 3.4. Section 
3.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical considerations 
3.2.1 First-mover advantage, product heterogeneity and industry 
evolution 
Early entrants into an industry have frequently been said to benefit from 
having advantages over competitors who enter later (cf., e.g., Agarwal and Gort, 
1996; Agarwal, 1997, for empirical evidence). In general terms, first-mover 
advantages of early entrants can be explained by their having a head start on the 
learning curve. More precisely, being able to start the accumulation of industry- and 
product-relevant knowledge early on helps entrants lower their costs, increase their 
higher market shares and thus attain higher performance and longevity (Liebermann 
and Montgomery, 1988, Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996). However, 
industry leadership is often evasive. Given a highly mobile workforce, research 
publications and reverse engineering, accumulated knowledge can often not be 
retained proprietary (Mansfield, 1985; Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988). Later 
entrants may then be able to free-ride on the initial investment by market pioneers 
(Mansfield et al., 1981). In line with these considerations, the managerial relevance 
of first-mover advantages has been challenged by studies investigating the conditions 
under which this allegedly universal pattern is not observed (Suarez and Lanzolla, 
2007). Olleros (1986; see also Lambkin and Day 1989; Christensen, 1993) was 
among the first scholars to highlight the fact that latecomers outperformed early 
entrants in industries such as typewriters, transistors, semiconductors or disk drives.  
According to Wernerfelt and Karnani (1987) as well as Min et al. (2006), 
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whether or not early entrants will end up dominating a market strongly depends on 
product characteristics and market uncertainty. Tushman and Anderson (1986) argue 
that technologies undergo phases of incremental change but may also experience 
technological discontinuities. Incremental change leads to efficiency gains and 
performance increases; e.g. around a dominant design. In contrast, technological 
discontinuities are non-cumulative in nature. They mark breakthrough advancements 
over the prevailing technology that cannot be realized by gradual step-by-step 
improvements.  
Discontinuities, which may take the form of newly introduced alternatives to 
the existing product or consist of major process-related advancements, can either be 
competence-destroying or competence-enhancing for the existing producers. If the 
new product, submarket or process requires knowledge and capabilities which are 
different from those previously developed, then discontinuities are competence-
destroying. In this case, former industry leaders with dedicated technology-specific 
expertise are likely to lose their market dominance to new innovative market 
entrants. As a minimum, industry experience does not provide competitive 
advantages to incumbents vis-à-vis new entrants, as knowledge accumulated before 
the competence-destroying discontinuity can no longer be leveraged. In contrast, 
competence-enhancing discontinuities build on incumbents‟ existing expertise. They 
are therefore not likely to result in a significant shift of power away from established 
firms, but will instead reinforce their advantages, as posited by the first-generation 
models of industry evolution (Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996). 
 
3.2.2 Heterogeneous entrants, endogenous timing of entry and firm 
performance 
The above discussion indicates that first mover advantages are not a universal 
phenomenon, as pioneering firms may be outperformed by later entering competitors 
in the case of competence-destroying discontinuities introducing new forms of 
heterogeneity into product designs. While changes in the degree of product 
heterogeneity were highlighted, we have so far abstracted these from the 
heterogeneity of entrants. However, a sizable amount of the prior literature suggests 
that entrants differ in terms of their pre-entry experience and thus their resources and 
capabilities. Having access to a larger or better resource and capability base allows 
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for the generation of competitive advantage and is thus related to higher performance 
(Barney, 1991), with substantial repercussions for industry  evolution. 
It has been suggested that pre-entry experience influences firms when they 
enter into a new industry (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Lee, 2008). Before entering a 
new industry, firms form expectations about the future development of the targeted 
market, and about how far their resources and capabilities are useful with respect to 
the predicted development path. Thus, the decision to enter an industry or a newly 
emerging submarket at a specific point in time relates both to individual capability 
constellations and market conditions and how well they match at that particular point 
in time. As a consequence, when new product segments change market conditions in 
an existing industry, this may trigger the entry of experienced firms that re-evaluate 
the match between their own resources and capabilities based on industry 
requirements.  
In this view, entry decisions are not one-time decisions but rather represent a 
continuous evaluation process by the potential entrant. They are thus endogenous to 
the firm and its resources, as well as to the development of the respective market. At 
the same time, firms that once entered the market based on their capabilities given 
the original conditions may no longer be best equipped to meet the challenges of the 
changed competitive environment e.g. after a competence-destroying disruption. 
They may therefore be forced to exit despite their first-mover experience. 
In this context, Helfat and Lieberman (2002) argue that success mainly 
depends on the type of pre-entry resources and capabilities the entrant possesses and 
whether or not these capabilities match the requirements of the industry at the time of 
entry. The crucial element in their reasoning is that markets undergo various 
evolutionary stages, attracting different types of firms, such as diversifiers or spin-
offs, which enter the industry at different points in time. In particular the emergence 
of new customer segments or product niches gives rise to new waves of entry, which 
may be successful even vis-à-vis the competition of earlier entrants.  
Diversifying entrants from related industries have often been found to be 
more successful and long-lived than start-up companies (e.g., Mitchell, 1991; 
Klepper and Simons, 2000). Helfat and Liebermann (2002) explain this pattern in 
terms of a larger resource and capability base possessed by diversifying entrants. 
This is not limited to financial resources, but particularly concerns technological 
knowledge and experience related to customer needs (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). 
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As Teece (1980, 1982) has pointed out, firms tend to acquire resources and 
capabilities that are context specific and which therefore can only be usefully 
deployed in a very limited set of environments, such as industry conditions or 
regional specificities (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). However, a large amount of 
firms‟ capabilities are transferable to other markets. Some capabilities such as 
organizational resources and managerial knowledge are general in nature. Their 
usefulness is largely independent of the specific market the firm is active in. Others 
such as marketing, sales and distribution experience can often be leveraged when 
entering related markets.  
In addition to diversifiers, de novo firms organized as spin-offs by employees 
leaving industry incumbents have also been identified as highly successful entrants in 
a variety of industry contexts. In the disk drive and other industries, spin-offs on 
average outperformed other de novo entrants, with spin-off performance directly 
related to parent firm performance (Agarwal et al., 2004, Franco and Filson, 2006, 
see also Klepper, 2009, for a survey). While diversifiers are often prominent among 
the early entrants into a new industry, in various industries successful late entry 
primarily reflects spin-off activities. This is not surprising since spin-off founders 
draw on their intimate industry-related knowledge, most importantly consisting of 
knowledge related to markets and customer needs (cf., e.g., Chatterji, 2009, for the 
medical devices industry). Accumulating this knowledge obviously requires that 
prospective spin-off founders have time to work in the respective industry. 
Following Helfat and Liebermann (2002, see also Silverman, 1999; Miller, 
2004), we expect firms‟ entry decisions to be endogenous, being driven by entrants‟ 
expectations at any given time of how well their resources and capabilities will 
match the requirements of the industry. In more detail, we refer to the concept of 
time-varying capability relevance developed by Lee (2008). In this approach, the 
classical resource-based view is refined.  A firm‟s resource bundle hence reflects its 
ability to produce and sell a product successfully in a market at a certain point in 
time. As a consequence, firms which sense higher capability relevance are more 
likely to enter into a market.  
Based on the above considerations, we expect that changes over time in the 
composition of entrants reflect changing prospects faced by individual types of 
entrants. Potential entrants will try to actually enter when conditions are best suited 
for them. In particular, strategic timing of entry will be a relevant issue for de alio 
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entrants pondering diversification from related industries. Newly emerging 
submarkets may then induce a new wave of entry by firms possessing the required 
capabilities to serve these submarkets. This leads us to predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Pre-existing (de alio) entrants into an industry (e.g., diversifiers from 
related industries) tend to enter when their resources and capabilities best match the 
requirements in the industry.  
 
Endogeneity of enty timing as suggested by Hypothesis 1 can have profound 
implications for analyses of firm performance, which have received rather limited 
prior scholarly attention (Boulding and Christen, 2003; Peltoniemi, 2011). In general, 
performance differences between groups of firms that entered an industry at different 
points in time tend to be interpreted as being causally related to the timing of entry. 
As mentioned above, first-mover advantages have attracted the most interest in the 
prior literature. They have mainly been attributed to learning effects. However, if 
decisions about when to enter an industry are endogenous, then first-mover 
advantages, or more generally cohort effects on performance, need not be caused by 
the timing of entry. They may also reflect inherent differences in the resources / 
capabilities of the various cohorts of entrants (and how well they match the 
requirements of the industry at that time). Empirically controlling for the 
endogeneity of entry timing should then reduce the observable cohort effects on 
performance. These considerations inform our second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Observable performance differences between cohorts of entrants 
reflect the endogenous timing of entry. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Controlling for endogenous timing of entry reduces the statistical 
association between entry time and firm performance.  
 
 While Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on the timing of entry and its association 
with a firm‟s performance, our final hypothesis addresses pre-entry experience as a 
foundation of entrants‟ resources and capabilities and therefore as a driver of firm 
performance. We generally expect that entrants‟ resources and capabilities predict 
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their performance in the industry. In industries faced with the emergence of new 
submarkets and competence-destroying discontinuities, the competitive relevance of 
individual resources and capabilities is likely to vary over time. Again following 
Helfat and Liebermann (2002), we moreover predict that more general capabilities 
such as organizational procedures, which develop as firms mature and whose 
usefulness is not limited to a specific industry, can have a systematic effect on a 
firm‟s performance. In addition, experience accumulated in related markets is 
expected to be important for entrants‟ ability to make correct inferences about the 
industry‟s future development and their own odds of survival. These conjectures are 
in line with Buenstorf‟s (2008) earlier findings for the U.S. farm tractor industry 
where diversifiers, especially those with a background in agricultural implements, 
outperformed de novo entrants. Based on this prior evidence, we expect 
technological expertise to be of lesser relevance as compared to organizational and 
market-related capabilities. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Entrants whose resources and capabilities best match the 
requirements of the market at any given time tend to outperform other entrants. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Organizational and market-related capabilities are more relevant 
than technological capabilities as a determinant of firm performance. 
 
3.3 Empirical context: technological discontinuities in the 
German farm tractor industry10 
Farm tractors – defined here as agricultural traction machines powered by an 
internal combustion engine – were first invented in the U.S. (in 1889). They 
triggered an extraordinary growth in agricultural productivity in the 20
th
 century 
(Olmstead and Rhode 2000). The German farm tractor industry was launched 1896 
by Adolf Altman with his prototypic “Trakteur”. In the first decades, the industry was 
dominated by single-purpose motor plows.
 11
 Their usefulness was limited to large 
croplands, which were concentrated in northern and eastern Germany. In contrast, 
                                                 
10
 This section heavily draws on the historical accounts by Bach (1999), Bauer (1987; 1995), Gebhard 
(1988; 2006) and Rödiger (1990). 
11
 A motor plow is a plow carried by two or three wheels and powered by an internal combustion 
engine.  
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early farm tractors were not profitable for small scale farmers in southern Germany.  
Demand for the German tractor industry noticeably increased after the end of 
World War I in 1918. Because of the war, there was a serious shortage of food, as 
well as a pronounced shortage of labor and draft horses, leading to an increased 
demand for mechanical power in agriculture. This promoted entry into the market, 
giving rise to the first peak in firm population size in 1920 with 48 active producers 
(Figure 3.1). Subsequently, firm numbers fell again to reach a low of 16 in 1932. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Lifecycle of the German farm tractor industry 
 
The motor plow farm tractor design became extinct around 1928, when the 
multipurpose farm design had been established through a series of innovations. One 
of these was the use of Diesel engines for farm tractors pioneered by Benz-Sendling 
in 1922. In addition, several technological achievements from the U.S. were adopted 
by German producers at this time, such as block construction (in 1923) and assembly 
line production (in 1924). However, the decisive innovations contributing to the 
emergence of a new submarket through the multipurpose farm tractor design in the 
late 1920s were the standardized power takeoff and the balloon tire, both of which 
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were also taken over from U.S. producers, The standardized power takeoff was first 
used by German producers around 1927 and was well-established by the mid-1930s. 
It allowed tractors to be used as a versatile source of mechanical energy in a variety 
of farm applications, which was decisive in making farm tractors attractive to the 
small-scale farmers of Southern Germany. Balloon tires were introduced in the late 
1920s in the U.S. farm tractor market. In Germany, the first serial production of farm 
tractor balloon tires was started in 1934 by Continental. 
As the standardized power takeoff had been developed in the U.S., no 
particular technological expertise was required to introduce it in Germany. The other 
key components of the emerging multipurpose tractor design were borrowed from 
other industries (as the Diesel engine and/or from the U.S. market (assembly line 
production, block construction, balloon tire). The multipurpose tractor design can 
thus be interpreted as a competence-destroying discontinuity reducing the 
competitive relevance of technological competences as well as the market knowledge 
accumulated in the northern market. It was in-depth knowledge about agricultural 
procedures and customer needs in the South that was needed to perceive and exploit 
market opportunities there. This knowledge was mostly possessed by producers 
located in the South, in particular those with intimate experience of other agricultural 
markets.  
Following this series of innovations, a boom in the German farm tractor 
market occurred around 1935, which was fueled by strongly increased demand from 
small farmers, especially in southern Germany. This new demand was primarily 
served by local producers designing and marketing small multipurpose farm tractors. 
Many of them were newly entering the industry at this time. Hence, a surge of entry 
into the industry took place from 1935 that strongly raised the number of producers 
in the market up to 37 in 1939.  
The Nazi regime and the ensuing World War II brought drastic changes for 
German farm tractor producers. In 1939 the “Schell Plan” enacted by the Nazi 
government orchestrated a consolidation of the German farm tractor industry. To free 
resources for weapons production, the number of tractor types was cut by two thirds, 
forcing many producers to exit between 1939 and 1945 (Bauer, 1987; 1995). After 
the war, the large croplands of East Germany were no longer available to feed the 
Western population, and large areas of pasture land in South and West Germany were 
now transformed into cropland. At the same time, large parts of the German 
57 
infrastructure were destroyed and the allied forces imposed severe restrictions on 
manufacturing. In this market context of high demand for agricultural machinery and 
limitations in other product markets, many producers newly entered the (West) 
German farm tractor market. Another surge of entry from 1946 to 1950 ensued, 
leading to a third peak in firm numbers with a total of 67 active producers in 1951. 
 At the beginning of the 1960s, many German producers withdrew from the 
farm tractor market. This exit was triggered by various developments. First, markets 
were saturated, as even smaller German farms were usually equipped with farm 
tractors at this time. Second, foreign producers entered into the German market and 
increased the competition. Third, the farm tractor had become a highly homogeneous 
product and shakeout dynamics set in (Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 2009). In 
particular, the standardized three point suspension helped to establish a stable farm 
tractor design at this time. Overall, the number of registered farm tractors rose from 
140.000 in 1949 to 1 million in 1963. From the beginning of the 1970s to the present, 
the number of active German producers has remained relatively stable at between 15 
and 25.  
 
3.4 Data and methods 
3.4.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset encompassing the full 
population of German farm tractor producers, which was constructed from historical 
trade publications (Flücht and Blum 1942, Neubauer 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 
1961, 1966) as well as more recent accounts of the industry‟s history (Herrmann 
1987, Bauer 1987, 1995, Gebhardt 1988, 2006, Bach 1999). Altogether, we identified 
293 entrants into the German farm tractor industry from 1896 to 2006. Out of this 
population, we were able to classify 246 firm or founder backgrounds. The majority 
of these entrants are experienced (226). In total, 187 entrants diversified out of other 
industries, 30 had re-entered
12
 the German farm tractor market and 9 could be 
identified as spin-offs. We furthermore classified the pre-entry experience of the 
diversifying entrants, allowing for multiple experience backgrounds. A total of 88 
                                                 
12
 Re-entrants are firms that exit the German farm tractor market for more than five years and then re-
enter. Correspondingly, firms that re-entered after less than six years are not treated as a new re-
entrant. Rather we retain the original entrant type and deduct the period of market abstinence from the 
whole market spell. 
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diversifiers possessed experience in agricultural implements, 59 had produced non-
agricultural vehicles such as trucks or automobiles, 26 were engine producers, and 
117 had other types of pre-entry experience.  
 
3.4.2 Dependent variables 
We follow a two step empirical approach. We start with a simple logit 
regression to test whether, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the new submarket for small 
multi-purpose tractors emerging after 1927 indeed induced a specific type of entrants 
(diversifiers with market-related experience and from the South) to join the industry. 
We then adopt longevity as a general measure of firm performance and apply 
survival analysis to probe how the hazards of exit from the tractor industry was 
related to pre- and post-entry experience, as predicted by Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Since the underlying data on firm survival are based on annual observations, we 
employ discrete-time complementary log-log hazard rate regressions (Allison, 1982). 
Accordingly, the hazard rate is defined as 
 
 ( ) 1 exp expi t t ih t = a + β x    ,       (1) 
 
where (t)hi is the probability that firm i exits the German farm tractor industry in 
year t, given it survived up to t, ta  is a baseline hazard function that may be duration 
dependent, and tβ  is a vector of coefficients estimating the relevance of firm 
characteristics .ix  (time-varying covariates should be allowed for in equation 1) for 
the hazard.  
As we are interested in the hazards of exit due to poor firm performance, exits 
related to World War I or II are treated as censored observations. In line with earlier 
work on industry evolution (e.g., Klepper, 2002a), exits due to mergers or 
acquisitions are coded as follows. Firms that were acquired by foreign farm tractor 
producers that have not been active in the German market before are coded as 
continuing firms. If a German farm tractor producer acquired another one, the 
acquiring firm is coded as continuing, while the acquired firm is censored. We only 
have a single domestic acquisition in our sample, namely that of Daimler and Benz, 
which is handled intuitively. As Benz was the smaller firm, Daimler is the continuing 
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firm, while Benz is censored. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that firms with regional and market-related knowledge 
are more likely to enter the German farm tractor market after 1927. If true, this gives 
rise to the empirical problem of sample selection bias or confounding when testing 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (Deheija and Whaba, 2002; Imbens, 2004). In other words, if 
firms with promising local and market related experience were more likely to enter 
into the German farm tractor market after 1927, firms operating from 1928 onwards 
were generally more capable, and the hazard rate estimator for firms entering after 
1927 will be downward biased. One way of overcoming this problem would be the 
inclusion of interactions of all relevant firm-background constellations with firm 
entry after 1927. However, for reasons of model parsimony and to economize on 
degrees of freedom, we prefer to use a propensity score weighting approach to 
handle the problem of market-entry selection bias. 
 Propensity score weighting is an efficient methodology to remove almost all 
sample selection bias (Lunceford and Davivian, 2004; Ukoumunne et al., 2010; 
Busso et al., 2011). It is based on first estimating the probability (propensity score) 
ie

(v) of a firm entering into the German farm tractor market after 1927, where v 
represents a vector of covariates. Second, a weighting estimator for the average 
causal effect of entering after 1927 ,h(t)  based on (t)hi  and ie

,(v)  is generated. It 
is important not to employ the true entry probability (v)ei  for the weights, which can 
be assured either by estimating it non-parametrically (Hirano et al., 2003; Imbens, 
2004) or parametrically by using a logit estimation (Lunceford and Davidian, 2004). 
In the latter case, it is important that enough treated and untreated observations do 
not face too many covariates v so that perfect prediction is unlikely (Kline, 2011), 
which is valid in our case. h(t)  has the following shape (see Hirano et al., 2003; 
Lunceford and Davidian, 2004; Imbens 2004): 
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In (2) iZ  indicates whether entry into the German farm tractor market was after 
)1( iZ  of before 1927 ).0( iZ  Thus, interpreting (2), every firm that entered until 
1927 is assigned with a weight of )),(1/(1 ve i

  while firms that entered after 1927 
are weighted by a factor of ).(/1 ve i

 This procedure assures that observations with 
relatively a high )(ve i

 are weighted more heavily in case they entered until 1927 and 
vice versa for firms that entered after 1927. Put differently, a pseudo population is 
generated which has the property of equally distributed pre-entry experiences across 
both examined entry cohorts, thus removing sample selection bias regarding local 
and market related knowledge (see Imbens, 2004; Hernan and Robins, 2006). The 
weights in (2) are normalized with the respective entry cohort sum of weights such 
that they always add up to 1, which helps ensure higher efficiency (Lunceford and 
Davidian, 2004; Imbens, 2004).  
 
3.4.3 Independent variables 
To test the hypotheses developed in Section 3.2, we focus on a set of 
explanatory variables accounting for entrants‟ pre-entry experience and regional 
background (location in or outside southern Germany). Experienced firms are 
divided into diversifiers, spin-offs, and firms re-entering the tractor industry after 
having exited before. For diversifiers, we can further distinguish between different 
types of backgrounds. We take prior experience in vehicle or engine production as an 
indication of technological capabilities, whereas experience in agricultural 
implements is interpreted as a source of market-related knowledge. Multiple 
backgrounds of individual firms are reflected by positive values for more than one of 
the respective indicator variables. Another indicator variable denotes the cohort of 
post-1927 entrants to allow the emergence of the multi-purpose farm tractor 
submarket to modify the influences on entry and performance.  
 The empirical analysis moreover controls for several other factors that may 
affect the hazard rates of German farm tractor producers. We control whether a firm 
was designated as a farm tractor producer in the Schell Plan (cf. above Section 3.3) 
and was thus authorized to make farm tractors between 1939 and 1945. We also 
control for market density, or, in other words, the number of competitors in the 
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market. Carroll and Hannan (1989) propose that the hazard rate has an inverted-U 
relationship with market density. We therefore control for the logarithm of market 
density as well as the squared logarithm of market density in t. To allow for 
agglomeration externalities to affect the hazard rate of industry exit, the share of all 
active producers in t that were located in the same region, or in an adjacent region, as 
the target firm is used as another control. As there might be regional spillover effects 
from related industries (Eriksson, 2011), we also control for the number of regional 
automobile firms. Data on the location and activity of German automobile firms was 
taken from Dressler (2006). Finally, several prior studies suggest that the hazard rate 
of market exit is duration dependent (Klepper, 2002; Cantner et al, 2006, Buenstorf 
and Guenther, 2011). Taking these findings into account, we allow for linear and 
squared effects of duration dependence.  
All independent variables are listed and described in more detail in Table 3.1. 
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Experienced Dummy that indicates whether the entrant is experienced, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
Diversifier Dummy that indicates whether the entrant is a diversifier, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
Re-entrant Dummy that shows whether the entrant is classified as a re-entrant, 1=YES, 
0=NO.  
Spin-Off Dummy variable that shows whether the entrant is a spin-off or not, 1=YES, 
0=NO. 
Div Agr. Impl. Dummy that indicates whether the diversifier has experience in the production 
of agricultural implements, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
Div Vehicles This variable shows whether the diversifier has pre-entry experience in the 
production of vehicles, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
Div Engines A Dummy that shows whether the diversifier has pre-entry experience in the 
production of engines, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
Div Others Dummy variable that indicates whether the diversifier possess other pre-entry 
experience than in agricultural implements, vehicles or engines, 1=YES, 
0=NO. 
ENTRY1927 Entry-cohort from 1928-2007, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
South Dummy variable that indicates whether the entering firm is located in South 
Germany (Southern German Federal States Bavaria or Baden-Wuerttemberg), 
1=YES, 0=NO. 
2WW Dummy that indicates whether the entrant was active during the World War II, 
1939-1945, 1=YES, 0=NO. 
LogMDEN Time varying; renders the logarithm of number of firms in the market. 
LogMDEN^2 Time varying; renders the squared logarithm of number of firms in the market. 
RegDEN Time varying; shows the regional fraction of the whole number of firms in the 
market. The region is mainly based on German counties, 
Raumordnungsregionen. In case the entrant was located in former German 
areas, we used Polish counties, Województwos, or French counties, Régions. 
NRegDEN Time varying; shows the neighbour regional fraction of the whole number of 
firms in the market. The region is mainly based on German counties, 
Raumordnungsregionen. In case the entrant was located in former German 
areas, we used Polish counties, Województwos, or French counties, Régions. 
ARegN Time varying; shows the regional number of automobile firms in the market. 
The region is mainly based on German counties, Raumordnungsregionen. In 
case the entrant was located in former German areas, we used Polish counties, 
Województwos, or French counties, Régions. 
T Time varying; indicates the number of years of market experience from the 
time of entry. 
T^2  Time varying; indicates the squared number of years of market experience 
from the time of entry. 
 
Table 3.1: Description of variables 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
Summary statistics of our data may be found in Table 3.2 and correlation 
coefficients may be taken from Table 3.3.
13
  
The German farm tractor industry provides a highly suitable empirical 
context to assess the relevance of endogeneous entry timing and the performance 
                                                 
13
 The summary statistics and correlation table does not include the time-varying variables as those 
change every year in which the firms are operating. Thus, such one-dimensional measures as 
correlation coefficients have no explanatory power.  
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implications of differences in pre-entry experience. The decisive development in the 
industry‟s early decades was the emergence of the submarket for small multi-purpose 
tractors. Its timing can be pin-pointed to 1927 when the standardized power takeoff 
was introduced in Germany (cf. the above discussion in Section 3.3).  
 
Mean SD Max Min
1. Experienced 0.924 0.265 1 0
2. Diversifiers 0.708 0.455 1 0
3. Reentrants 0.113 0.317 1 0
4. Spin-offs 0.215 0.412 1 0
5. Div Agr. Impl 0.488 0.5 1 0
6. Div Vehicles 0.325 0.469 1 0
7. Div Engines 0.162 0.369 1 0
8. Div Others 0.522 0.5 1 0
9. De Novo 0.075 0.265 1 0
10. ENTRY 1927 0.56 0.497 1 0
11. South 0.405 0.491 1 0
12. 2WW 0.162 0.369 1 0  
 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. Experienced 1.00
2. Diversifiers 0.45*** 1.00
3. Reentrants 0.10* -0.56*** 1.00
4. Spin-offs 0.15*** -0.82*** 0.68*** 1.00
5. Div Agr. Impl 0.28*** -0.06 0.20*** 0.24*** 1.00
6. Div Vehicles 0.20*** -0.03 0.01 0.17*** -0.10 1.00
7. Div Engines 0.13** -0.12** 0.10* 0.22*** -0.10* 0.15*** 1.00
8. Div Others 0.30*** 0.32*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
9. De Novo -1.00*** -0.45*** -0.10* -0.15*** -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.13** -0.30*** 1.00
10. ENTRY 1927 0.21*** -0.05 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.27*** 0.01 -0.15*** -0.08 -0.21*** 1.00
11. South 0.12** -0.01 0.07 0.09 0.23*** 0.07 0.05 -0.14** -0.12** 0.33*** 1.00
12. 2WW 0.09 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.16*** 0.11* -0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.23*** 0.07 1.00
 
Table 3.3: Correlation coefficients 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that de alio entrants enter when their resources and 
capabilities best match industry requirements. In the empirical context of the German 
tractor industry, this endogeneity of entry timing should lead to a higher likelihood of 
companies with a location in southern Germany and/or diversifying from an 
agricultural background to enter after 1927, when their market-based knowledge was 
of strategic value to exploit the opportunities opening up in the new submarket for 
multi-purpose tractors. The results of the logit regressions to test Hypothesis 1 are 
presented in Table 3.4. Model 1 confirms our conjecture with respect to the regional 
dimension.  Model 2 further corroborates our prediction that both a location in 
southern Germany as well as pre-entry experience in agricultural implements are 
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directly related to entering the industry after 1927. We also observe that a 
background in engine production, which represented technological rather than 
market related experience, significantly lowered the likelihood of entering after 
1927. In addition, standardized mean differences (cf. Austin, 2009) of the 
backgrounds of firms entering until and after 1927, respectively, are reported in Table 
3.5. All values exceed the threshold of |0.1|, which has been proposed as a 
benchmark for covariate imbalance (Normand et al., 2001).Thus, our initial empirical 
findings provide support for Hypothesis 1.  
 
Dep. Var.: Entry1927 1. 2.
South 0.845*** 0.780***
(0.265) (0.291)
Spin-Offs 0.586
(0.786)
Reentrants 1.754***
(0.571)
Diversifier*Agricultural Implements 0.878***
(0.309)
Diversifier*Vehicle Producers 0.0291
(0.345)
Diversifier*Engine Producers -1.376***
(0.502)
Diversifiers*Others -0.0625
(0.302)
Const -0.152 -0.485
(0.175) (0.300)
N 246 246
Events 137 137
AIC 331.4 313.3
BIC 338.4 341.3
Log-likilhood -163.678 -148.638
p>chi2 0.0014 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
Table 3.4: Models 1-2.  
 
before weighting after weighting
mean
entry<=1927  
mean
entry>1927
standardized
differences
mean
entry<=1927  
Mean
entry>1927
standardized 
differences
South 0.55 0.23 -0.637 0.42 0.41 -0.008
Spin-Offs 0.04 0.03 -0.79 0.04 0.04 0.016
Reentrants 0.18 0.05 -0.352 0.12 0.11 -0.024
Diversifier*Agricultural Implements 0.42 0.28 -0.299 0.36 0.36 0.011
Diversifier*Vehicle Producers 0.22 0.27 0.113 0.23 0.24 0.011
Diversifier*Engine Producers 0.04 0.17 0.635 0.09 0.10 0.056
Diversifiers*Others 0.43 0.53 0.204 0.50 0.49 -0.024
 
Table 3.5: Standardized mean differences before and after propensity score 
weighting 
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 These findings imply that “market-entry selection bias” is a relevant concern 
in our sample. In order to account for “market-entry selection bias”, we estimate 
firms' )(ve i

 with the help of Model 2 from Table 3.4 and create propensity score 
weights. Standardized differences of all observations in our sample after weighting 
are shown in Table 3.5. All values are far below |0.1|, which indicates that after 
weighting our sample is almost entirely balanced with regard to pre-entry 
backgrounds.  
In the next step, weighted complementary log-log hazard rate regressions 
with normalized weights, as well as analogous non-weighted models, are estimated 
to test Hypotheses 2a-3b. (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). As described above, output volumes 
in the farm tractor market reached a considerable size, and the struggle for market 
dominance via scale advantages set in only after the emergence of the new southern 
submarket in 1927. Before this time, much of the accumulated experience with 
earlier tractor versions in the North was of little relevance with respect to both 
technology and customer demand in the larger southern market. The relevant post-
entry accumulation of industry-specific knowledge only started after 1927. New 
entrants were still able to compete with incumbents on equal terms at this time. If 
they could draw on relevant pre-entry experience, they could even be in an 
advantageous position. On this basis, no systematic advantages for early entry are 
expected to be found. We also expect that for the post-1927 entrants, a background in 
related markets was more important in reducing exit hazards than experience in 
technologically related industries. Given their familiarity with regional markets, we 
also expect to find that post-1927 entrants located in southern Germany have a lower 
exit hazard than entrants from northern Germany.  
Without controlling for the endogeneity of entry times, we find that post-1927 
entrants and firms with pre-entry experience were systematically more long-lived 
than earlier and inexperienced peers (Models 3 and 4). In Models 5 and 8 we find 
that experience has a stronger effect on later entrants. Controlling for endogeneous 
timing of entry in the weighted regressions, the effect of entering after 1927 on 
performance is no longer significant (Models 6 and 7). These findings are consistent 
with Hypothesis 2a-b. 
Models 9-12 (Table 3.7) provide a more detailed analysis of the associations 
between specific pre-entry backgrounds and exit hazards. In line with the predictions 
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of Hypothesis 3a, we find that entrants whose resources and capabilities best 
matched the requirements of the market on average were more long-lived. 
Specifically, being located in the South or diversifying from agricultural implements 
is associated with a lower hazard, but only for post-1927 entrants when market-
related capabilities were of the utmost importance (Model 12). None of the other 
types of industry experience provided late entrants with specific competitive 
advantages. If anything, Model 12 is suggestive of technological capabilities 
enhancing the performance of early diversifiers from the vehicle industry. These 
patterns are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3a. In all models (with or 
without correcting for endogenous timing of entry, with or without interaction terms 
for late entrants) we find robust evidence of performance effects for only three types 
of backgrounds: intra-industry experience accumulated by re-entrants and spin-offs, 
as well as experience in agricultural implement markets brought by the respective 
group of diversifiers. This finding corroborates Hypothesis 3b.
14
  
 
                                                 
14
 As a robustness check, we also estimated hazard rate regressions with a time-varying dummy 
measuring whether firms participated in the German farm tractor industry when the submarket of the 
multipurpose farm tractor started to boom in 1935 (Bauer 1987; 1995), instead of a dummy 
representing entry after 1927. Results, which are very similar to those reported above, may be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
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non weighted weighted
Dep.Var.: Hazard Rate 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Entry 1927 -0.501*** -0.438** 1.013* -0.293 -0.228 0.978*
(0.172) (0.175) (0.570) (0.192) (0.193) (0.551)
Experienced -1.036*** -0.798*** -1.115*** -0.842***
(0.279) (0.291) (0.262) (0.278)
Experienced*Entry 1927 -1.505*** -1.268**
(0.581) (0.569)
2WW -1.242*** -1.225*** -1.224*** -1.422*** -1.394*** -1.398***
(0.217) (0.215) (0.219) (0.241) (0.237) (0.243)
log(MDEN) -0.933** -0.754 -0.767 -0.945** -0.706 -0.729
(0.452) (0.476) (0.468) (0.480) (0.517) (0.507)
log(MDEN)^2 0.192** 0.167** 0.166** 0.175* 0.139 0.139
(0.0821) (0.0849) (0.0837) (0.0908) (0.0947) (0.0932)
Log(RegDEN) -0.0963 -0.146 -0.127 -0.135 -0.205 -0.181
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.130) (0.129) (0.131)
NRegDEN 1.198 1.111 1.395 1.480 1.551 1.820
(1.546) (1.612) (1.561) (1.699) (1.754) (1.688)
ARegN 0.0157 0.00576 0.00857 0.0151 0.00885 0.0112
(0.0132) (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0131)
T -0.0549*** -0.0508*** -0.0497*** -0.0652*** -0.0601*** -0.0591***
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138)
T^2 0.000535** 0.000488** 0.000469** 0.000589*** 0.000535** 0.000516**
(0.000222) (0.000226) (0.000227) (0.000206) (0.000211) (0.000211)
Const -0.865 -0.382 -0.496 -0.648 -0.247 -0.353
(0.643) (0.674) (0.654) (0.625) (0.711) (0.683)
N 246 246 246 246 246 246
Fails 217 217 217 217 217 217
AIC 1376.7 1366.9 1364.4 2648.3 2620.7 2614.1
BIC 1435.7 1431.8 1435.2 2707.2 2685.6 2684.8
log-liklihood -678.370 -672.442 -670.196 -1314.129 -1299.372 -1295.167
p>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
 
Table 3.6: Models 3-8. 
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non weighted weighted
Dep. Var.: Hazard Rate 9. 10. 11. 12.
Entry 1927 -0.215 0.0566 -0.198 0.194
(0.203) (0.383) (0.217) (0.427)
South -0.288 0.0602 -0.175 0.323
(0.193) (0.267) (0.214) (0.293)
Spin-Offs -0.954*** -1.135*** -1.012*** -1.429***
(0.211) (0.287) (0.213) (0.264)
Reentrants -1.039*** -1.293* -1.017*** -0.944**
(0.297) (0.771) (0.337) (0.479)
Diversifier*Agricultural Implements -0.947*** -0.404* -0.810*** -0.118
(0.170) (0.235) (0.193) (0.265)
Diversifier*Vehicle Producers -0.335* -0.627*** -0.293 -0.561**
(0.173) (0.226) (0.190) (0.284)
Diversifier*Engine Producers -0.177 -0.258 -0.158 -0.405
(0.189) (0.224) (0.280) (0.266)
Diversifiers*Others -0.272 -0.357 -0.283 -0.537**
(0.167) (0.222) (0.188) (0.247)
South*Entry 1927 -0.620* -1.092***
(0.364) (0.416)
Spin-Offs*Entry 1927 0.0318 0.510
(0.436) (0.463)
Reentrants*Entry 1927 0.147 -0.216
(0.866) (0.643)
Diversifier*Agricultural Implements*Entry 
1927 -0.920*** -1.223***
(0.331) (0.376)
Diversifier*Vehicle Producers*Entry 1927 0.629* 0.748*
(0.355) (0.401)
Diversifiers*Engines*Entry 1927 0.500 0.986
(0.551) (0.653)
Diversifier*Others*Entry 1927 0.0146 0.290
(0.341) (0.381)
2WW -1.234*** -1.363*** -1.451*** -1.751***
(0.205) (0.217) (0.233) (0.273)
log(MDEN) -0.620 -0.649 -0.580 -0.570
(0.470) (0.480) (0.479) (0.486)
log(MDEN)^2 0.155* 0.159* 0.123 0.119
(0.0833) (0.0847) (0.0888) (0.0888)
Log(RegDEN) -0.0621 -0.0451 -0.135 -0.0456
(0.115) (0.124) (0.130) (0.149)
NRegDEN 1.880 3.176* 1.846 4.286**
(1.738) (1.728) (2.001) (1.778)
ARegN 0.00732 0.00836 0.0104 0.0112
(0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0163)
T -0.0382** -0.0331** -0.0521*** -0.0394***
(0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0149)
T^2 0.000414 0.000372 0.000521** 0.000371
(0.000268) (0.000255) (0.000241) (0.000242)
Const -0.788 -0.769 -0.619 -0.581
(0.693) (0.704) (0.682) (0.695)
N 246 246 246 246
Fails 217 217 217 217
AIC 1350.0 1349.9 2591.2 2545.7
BIC 1450.3 1491.5 2691.4 2687.2
Log-likilhood -657.989 -650.961 -1278.577 -1248.835
p>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
Table 3.7: Models 9-12. 
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we study the relationship between entry timing, pre-entry 
experience and post-entry performance in industry evolution. Analyzing entry and 
firm survival in the historical German farm tractor industry, we found empirical 
support for the conjecture that entry timing is endogenous and reflects entrants‟ 
attempts to find the best match between capability endowments and market 
requirements. The emergence of a new tractor submarket after 1927 induced a new 
wave of entry, which was predominately composed of southern firms diversifying 
from agricultural backgrounds. With their market-related knowledge, these new 
entrants were well-positioned to succeed in the newly emerging submarket. They 
subsequently outperformed the earlier entrants into the industry.  
Our finding that late diversifiers with market-related knowledge were more 
likely than early entrants to survive the shakeout in the German farm tractor industry 
resonates with recent work by Ulaga and Reinartz (2011) who identify a product 
sales force and distribution network as a critical resource of manufacturing firms. 
Among the critical resources and capabilities identified by these authors is personal 
selling, which presumably provided a distinct advantage for regional producers in the 
dominant southern submarket. Hybrid sales offerings and deployment capabilities are 
also suggested as being important (Ulaga and Reinartz, 2011). In this regard, the idea 
that there was a competitive advantage for agricultural implement producers, which 
would be able to provide complementary equipment for the multipurpose farm 
tractors, is plausible. The competitive relevance of sales capabilities and presence in 
horizontally related sales markets, as suggested by Ulaga and Reinartz (2011), is 
consistent with the account provided by Buenstorf (2008) of the large number and 
competitive success of diversifiers from agricultural implements in the U.S. farm 
tractor industry.  
How much we generalize from the above analysis of a single historical 
industry? In some industries a single submarket dominates over the entire evolution 
of the industry, and hence no technological discontinuities are observed. Penicillin 
and TV receivers have been suggested as cases in point (Bhaskarabhatla and Klepper, 
2009). However, numerous industries other than the German farm tractor industry 
have experienced technological discontinuities. Future research should focus on 
these industries in order to paint a more complete picture of the interplay between 
endogenous entry timing and firm success.  
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In a similar vein, our study does not explain whether and how entry or 
incumbency shapes technological discontinuity in the German farm tractor market. 
Recent research by Sood and Tellis (2011) shows that technological disruptions are 
mainly introduced by incumbents. However, even incumbents may possess the right 
capabilities to introduce a technological discontinuity as well as the ability to deploy 
it. 
Another limitation, generally valid in industry evolution studies, refers to the 
demand side (Adner, 2002). The question how the new submarket gained dominance 
among the small scale farmers in southern Germany remains undisclosed because of 
insufficient data. Future research may therefore focus on both the supply and demand 
side of industry evolution, beyond anecdotal evidence. 
When looking at the increasing product heterogeneity in contemporary 
markets, we would suspect that early entry is no guarantee in general for success any 
more (if it ever was). In this respect, from the example of the historical tractor 
industry, lessons can be drawn both for practitioners and for researchers. For 
practitioners, our study suggests the importance of entry timing as an object of 
strategic management. Changing markets may provide opportunities to new entrants 
well after the first wave of entry into this market. Postponing entry may not simply 
come at a cost of foregoing experiential learning but may also have a positive option 
value. Strategic decision making should then try to balance the costs and benefits of 
waiting.  
For researchers, our study holds the message that special attention needs to be 
paid to the existence and emergence of submarket structures within industries e.g. 
when investigating entry barriers and entry decisions. Further empirical 
investigations should pay increased attention to the interplay of entry timing 
decisions and pre-entry capabilities of market entrants along the life cycle, instead of 
treating them separately. It is the joint examination of changing market conditions 
and the endogenous entry timing decision that serves to capture the main 
determinants of individual firm survival and industry evolution. 
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4 Chapter: Innovation, personality traits and 
entrepreneurial failure  
4.1 Introduction 
 Regardless of the recent growing interest in investigating entrepreneurial 
failure (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2011; Rauch and Rijsdijk, 2012), empirical 
investigations on the subject are rare (Cardon et al., 2011). Failure causes financial 
loss, grief to the entrepreneur (Shepherd et al., 2009) and affects social welfare 
(McGrath, 1999). The reasons for entrepreneurial failure correspond either to 
external factors, in other words, entrepreneurs are “unlucky” (Hall, 1992, p. 239, see 
also Everett and Watson, 1998; Watson and Everett, 1999), or to individual aspects of 
the entrepreneur and his firm (Hall, 1992; Everett and Watson, 1998).  
 One important internal factor affecting failure is innovation (Berggren and 
Nachher, 2001; Rosenbusch et al., 2010). Innovative entrepreneurship usually 
displays a higher degree of uncertainty than non-innovative entrepreneurship 
(McGrath, 1999). Uncertainty in innovative entrepreneurship mainly stems from the 
entrepreneurial firms' liability of newness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Suchman, 
1995; Garonne and Davidsson, 2010; Semasinge et al., 2011). Despite the existence 
of a broad agreement on the positive relationship between innovation and 
entrepreneurial performance (see Rosenbusch et al., 2010), the effect of innovation 
on entrepreneurial failure is less well-established. However, answering the question 
whether innovation is a promising strategic choice for start-up entrepreneurs may 
help to avoid failure. 
Moreover, also referring to internal aspects, the personality traits of the 
entrepreneur may explain entrepreneurial failure (Shepherd and Wiklund, 2006). 
Nevertheless, although personality traits have been observed to have a direct effect 
on entrepreneurial performance measures (Ciavarella et al., 2004; Baron and 
Markman, 2005; Rauch and Frese, 2007a; Zhao et al. 2010), those effects are, at 
most, moderate (Rauch and Frese, 2007; Zhao et al., 2010). However, personality 
traits are proposed to moderate the successful implementation of innovations (Rank 
et al., 2004; Bledow et al., 2009) and thus may indirectly affect entrepreneurial 
failure. We use the Big Five personality traits consisting of conscientiousness, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness and neuroticism (Digman, 1990; Barrick and 
Mount, 1991; Costa and McCrae, 1995) to probe their moderating effect on the 
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relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure. Particularly, extraversion 
(Rank et al., 2004) and conscientiousness are attributed to have a positive influence 
on innovation implementation, while openness is inimical (Bledow et al., 2009). 
Consequently, the reason why innovation is volatile with respect to 
entrepreneurial performance or failure may be explained by the personality traits of 
the implementing entrepreneur. Thus, investigating the moderating effect of 
personality traits on the innovation failure relationship may help to draw some 
conclusions on the risky nature of innovations in entrepreneurship research.   
Our study contributes to the literature on the personality performance 
relationship in entrepreneurship (Rauch and Frese, 2007a; Zhao et al. 2010), in which 
moderating effects of personality on failure are an under-investigated phenomenon. 
Moreover, a striking shortcoming in studies that employ venture survival as a 
performance measure is neglecting reasons beyond failure that lead to ceasing 
entrepreneurial activities within a firm (Wennberg et al., 2010; Amaral et al., 2007; 
Headd, 2003). For instance, bankruptcy is not the only reason to depart from a 
business but also a successful sale.  
 Another contribution of the present study is the consideration of self selection 
bias into innovative entrepreneurship when measuring the effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure. Evidence on the effect of innovation on firm performance that 
takes self selection bias into account is scarce. We utilize sub-classification on the 
propensity score to control for entrepreneurial characteristics that determine self 
selection into innovative entrepreneurship. Therefore, our study design allows our 
results to be interpreted as causal, given the made assumptions hold true.   
 In conclusion, there is a lack of evidence regarding the effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, the moderating 
effect of personality on the innovation failure relationship has not yet been 
investigated in entrepreneurship research. We therefore attempt to shed some light on 
the questions: (1) “Which effect has innovation on entrepreneurial failure if observed 
endogeneity is considered?” (2) “Which Big-Five personality traits moderate the 
effect of innovation on entrepreneurial failure?” and follow Sarasvathys‟ (2004) call 
to link specific performance measures to the characteristics of specific subgroups of 
entrepreneurs.  
 To answer these questions, we identify entrepreneurial failure with the help of 
external bankruptcy information and self-reports, as entrepreneurial failure is not to 
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the same as entrepreneurial exit (Everett and Watson, 1998; Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2011). We use a dataset consisting of 423 entrepreneurs. Their innovativeness is 
assessed through self-reports on the question whether the business idea is based on 
an innovative product or process. We only investigate entrepreneurs that operate with 
their firms in industries in which companies on average spend more than 3.5% of 
their turnover on R&D (see Grupp and Legler, 2000).  
 We suggest that some of the Big Five personality traits may affect the 
entrepreneurial firms' liability of newness and the propensity to implement 
innovations properly. Innovative firms in general face a higher liability of newness. 
The firms' liability of newness is decisive in explaining entrepreneurial success and 
failure. Consequently, we propose that a firms' liability of newness may account for 
divergent effects of personality traits on failure with innovative compared to non-
innovative firms. Moreover, we test the effect of external cost and revenue shocks on 
entrepreneurial failure, which is empathically suggested by the literature (Hall, 1992; 
Everett and Watson, 1998; Watson and Everett, 1999; Carter and Van Auken, 2006). 
 In the following section we outline the term of entrepreneurial failure that is 
utilized. This is necessary in order to assess a clear-cut outcome variable within our 
analytical framework. In the Section 4.3, the relationship between external cost and 
revenue shocks on failure is discussed. In the Section 4.4 the effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure is treated. The Section 4.5 theoretically treats the relationship 
between innovation, the Big Five traits extraversion, conscientiousness and openness 
and entrepreneurial failure. In the Section 4.6, we present our dataset consisting of 
more than 400 start-up entrepreneurs from the German federal state of Thuringia. 
Subsequently, our estimation strategy, which is based on sub-classification on the 
propensity score and survival analysis, is disclosed. The Section 4.7 deals with the 
results of our analysis and in the Section 4.8 we discuss our findings. Our 
conclusions are then presented at the end.   
 
4.2 Definition of entrepreneurial failure  
 Focusing on entrepreneurial failure, we first have to discuss what we mean by 
that term. Many studies employ entrepreneurial exit as a proxy for failure. However, 
even businesses considered as financially successful sometimes cease (Gaskill and 
Van Auken, 1993; Gimeno et al., 1997; Headd, 2003; Bates; 2005) or see their 
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owners leave. For example, entrepreneurs may decide to withdraw if they have a 
preference for more leisure time (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), have problems 
with their health, or decide they have earned enough money. Additionally, Bates 
(2005) argues that entrepreneurial exit is also driven by higher opportunity costs for 
other activities or projects. Thus, entrepreneurial exit is apparently not a proper 
indicator for entrepreneurial failure. 
 Zacharakis et al (1999; see also Shepherd, 2003) consider only bankruptcy of 
an owner-manager‟s firm to be entrepreneurial failure. In this spirit, Kato and Honjo 
(2010) in their study on firm survival distinguish between bankruptcy, voluntary 
liquidation and merger. However, even among these exit categories a mixing up of 
failures may occur, with successful withdrawals within the respective non-
bankruptcy categories. More precisely, mergers might be driven by poor business 
expectations or a meagre performance of one of the merged firms (Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2011), and a voluntary firm liquidation must not necessarily be a 
successful one (Wennberg et al., 2010).  
 For all of these reasons, we instead stick with the definition by Gaskill and 
Van Auken (1993, p. 21). They see business failure as “…wanting or needing to sell 
or liquidate to avoid losses or to pay off creditors or general inability to make a 
profitable go of the business”. As entrepreneurs are the architects of their businesses 
(Sarasvathy, 2004), we assume that their personality affects failure (see Shepherd and 
Wiklund, 2006). In order to meet this definition and to consider only exits driven by 
a low economic performance of the owned firm, we exclude exits that are not forced 
by failure and recode them as “not failed”.  
 As mentioned above, entrepreneurial failure is caused by internal as well 
external factors. We hence discuss external cost and revenue shocks as a driver of 
failure in the next section. 
 
4.3 External shocks and entrepreneurial failure 
In their study on small business failure, Everett and Watson (1998) find that 
30-50% of small business failures are related to developments in the external 
environment. Cost and revenue shocks are especially attributed to business failure, 
while the individual entrepreneur has no impact on those effects. Failure because of 
cost and revenue shocks hinges on the internal fixed cost structure of firms. As fixed 
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costs are usually established on past developments, cost or revenue shocks may bring 
firms into financial trouble (Hall, 1992). Cost and revenue shocks originate either 
from developments within the firms‟ industry or the economy as a whole. However, 
industry cost or revenue shocks regularly have a higher impact on firm failure 
(Everett and Watson, 1998). We thus propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Industry related cost or revenue shocks contribute to entrepreneurial 
failure in highly innovative industries.    
  
Besides external factors, entrepreneurial failure is endogenously affected by 
entrepreneurial qualities. In the next section, the links between innovation, 
personality and entrepreneurial failure are illustrated. In a first step, the direct 
relationship between an innovation strategy and entrepreneurial failure is discussed. 
Subsequently, how the entrepreneurs‟ personality affects the tendency to fail is 
examined. And finally, the moderating effect of innovation on the personality failure 
relationship is described.   
 
4.4 Innovation and entrepreneurial failure  
 In the following, innovation refers to the introduction of a new product, 
service or process into a market by an entrepreneurial firm (see Utterback and 
Abernathy, 1975). Recent meta-analytical evidence suggests that small firm 
performance and innovativeness share a positive relationship, though this result is 
moderated by contextual variables (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). In general, innovations 
establish a monopoly for entrepreneurs and thus create substantial revenue potential 
(Schumpeter, 1911). Particularly entrepreneurs with young and small firms possess 
advantages in commercializing innovations, because their activities are hardly visible 
by established competitors (Carayannopoulos, 2009). Consequently, innovators build 
up advantages by forestalling competitors in acquiring rare assets as well as 
attracting a customer base (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Likewise, innovative 
firms gain competitive advantages over their competitors through competencies and 
resources that are hardly duplicable (Teece et al., 1997). Finally, innovations create 
unique organizational competencies and resources (Teece, 1996), which assure a 
competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993).    
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 On the other hand, entrepreneurs with innovative firms face a higher liability 
of newness
15
 (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Suchman, 1995; Shepherd et al., 2000; 
Garonne and Davidsson, 2010; Semasinge et al., 2011). This obstacle manifests in a 
lack of market awareness, uncertainty about the production process and in managing 
the new venture. Entrepreneurs who struggle to diminish their firms‟ liability of 
newness are more likely to fail. Diminishing a firms‟ liability of newness involves 
strategies like generating market awareness or substantial investments in marketing 
activities, raw materials, skilled staff, information, external consulting, organization 
building and generating deliverable products. Hence, acquiring the necessary 
resources is imperative to avoid failure for innovative entrepreneurs (Shepherd et al., 
2000).  
 We nevertheless infer that the likelihood of entrepreneurial failure is 
decreased if entrepreneurs start up with innovative firms. The results of the meta-
analysis of Rosenbusch et al. (2011) imply that innovation is on average positively 
related with firm performance and hence decreases the likelihood to fail. They find 
that altogether innovation increases the performance of small and medium firms and 
argue that advantages such as establishing a monopoly or entry barriers outbalance 
drawbacks like uncertainty. Therefore we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Innovation decreases the likelihood of entrepreneurial failure. 
 
 The next section deals with the relationship of personality and entrepreneurial 
failure. 
 
4.5 The Big Five personality traits, innovation and 
entrepreneurial failure 
4.5.1 The Big Five personality traits and entrepreneurial failure 
The link between personality traits and entrepreneurial performance 
dimensions is well documented (Rauch and Frese, 2007a; Zhao et al., 2010). We 
draw upon the Big Five traits in order to measure personality. The Big Five 
comprises five broad personality factors, namely extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness (Digman, 1990; Barrick and Mount, 
                                                 
15
 The concept of liability of newness was originally introduced by Stinchcombe (1965). 
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1991; Costa and McCrae, 1995). The Big Five personality factors are widely 
accepted in order to grasp the personality traits of an individual (Digman, 1990; 
Barrick and Mount, 1991; Barrick et al., 2003) Moreover, the Big Five dimensions 
are independent of cognitive dispositions (McCrae and Costa, 1987), robust across 
different cultures (McCrae and Costa, 1997; John and Srivastava, 1999) and 
relatively stable over time
16
 (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Roberts and DelVecchio, 
2000; Hampson and Goldberg, 2006). Secondly, it is broadly suggested that the Big 
Five personality traits predict essential differences in observed actions and reactions 
(McCrae and Costa, 1999). Although the Big Five cannot predict a person‟s actions 
in a particular situation, they are quite reliable in marking behavioural trends across 
different situations and over time (McAdams and Pals, 2006). Meta-analytical 
evidence by Zhao et al. (2010) points out that the Big Five traits openness, 
conscientiousness and extraversion positively relate with entrepreneurial 
performance. Contrarily, neuroticism is detrimental to entrepreneurial performance 
and agreeableness has no effect.  
Studies that investigate the relationship between the Big Five and venture 
survival are given by Ciavarella et al. (2004) and Baron and Markman (2005). The 
results of the first refer to apparently non-innovative industries, whereas the last 
investigate entrepreneurs in innovative industries from a single technological 
domain. In both studies it is neither distinguished between different types of 
entrepreneurial exits nor between innovative and non-innovative entrepreneurs. 
Conscientiousness contributed to venture survival in both studies. The trait openness 
decreased survival prospects in Ciavarella et al. (2004) but not in Baron and 
Markman (2005). The other traits are not correlated to survival or, in case of 
agreeableness and neuroticism, not investigated by Baron and Markman (2005).  
Rauch and Frese (2007a; 2007b) argue that broad personality traits have, at 
most, a moderate effect on entrepreneurial performance measures. Consequently, we 
expect only modest direct effects of the Big Five personality traits on entrepreneurial 
failure. It is also suggested that personality rather indirectly affects entrepreneurial 
performance measures (Jong et al., 2011), for instance through moderation effects 
(Rauch and Frese, 2007a; 2007b). Hence, we propose that personality can moderate 
                                                 
16
 Empirical evidence suggests that the Big Five are at least partly genetically determined (Jang et al., 
1997). Hampson and Goldberg (2006) find a significant stability over forty years for all traits 
excepting neuroticism. 
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the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure. In this vein, the Big 
Five traits extraversion, openness and conscientiousness are mentioned in affecting 
the effectual implementation of innovations (Rank et al., 2004; Bledow et al., 2009). 
We therefore discuss the moderating effect of those traits on the innovation 
entrepreneurial failure relationship in the next section. 
  
4.5.2 The moderating effect of personality on the innovative 
entrepreneurship failure relationship 
 Innovative entrepreneurship is characterized by lacking information on 
customer behaviour, uncertainty regarding production processes or not assessable 
competition (Koellinger, 2008). Compared to imitative entrepreneurs, innovative 
entrepreneurs face different organizational settings (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 
2009), tasks (Shepherd et al., 2000, Alvarez and Barney, 2005), and relationship 
requirements (de Jong et al., 2010). As implementing innovations properly requires 
certain behaviours and personality traits predict behaviour, the personality of people 
is linked with innovative behaviour and the effectual implementation of innovations 
(Miron et al., 2004; Bledow et al., 2009). On the other hand, as Bledow et al. (2009, 
p. 316) put it, “Individuals need to invest high regulatory effort to meet demands of 
innovation that are inconsistent with their disposition.” This means that people with 
particular personality characteristics need to invest effort in changing their 
personality congruent behaviours in order to effectively implement innovations. 
Negative emotions in case of trait incongruent behaviour may explain this 
phenomenon (Moskowitz and Cote, 1995). Consequently, entrepreneurs who are 
disposed with a personality profile congruent with effectual innovation 
implementation are more likely to succeed. As a poor innovation implementation 
leads to entrepreneurial failure, we propose a moderating effect of personality on the 
relationship between innovative entrepreneurship and failure. 
 However, we do not expect a moderating effect of all of the Big Five 
personality traits. As entrepreneurial failure with an innovative business idea is 
mainly an innovation implementation but not a creation problem, the traits 
extraversion (Patterson, 2002; Rank et al., 2004) as well as openness and 
conscientiousness (Bledow et al., 2009) are proposed to be linked with the 
implementation process of innovations. Correspondingly, we derive hypotheses on 
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the moderating effect of extraversion, openness as well as conscientiousness on the 
relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure.  
 Extraversion. Extraversion is defined as “…an energetic approach toward the 
social and material world and includes traits such as sociability, activity, 
assertiveness, and positive emotionality” (John and Srivastava 1999). People high in 
extraversion are gregarious, assertive and outgoing (Zhao et al., 2010). Extraverted 
entrepreneurs thus have advantages in establishing and maintaining social networks 
with customers, financiers or other institutions (Ciavarella et al., 2004, Zhao and 
Seibert, 2006, Shane et al., 2010). Institutional linkages reduce the liability of 
newness of organizations (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Likewise, extraverts have a 
tendency to develop plots, emblems and connotations, which decrease the liability of 
newness of their entrepreneurial firms (Patel and Thatcher, 2012). The social abilities 
of extraverts also promote the sourcing of financial and other resources, which is 
particularly important in exploiting innovations and avoiding failure (Choi and 
Shepherd, 2004).  
In addition, the successful implementation of innovations requires a high 
degree of personal initiative (Rank et al., 2004, Miron et al., 2004). From the Big 
Five personality traits, extraversion is most strongly linked with personal initiative 
(Fay and Frese, 2001). Personal initiative enhances idea communication of the 
innovation (Frese, 2000). Moreover, initiative is linked with acquiring information, 
avoiding negative outcomes and sustaining despite obstacles (Frese et al., 1996), 
which is conductive for implementing innovations successfully (Baer and Frese, 
2003).  
 In conclusion, beyond the positive aspects, innovation leads to liabilities of 
newness, which may increase the likelihood of failure. As extraversion is linked with 
behaviours that decrease liabilities of newness particularly related with market 
awareness and uncertainty in production as well as management, this trait assures a 
more effectual implementation of innovations. Thus, we suggest that extraversion 
moderates the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure. More 
precisely, extraversion strengthens the negative effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure. And thus we propose the following hypothesis:  
  
Hypothesis 3: Extraversion moderates the negative effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure such that the relationship is stronger for higher levels of 
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extraversion and weaker for lower levels of extraversion. 
 
 Openness. A person‟s openness covers “…the breadth, depth, originality, and 
complexity of an individual‟s mental and experiential life” (John and Srivastava 
1999). This trait relates positively with opportunity recognition (Ciavarella et al., 
2004; Zhao et al., 2010), which is in general a prerequisite of successful 
entrepreneurship (Baum et al., 2001). 
 On the other hand, entrepreneurs high in openness have difficulties 
concentrating on a single area and being focussed due to their preference for variety 
(Ciavarella et al., 2004, Baron and Markman, 2005). Open people also render a 
preference for non-conformity (McCrea, 1994). Hence, openness entails 
characteristics that work detrimentally against the thorough implementation of 
innovations (Bledow et al., 2009).  
For instance, firstly, innovation performance requires conformity in order to 
provide a high product quality (Miron et al., 2004). Secondly, entrepreneurs need to 
focus on the generation of profits and cash flows, which is crucial especially for 
innovative small businesses. In more detail, innovative small businesses struggle 
more in generating external funding than non-innovative and thus frequently have a 
finance gap (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Thirdly, the preference of open entrepreneurs 
for new experiences, novel ideas and progressive action (Zhao and Seibert, 2006, 
Zhao et al., 2010) may increase the uncertainty in the production process and 
management of an innovative start-up. And finally, concentrating solely on the novel 
aspects of opportunities distracts entrepreneurs from the operability and economic 
capacity of innovations (Baron and Ensley, 2006).  
All these aspects lead to higher uncertainty in managing a venture and in the 
production process when an innovation is implemented by a start-up. 
Correspondingly, the liability of newness through innovations is amplified by 
openness. Hence, openness weakens the negative effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure. Consequently, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Openness moderates the negative effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure such that the relationship is weaker for higher levels of 
openness and stronger for lower levels of openness. 
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 Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is “…a socially prescribed impulse 
control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior, such as thinking before 
acting, delaying gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, 
and prioritizing tasks.” (John and Srivastava, 1999). Conscientious entrepreneurs are 
achievement motivated, persistent, thorough and diligent (Ciavarella et al., 2004; 
Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Zhao et al., 2010). These qualities are especially important 
when it comes to the implementation of innovative business ideas (Amabile, 1983), 
because they may help to decrease liabilities of newness in the production process 
and in managing innovative start ups. Innovative product success furthermore 
strongly relies on product quality (Cooper, 1979). An important work performance 
facet of conscientiousness is to be quality driven (Robertson et al., 2000). Thus, 
again, conscientiousness seems to be a trait which is predestined in decreasing a 
start-ups‟ liabilities of newness regarding the production process when it comes to 
innovation implementation.  
As decreasing liabilities of newness helps the hampering detrimental effects 
of innovation, conscientiousness is supposed to be an imperative for successful 
innovation implementation (Bledow et al., 2009). In turn, conscientiousness may 
strengthen the negative effect of innovation on entrepreneurial failure. Hence, we 
propose:   
  
Hypothesis 5: Conscientiousness moderates the effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure such that the relationship is stronger for higher levels of 
conscientiousness and weaker for lower levels of conscientiousness. 
 
 In the next section, the data and our estimation strategy for testing the above 
hypotheses is introduced. 
 
4.6 Data and empirical methods 
4.6.1 Sample and data selection 
 The data for this study stems from the Thuringian Founder Study, which is a 
project on the success and failure of solo or team entrepreneurs in the East German 
Federal State of Thuringia. The focus in this study was on innovative industries; 
“advanced technology” and “technology-oriented services” companies according to 
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the Centre for European Research (ZEW) classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000). 
All entrepreneurs in our dataset operate in industries in which on average more than 
3.5% of the turnover is spent for R&D. The study draws from a population of 4,215 
founders who registered a new entry in the commercial registry in Thuringia between 
1994 and 2006. This was the basis of a random sample of 2,606 start ups. From this 
random sample, 639 face-to-face interviews were realized (response rate 25%) 
between January and August 2008. The data contains more than 200 socio-economic 
and psychological variables of the founders and their (team) ventures, like age, 
education, vocational experience, gender, industry classification of the firm, their Big 
Five personality scale etc. If there was a team founding, the lead founder was 
interviewed. 
 Altogether, we dropped 223 observations because of missing values
17
. The 
remaining sample size then comprised 416 observations, of which 95 (co-)founders 
had ceased their entrepreneurial activity by 2008. In our study, we consider 
entrepreneurial exit following DeTienne (2010) as “…the process by which the 
founders of privately held firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby 
removing themselves…from the primary ownership and decision-making structure of 
the firm”.    
 
4.6.2 Dependent variable: Hazard rate of entrepreneurial failure 
 Considering our dataset, the most appropriate empirical method to investigate 
entrepreneurial failure is duration analysis. The time of entrepreneurial activity is the 
most precise indicator to measure entrepreneurial failure in our sample. We quantify 
the duration of entrepreneurial activity from the time when the observed entrepreneur 
started his business until he withdrew from managing his own firm. The duration is 
measured in years. Furthermore, entrepreneurial failure is present if the remaining 
firm can be classified as economically not successful. We estimate the hazard rate to 
test our hypotheses, which is the instantaneous probability of failing, given that an 
entrepreneur has maintained his activities until the current period. 
 Following our definition of failure above, we classify entrepreneurial failure 
                                                 
17
 37 observations were deleted due to a poor interview quality, 19 because of missing data and 70 
firms turned out to be no original start-ups (for instance, they were a new subsidiary of an existing 
firm). Moreover, 96 start-ups that were launched earlier than 1994 are not recognized. The intention 
behind this measure was to minimize the effects of German reunification. 
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due to Watson and Everett (1996). Accordingly, failure is at hand either if (1) the left 
firm was filed for bankruptcy, (2) the leaving entrepreneur wanted to prevent further 
losses or (3) the leaving entrepreneur did not “make a go” of the firm. With the help 
of Credit reform, which is the leading rating agency for firms in Germany, we find 46 
bankruptcies at the time of exit among the 95 exits in our sample. The remaining 49 
firms kept their dates of payment at the time of entrepreneurial exit. Nevertheless, as 
even underperforming firms remain in operation through personal financial 
investments of their owners (van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Shepherd et al., 2009), losses to 
creditors are not sufficient to display failure. Thus, exited entrepreneurs in our sample 
were additionally asked why they left their firms. Multiple answers were possible. 
Exit due to prevent further losses was measured with “I lost too much money” 
(1=Yes or 0=No, 23 cases) and exit because there was an inability to “make a go” of 
the business was measured with "The firm did not develop like I expected it" (1=Yes 
or 0=No, 41 cases). An overview of the interrelations of our indices is given in Table 
4.1. Altogether, 72 out of 95 exits are classified as failures as they were either due to 
bankruptcy, prevent further losses or an inability to “make a go” of the venture. In 
other words, in case that one of the three mentioned failure indicators was fulfilled, 
we classified the exit as a failure (see Watson and Everett 1996). The remaining 23 
entrepreneurs that resign from apparently economic healthy ventures are coded as 
censored.  
 
1. 2. 3. 1., 2. or 3.
1. Bankruptcy/losses of creditors 46
2. "I lost too much money" 12 23
3. "The firm did not develop like I expected it" 19 13 41 73  
 
Table 4.1: Indicators of entrepreneurial failure and their interrelations 
 
4.6.3 Explanatory variables: External cost and revenue shocks, 
innovativeness and the Big Five personality traits 
External cost or revenue shocks may be proxied by changes of the average 
profit margin in the respective industry. We approximate this measure with the 
growth rate of the ratio of gross operating surplus to production value at the NACE-
2-digit level, which is both provided by the Statistical Office Germany. This measure 
is used in a time-varying fashion (IND_PRO_GRO). 
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We measure innovativeness with the help of the item “Compared to your 
competitors, your business idea is based on a product or service that is new, 
qualitatively better, has a higher value or could be faster or cheaper produced” 
(INNO, 1=YES, 0=NO).  
The Big Five personality traits are quantified with 45 items (Ostendorf, 
1990). Each of the Big Five personality factors is measured by nine German bipolar 
adjective pairs on a six-point Likert scale (0–5). For all of the Big Five personality 
traits, a score closer to five represented a higher value in the concerning trait. 
According to the definitions above, we include variables of conscientiousness 
(alpha=.82), extraversion (alpha=.72), agreeableness (alpha=.73), openness 
(alpha=.57) and neuroticism (alpha=.78). A principal component factor analysis with 
promax rotation indicates that the items for the respective Big Five factor which we 
utilize actually form five independent personality factors in our sample (see Table 
B.1 Appendix B). 
 
4.6.4 Estimation strategy 
 We apply the Cox approach (Cox, 1972) to estimate respective (semi-
)parametric hazard rate models. Nonetheless, innovative entrepreneurship is hardly a 
random event, which is independent of the qualities of the entrepreneur and his firm 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Baron and Tang, 2011). 
Hence, the risk of sample selection bias (confounding) is given if non-innovative 
entrepreneurs have other characteristics than innovative entrepreneurs (see Dehejia 
and Wahba; 2002).  
 Methods based on the propensity score, which is the conditional probability 
to assign a treatment given a vector of observables, are useful to overcome sample 
selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In our case, stratification on subclasses 
of the entrepreneurs‟ propensity score to innovate correct for sample selection bias in 
Cox regressions (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984; Stukel et al., 2007). In the frequently 
used propensity score matching approaches some of the observations are discarded. 
Thus, stratification on subclasses of the propensity score is more appealing 
concerning our data, due to the moderate number of failures at hand.   
 Stratification on subclasses balances the observations in our sample in a way 
that the distribution of the observed properties is equal for innovative and non-
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innovative entrepreneurs (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984; Steiner and Cook, in press). 
Cochran (1968) shows that stratifying on 5 subclasses removes approximately 90% 
of sample selection bias. Given that all confounding factors are represented with the 
propensity score, stratification is correct for almost all confounding (Imbens, 2004). 
In order to fulfill our analysis, we process according to the following steps (see 
Stukel et al., 2007; Schafer and Kang, 2008; Steiner and Cook, in press).  
 First, we measure the propensity score to innovate by means of a logistic 
regression model. In line with Schafer and Kang (2008), we fit the propensity score 
model with variables that can affect both innovativeness and entrepreneurial failure. 
Therefore, in addition to the above introduced controls that are supposed to affect 
failure, we control for factors that are suggested to have an effect on innovativeness 
as well. Studies on determinants of innovation show that patents (Basberg, 1987), 
R&D (Rosenbusch et al., 2011) and human capital (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005) 
affect innovation. Thus, we control for R&D activities before the first business year 
(R&D, 1=YES, 0=NO), the number of years of studying (STUY) and the number of 
years in self-employment (YEARS_SELFEMP). In addition, it is controlled for age 
(AGE), former industry experience (IND_EXP; 1=YES, 0=NO), industry (NACE2; 
1=YES, 0=NO), whether the founded firm is an academic spin off (SPIN_OFF, 
1=YES, 0=NO) and start up before the year 2002 (2002, 1=YES, 0=NO). 
 Secondly, observations are allocated to one subclass of equal range analog to 
their propensity scores. With the purpose in mind to fulfill one precondition for 
balancing within subclasses, it is tested whether the average propensity score of 
innovative and non-innovative entrepreneurs differs. The starting point is one 
subclass. If the propensity score within a subclass is significantly different, this 
subclass is split in half and is tested once more for balance in the propensity score. 
This procedure is continued until the propensity score within each stratum is 
statistically equal. Then it is tested whether the mean of every characteristic within a 
subclass is equal for innovative and non-innovative entrepreneurs. A two sided t-test 
with a significance threshold of 0.01 is utilized for balance testing (see Becker and 
Ichino, 2002; Imbens, 2004).  
 In a third step, we estimate a stratified Cox regression (see Wei et al., 1989; 
Lunn and McNeil, 1995) according to the generated subclasses. All standard errors 
are computed with robust covariance matrix estimators (see Lin and Wei, 1989). 
Estimations are undertaken with Stata. We use Becker and Ichinos' (2002) Stata 
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application pscore to estimate propensity scores. In addition, the Stata package 
pbalchk by Lunt (2009) is utilized for balance checking.  
 
Mean Mean* Mean# SD SD* SD# Max Max* Max# Min Min* Min#
1. Conscientiousness 3.64 3.63 3.7 .592 .594 .579 4.89 4.89 4.78 0 0 2.33
2. Extraversion 3.2 3.2 3.16 .619 .623 .601 4.78 4.78 4.44 1.44 1.44 1.67
3. Agreableness 3.09 3.1 3.02 .574 .554 .664 5 5 4.44 .889 .889 1.22
4. Openness 3.18 3.17 3.24 .541 .542 .533 4.89 4.89 4.38 1.56 1.56 2.22
5. Neuroticism 1.36 1.37 1.34 .509 .498 .564 3.11 3.11 2.55 0 0 .222
6. AGE 39.7 39.4 41.3 9.49 9.52 9.3 67 63 67 18 18 25
7. STUY 4.6 4.56 4.78 2.76 2.64 3.26 14 13 14 0 0 0
8. YEARS_SELFEMP 2.47 2.13 4.07 4.34 4.06 5.24 34 34 26 0 0 0
9. R&D .447 .419 .583 .498 .494 .496 1 1 1 0 0 0
10. IND_EXP .822 .837 .75 .383 .37 .436 1 1 1 0 0 0
11. SIZE_TURN .392 .413 .292 .489 .493 .458 1 1 1 0 0 0
12. TEAM .68 .66 .778 .467 .474 .419 1 1 1 0 0 0
13. NACE2 .236 .221 .306 .425 .415 .464 1 1 1 0 0 0
14. SPIN_OFF .113 .116 .097 .317 .321 .298 1 1 1 0 0 0
15. 2002 .757 .727 .903 .429 .446 .298 1 1 1 0 0 0
16. INNO .808 .817 .764 .395 .387 .428 1 1 1 0 0 0
*indicates that observations not failed
#indicates that observations failed
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
1. Conscientiousness 1.00
2. Extraversion 0.18*** 1.00
3. Agreableness 0.11** 0.06 1.00
4. Openness 0.12** 0.28*** 0.03 1.00
5. Neuroticism -0.27*** -0.34*** -0.19*** -0.25*** 1.00
6. AGE 0.14*** 0.05 0.14*** -0.05 -0.02 1.00
7. STUY -0.03 -0.10** 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.25*** 1.00
8. YEARS_SELFEMP 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.16*** -0.15** 1.00
9. R&D -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.14*** 0.02 0.03 0.13** 0.09* 1.00
10. IND_EXP -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.00 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
11. SIZE_TURN 0.02 -0.00 -0.09* -0.10** -0.07 -0.02 -0.10** -0.00 -0.04 0.14*** 1.00
12. TEAM -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.11** 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.09* 1.00
13. NACE2 0.09* 0.05 0.07 -0.13** 0.01 0.16*** -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.15*** -0.04 1.00
14. SPIN_OFF -0.11 -0.06 0.09* 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.23*** -0.06 0.24*** -0.09* -0.13** 0.20*** -0.11** 1.00
15. 2002 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12** 0.02 -0.03 0.09* -0.12** -0.11** 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 1.00
16. INNO 0.05 0.10** -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.09* 0.27*** -0.12** 0.00 0.01 0.14*** 0.10** -0.15*** 1.00
17. FAIL 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.17*** 0.13** -0.09* -0.09* 0.10* 0.08 -0.02 0.16*** -0.05 1.00
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01
 
Table 4.3: Correlation coefficients
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4.7 Results 
 Table 4.2 shows summary statistics of our variables and Table 4.3 indicates 
the respective correlations
18
. The variable FAIL in our correlation table specifies all 
observations that failed in our sample. The estimation of the propensity score is 
depicted in Table 4.4.  Table 4.5 shows the quantiles and the number of innovative 
and non-innovative entrepreneurs within each quantile. The total number of 
subclasses after utilizing the above introduced allocation algorithm is 4 (detailed test 
statistics on the balance of the propensity scores and characteristics within subclasses 
are obtainable upon request). Balancing statistics of entrepreneurial characteristics 
based on standardized differences (Austin, 2009) before and after sub-classification 
are shown in Table 4.6. After sub-classification, all of the standardized differences 
are below 0.1 and thus balancing between innovative and non-innovative 
entrepreneurs after stratification is corroborated (see Normand et al., 2001).  
 We employed five models which are listed in Table 4.7. Models 1-2 are 
unstratified specifications, whereas the Models 3-4 are stratified according to the 
balanced subclasses. All classified “fails” are counted as events. In Models 1 and 3 
the main effect of innovation on failure is tested. Moreover, industry specific cost 
and revenue shocks are probed as well in the models 1 and 3. Models 2 and 4 are 
specified to test the moderating effect of extraversion, openness and 
conscientiousness on the relationship between innovation and failure.   
External cost and revenue shocks significantly )05.0( p  affect the likelihood 
to fail in Model 3, which is predicted by Hypothesis 1. Particularly, an increase of 
100% in the industries ratio of gross operating surplus to production value decreases 
the hazard rate to fail by a factor of exp(-1.652). Model 3 also indicates a 
significantly negative effect of innovativeness on entrepreneurial 
failure ),05.0( p which corroborates Hypothesis 2. According to the coefficient 
INNO, innovation decreases the likelihood to fail by a factor of exp(-0.717).  
 Regarding the moderating effect of personality, the Cox regression stratified 
on the balanced propensity score subclasses (Model 5) reveals that the hazard rate is 
significantly more negative for innovate entrepreneurs who are 
                                                 
18
 The summary statistics and correlation table does not include the variable IND_PRO_GRO as it 
changes every year in which the entrepreneur is operating. Thus such one-dimensional measures as 
correlation coefficients have no explanatory power.  
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extraverted ).05.0( p This result is in line with Hypothesis 3. The hazard rate is 
decreased by a factor of exp(-1.040) with a one unit level increase in extraversion, if 
entrepreneurs innovate. Additionally, for innovative entrepreneurs a one level unit 
increase in openness significantly increases the hazard rate of failure )05.0( p  by a 
factor of exp(1.259). Hence, Hypothesis 4 is supported. Finally, in contrast with 
Hypothesis 6, which suggests a negative interaction effect of innovation and 
conscientiousness, we find that the effect of innovation of entrepreneurial failure is 
positively affected by conscientiousness )1.0( p by a factor of exp(1.168). 
Consequently, Hypothesis 5 has to be rejected. 
 In order to check the robustness of our findings, we estimated standard errors 
on the base of 5000 bootstrap replications (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). The 
bootstrapped standard errors are slightly higher than the robust covariance 
estimations, which indicates that our p-values are relatively stable and not biased 
through outliers and sampling distribution assumptions. 
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Dep. Var.: Inno 1.
Conscientiousness 0.173
(0.229)
Extraversion 0.438*
(0.234)
Agreableness -0.366
(0.241)
Openness -0.0754
(0.275)
Neuroticism 0.0710
(0.287)
AGE 0.00413
(0.0150)
STUY 0.0621
(0.0550)
YEARS_SELFEMP 0.0558
(0.0343)
R&D 1.497***
(0.354)
IND_EXP -0.981**
(0.435)
SIZE_TURN 0.0863
(0.290)
TEAM -0.0897
(0.313)
NACE2 1.105***
(0.400)
SPIN_OFF 0.823
(0.595)
2002 -1.096***
(0.400)
Constant 1.162
(1.828)
N 416
Events 336
AIC 372.6
BIC 437.1
'*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01  
 
Table 4.4: Estimation of the propensity score 
 
 
INNO
Inferior of block of pscore 0 1 Total
0 11 8 19
.5 40 68 108
.75 20 87 107
.875 9 173 182
Total 80 336 416  
 
Table 4.5: Subclasses of the propensity score 
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before 
stratification
after 
stratification
mean 
(INNO=1)
mean
(INNO=0)
standardized 
difference
mean
(INNO=1)
mean 
(INNO=0)
standardized
difference
Conscientiousness 3.65 3.57 -0.137 3.65 3.64 -0.030
Extraversion 3.23 3.07 -0.253 3.23 3.19 -0.055
Agreableness 3.08 3.11 0.049 3.08 3.09 0.007
Openness 3.19 3.13 -0.113 3.19 3.16 -0.051
AGE 40.04 38.48 -0.163 40.04 40.06 0.002
STUY 4.67 4.29 -0.139 4.67 4.57 -0.035
YEARS_SELFEMP 2.65 1.71 -0.202 2.65 2.50 -0.032
R&D 0.51 0.17 -0.673 0.51 0.48 -0.064
IND_EXP 0.80 0.91 0.280 0.80 0.81 0.028
SIZE_TURN 0.39 0.01 -0.137 0.39 0.33 -0.022
TEAM 0.39 0.39 -0.011 0.39 0.39 -0.001
NUM_PAT 0.68 0.68 -0.014 0.68 0.67 -0.023
NACE2 0.26 0.11 -0.345 0.26 0.25 -0.034
NACE3 0.26 0.20 -0.134 0.26 0.25 -0.009
SPIN_OFF 0.13 0.05 -0.233 0.13 0.11 -0.049
2002 0.73 0.89 0.361 0.73 0.74 0.041  
 
Table 4.6: Standardized differences before and after stratification 
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non-stratified stratified
Dep. Var.: hazard rate 1. 2. 3. 4.
Conscientiousness 0.371 -0.534 0.333 -0.682
(0.241) (0.579) (0.233) (0.618)
Extraversion -0.302 0.720 -0.379* 0.489
(0.208) (0.444) (0.208) (0.458)
Agreableness -0.501** -0.508** -0.428* -0.444*
(0.237) (0.234) (0.227) (0.227)
Openness 0.328 -0.850* 0.301 -0.746
(0.245) (0.515) (0.239) (0.514)
Neuroticism -0.164 -0.171 -0.185 -0.192
(0.295) (0.300) (0.288) (0.294)
INNO -0.402 -4.721** -0.717** -5.509**
(0.305) (2.307) (0.351) (2.436)
IND_PRO_GRO -1.504** -1.471** -1.652** -1.679**
(0.737) (0.745) (0.696) (0.698)
Conscientiousness*
INNO 1.045* 1.168*
(0.628) (0.666)
Extraversion*INNO -1.229** -1.040**
(0.498) (0.505)
Openness*INNO 1.417** 1.259**
(0.570) (0.563)
YEARS_SELFEMP 0.101*** 0.0996*** 0.0886*** 0.0879***
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0214)
SIZE_TURN -0.677** -0.669** -0.604** -0.593**
(0.278) (0.283) (0.280) (0.284)
TEAM 0.754** 0.732** 0.773*** 0.758**
(0.297) (0.303) (0.297) (0.306)
NACE2 0.660** 0.638** 0.448 0.454
(0.279) (0.275) (0.284) (0.285)
N 416 416 416 416
Eventd 72 72 72 72
AIC 805.1 801.6 647.0 644.7
BIC 872.2 887.0 714.2 730.1
'*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01  
 
Table 4.7: Models 1-4. 
 
4.8 Discussion 
 In this paper we investigate external and internal factors which lead 
entrepreneurs to fail. In more detail, we test whether external cost and revenue 
shocks or innovation is related to entrepreneurial failure. In addition, the moderating 
effect of personality on the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial 
failure is probed.  
A rarely established finding is the negative (causal) relationship between 
innovation and failure. And, as expected, cost and revenue shocks are related with 
entrepreneurial failure. We find that the effect of innovation on entrepreneurial 
failure is stronger for entrepreneurs higher in extraversion. Inversely, the effect of 
innovation on failure is weaker for entrepreneurs higher in openness. An interesting 
though unexpected result concerns the positive interaction effect between innovation 
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and conscientiousness on entrepreneurial failure. In other words, conscientiousness 
weakens the negative effect of innovation on entrepreneurial failure. 
A not very surprising finding concerns the effect of external cost and revenue 
shocks on the propensity of entrepreneurs to fail. One explanation for this finding 
may be the fact that entrepreneurs struggle in adjusting their firms to the new 
circumstances regarding their fixed cost structure. Moreover, entrepreneurs may try 
to encounter an external cost or revenue shock by using a debt financed growth 
strategy, which is shown to increase the likelihood to fail (see Moulton et al., 1996). 
This study provides evidence that external factors markedly contribute to 
entrepreneurial failure.   
The negative relationship between innovation and failure was predicted by 
our hypothesis. Accordingly, advantages of innovations, like creating monopolies, 
first mover advantages and low visibility outweigh liabilities of newness and the 
struggles of innovation implementation. The present work provides evidence that 
innovation contributes to entrepreneurial firm performance (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). 
As studies on innovation and performance that acknowledge self selection bias are 
scarce, our findings add insights regarding the causal effect of innovation on small 
firm performance in innovative environments.  
 Zhao et al. (2010) find that entrepreneurial performance is linked strongest 
with openness. Though, some studies show a negative effect of openness on 
entrepreneurial survival (Ciavarella et al., 2004) or no effect (Baron and Markman, 
2005). The result that openness weakens the negative effect of innovation on failure 
may elucidate this contradiction. Interestingly, openness is suggested to enhance 
entrepreneurial performance in innovative environments (Zhao et al., 2010; de Jong 
et al, 2011). Nevertheless, this suggestion maybe rather refers to the generation of 
innovative products or processes (Bledow et al., 2009). Correspondingly, given that 
entrepreneurs innovate, the preference for variety of open entrepreneurs is “too much 
of a good” and lead to liabilities of newness which are not sustainable at the end 
(Ciavarella et al., 2004). Although, we find no significant relationship between 
innovation and openness in our sample, more open entrepreneurs might innovate 
comparably more radically (Fehr, 2009). However, we do not control for the 
radicalness of innovative activities in this study. 
 The negative relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure is 
stronger for extraverted entrepreneurs. Therefore, even if extraversion is only weakly 
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related to entrepreneurial performance (Zhao et al., 2010) and entrepreneurial 
survival (Ciavarella et al., 2004, Baron and Markman, 2005), it moderates the effect 
of innovativeness on failure. The moderating effect of extraversion on the innovation 
failure relationship underlines the importance of networking and establishment of 
financial sources in order to decrease an innovative firms' liability of newness. 
Likewise, this result corresponds with the suggestion that personal initiative is a 
crucial ingredient when it comes to the successful implementation of innovations and 
failure avoidance.  
In contrast to our hypothesis, we find that conscientiousness weakens the 
negative effect of innovation on entrepreneurial failure. The literature broadly 
attributes a positive relationship between conscientiousness and job performance 
(Barrick and Mount, 1991; Salgado, 1997; Hurtz and Donovan, 2000; Barrick et al., 
2001). However, those unidirectional results have to be considered with caution. 
Some facets of conscientiousness definitely have negative effects on job performance 
(Tett, 1998; Tett et al., 1999). Particularly, innovative entrepreneurs have to solve 
creative problems (Amabile, 1997a). Even in successfully implementing innovations, 
entrepreneurs need to think differently (Im and Workman, 2004; Zhou, 2008). The 
facet of conscientiousness dependability, which is a tendency to obey social rules and 
norms, is obstructive for job performance in creative jobs and hinders “thinking 
outside the box” (Tett, 1998, p. 26). Moreover, orderliness, deliberateness and 
methodological are other facets of conscientiousness which counteract adaptiveness 
(LePine et al., 2000). Nevertheless, successful innovation hinges on adaptability to 
the external environment (Hurley and Hult, 1998) and entrepreneurs need to adjust to 
unexpected customer reactions when it comes to innovation implementation (see Im 
and Workman, 2004). In other words, entrepreneurs need to adapt their firms 
internally and externally to overcome a high liability of newness, otherwise they may 
fail (Choi and Shepherd, 2005). Therefore, our work contributes to evidence that 
conscientiousness is not always a predictor of job performance, especially if the job 
outcome is uncertain or a creative artifact (Tett, 1998; Feist, 1998; George and Zhou, 
2001; Tett and Burnett, 2003) 
 There are limitations regarding our study. First of all, our measure of 
innovativeness is based on self-reports. Despite there exists no objective measure for 
innovation, future research ought to draw on external expert judgements to validate 
self-assessments of entrepreneurs. We furthermore used no scale for the degree of 
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innovativeness, which may lead to incorrect conclusions. For instance, more radical 
innovations may be more risky and thus lead to a higher likelihood of failure 
compared to less radical innovations. Future research ought to consider both 
concerns. 
Secondly, our measure of cost and revenue shocks is relatively broad at the 
nace-2-digit level. Industries and markets are quite specific, even though they are 
technologically related and thus a more fine grained view on cost and revenue shocks 
might be helpful. Likewise, the question of how cost and revenue shocks lead to 
failure (i.e. a certain fix cost structure, wrong strategy to deal with the external 
shocks etc.) could not be addressed by this study.  
Third, our measure of personality was compiled ex post. Thus, instead of only 
affecting the result of entrepreneurial failure, the Big Five traits might marginally be 
influenced by this experience (Vaidya et al., 2002). Likewise, meta-analytical 
evidence shows that especially in young adulthood (20-40 years) moderate mean 
level changes in personality occur (Roberts et. al., 2006). Nonetheless, at the time of 
launching their firm the mean age of the failed entrepreneurs in our sample was over 
40 (39 for the not failed), which exceeds young adulthood and therefore personality 
mean level changes are a negligible problem. 
 Finally, our economic success measure is in part based on self-reports. More 
precise data on economic firm success might improve the accuracy of our results. A 
replication of this study with more precise financial firm data at a panel basis can 
solve this problem. The third difficulty concerns our indicator of innovativeness, 
which is based on self-reports too. Likewise, a more precise approach to gauge 
innovativeness, like measuring the radicalness of innovation might be illuminating.  
  Despite these limitations, our findings offer several contributions. The 
research design allows for causal interpretation of our results, given the observed 
confounders, as almost all sample selection bias concerning innovative 
entrepreneurship is removed (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Thus, setting up a 
new venture based on an innovative product or process is a promising strategic 
choice. We also provide robust evidence that the effect of innovation on 
entrepreneurial failure is moderated by personality. At present, relatively little 
evidence exists on this relationship. In line with meta-analytical evidence (Rauch and 
Frese, 2007a; Zhao et al., 2010), this outcome implies that the personality of 
entrepreneurs is linked indirectly to the performance of their (innovative) firms. 
96 
Furthermore, our study considers apparently “successful” exits and thus grasps failed 
entrepreneurs.  
 Practical implications of our results mainly refer to strategic considerations 
and consulting opportunities. From a strategic point of view, founding a business 
based on an innovation is more promising than an imitative start-up in innovative 
industries. This suggestion may also inform decisions of financiers, suppliers, 
customers, investors or employees of new ventures in innovative environments. 
When it comes to start-up consulting, advisors can also make founders aware of the 
fact that innovative firms are less likely to fail in innovative industries. And, 
accordingly, motivate their clients to base their business ideas on an innovation.  
 The significant effect of external cost and revenue shocks points to entry 
strategies which acknowledge the volatility of industries in order to avoid 
entrepreneurial failure. However, industry uncertainties are hard to predict, especially 
if technological discontinuities play a role (see Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
 Viewing on implications of the moderating effect of personality on the 
innovation failure relationship, cognitive learning and business services can help to 
decrease the hazard of entrepreneurial failure. Social skills are trainable (Baron and 
Tang, 2009). Hence, less extraverted entrepreneurs leading innovative firms may 
gain social skills through training in order to outbalance their disadvantages in 
establishing social networks with stakeholders. In turn, they may decrease their 
innovative firms' liability of newness. Akin to this proposition, innovative 
entrepreneurs may draw back on external consultants, business angels, venture 
capitalists or other partners like established firms to decrease their firms‟ liability of 
newness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Shepherd et al., 2000).  
 On the other hand, open entrepreneurs may draw back on experienced 
business consultants, who are able to figure out whether a business idea is realistic or 
not. Another implication for quite open entrepreneurs is that they back up their risky 
business ideas with enough financial resources (Ciavarella et al., 2004). Yet these 
suggestions should be taken cautiously, as the economy as a whole needs visionary 
entrepreneurship, although it may lead to failure from time to time.  
 Conscientious entrepreneurs may struggle to creatively adapting obstacles 
when it comes to implementing innovations, like reorganizing the firm or adjusting 
uncertain customer requirements. Again, external help, like consulting or the 
involvement of customers in innovation implementation may provide a remedy 
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against failure. In addition, creativity enhancing techniques like an open 
communication or an offensive attitude towards the future may help to assure 
creativity for implementing innovations (Amabile et al., 1996; Amabile, 1997b). 
Concerning the moderating effect of personality in general, regulatory effort through 
a proactive working attitude may enable entrepreneurs to implement innovations 
successfully even if dispositions work against that goal (Bledow et al., 2009). 
 Implications for future research concern the investigation of specific sub-
dimensions of openness, extraversion and conscientiousness that have a moderating 
effect on the innovation entrepreneurial failure relationship. As Rauch and Frese 
(2007b) point out, narrow traits might explain more variance. Also, investigating 
other moderators that affect the personality performance relationship in 
entrepreneurship research are helpful, like environmental dynamism or competition. 
 In conclusion, we add insights to the literature of innovation and 
entrepreneurial failure. We point out that personality has at least an indirect impact 
on this entrepreneurial outcome.  
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5 Chapter: For whom the bell tolls – personality and 
various motives of entrepreneurial exit19 
5.1 Introduction 
Many studies of entrepreneurship address the characteristics of entrepreneurs 
and their effect on entrepreneurial success or failure. A popular proxy for failure is 
entrepreneurial exit (Brüderl et al., 1992). In most of the studies of exits, no 
distinction is made between exit reasons (Davidsson, 2008; Watson, 2010), failure 
and successful closure (see Headd, 2003). Moreover, research into various exit 
reasons recognizes the economic factors that determine exit decisions (see Wennberg 
et al., 2010). However, as Gimeno et al. (1997) claims, entrepreneurs rely at least 
partially on psychic benefits when it comes to exit decisions, and even non-economic 
forces may lead to exits. These non economic factors, like relationships and 
emotional health, are useful to investigate (Cardon et al., 2005; DeTienne and 
Cardon, 2010), because entrepreneurial exit has a strong impact on the entrepreneur, 
the firm, industry dynamics and the whole economy through reallocation of 
resources (DeTienne, 2010). In general, entrepreneurial exit is widely understudied 
(DeTienne and Cardon, 2010). 
Entrepreneurs with specific qualities design their firms and their 
surroundings, which may impact on their propensity for certain outcomes 
(Sarasvathy, 2004). But what are these factors? One very promising avenue of 
research in explaining entrepreneurial exit is an entrepreneur‟s personality. In order 
to investigate this I will use the „Big Five‟ personality traits (Digman, 1990; Barrick 
and Mount, 1991; Barrick et al., 2003). To the best of my knowledge only one study 
exists that investigates the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and 
entrepreneurial failure (Cantner et al., 2012), but no study links the Big Five to 
various exit motives.  
Therefore in this paper I raise the question: “Does the founder‟s personality 
relate differently to various exit reasons in highly innovative environments?” The 
dataset that I will utilize in order to answer this question consists of 425 
entrepreneurs of highly innovative start-ups located in the German Federal State of 
                                                 
19
 An earlier paper version of this chapter was granted with the „Bent Dalum PhD Award“ in the 
context of the 2012 DRUID Academy Conference in Cambridge, United Kingdom, for the most 
promising and innovative research project.  
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Thuringia. With the help of the data, it is possible to distinguish 4 different motives 
for quitting entrepreneurial activities. I employ multivariate Cox regressions (Wei et 
al., 1989) to trace possible links between the entrepreneur‟s Big Five personality 
traits of extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism and 4 different motives to quit, 
which are (1) overinvestment of financial resources, (2) friction in the founder team, 
(3) job dissatisfaction, and (4) other reasons.    
As the relationship between the above exit motives and their determinants 
have not been effectively investigated in the past, the present study sheds some light 
on several unanswered questions in entrepreneurship research. Firstly, 
entrepreneurial overinvestment in financial resources has been investigated 
theoretically (Shepherd et al., 2009) and in an experiment (Holland and Shepherd, in 
press), but not with the help of field data. The drivers of overinvestment of financial 
resources are important, as overinvestment represents a misallocation of financial 
resources. Secondly, job turnover because of job dissatisfaction is mainly 
investigated for non-entrepreneurs and is thus not well understood in the field of 
entrepreneurship. As job dissatisfaction is inimical to health (Faragher et al., 2005) 
and general well-being (Warr, 1999), it is helpful to shed some light on the reasons 
for entrepreneurial exists. Finally, research into the exit decisions of founder team 
members and entrepreneurial exit from team ventures has stressed the importance of 
demographic and human capital variables (Ucbasaran et al., 2003), but not the 
personalities of the lead founders. As the exit of the lead founder of a founder team 
may have an important impact on an entrepreneurial firm, an entrepreneurial exit 
caused by friction in the founder team is an important issue in entrepreneurship 
research.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the threshold 
model of performance of Gimeno et al. (1997). I will demonstrate that not only 
economic factors play a role in exit decisions but also that differing conditions that 
cause economic and psychological imbalances may lead to such exits. The potential 
driver of these differing constellations is the personality, as it is this that shapes the 
occupational choice functions of entrepreneurs. The personality system theory is 
introduced in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 deals with theoretical and empirical findings 
about the relationship between the personality and the above mentioned motives to 
quit. Also, the respective hypotheses are outlined. The analytical framework and the 
dataset for testing my hypotheses are introduced in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 treats the 
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results and a discussion on them takes place in Section 5.7.  
 
5.2 Are all exits the same? 
In general, I will follow the definition of entrepreneurial exit given by 
DeTienne (2010, p. 204) as “…the process by which the founders of privately held 
firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby removing themselves…from the 
primary ownership and decision-making structure of the firm.” Entrepreneurial exit 
decisions are mainly explained by utility maximization and entrepreneurial exit as a 
career choice. The model of Gimeno et al. (1997) refers to exit decision of firms 
through their decision makers. In line with DeTienne and Cardon (2010), I suppose 
that this model may explain entrepreneurial exit decisions as well. Akin to Gimeno et 
al. (1997), there are two expected utility functions: 
 
.43
21
)(XPI+)(XEI=U
)(XPI+)(XEI=U
EEE
AAA
        (1) 
 
AU represents the expected utility of alternative employment, like launching another 
firm or to be employed, while EU renders the expected utility of remaining in an 
entrepreneurial firm.  AEI  or EEI represent the expected economic incomes in a 
different job or in one‟s own firm respectively. API and EPI represent the 
entrepreneurs‟ psychic income, either in an alternative employment or through 
remaining in one‟s own firm. The vectors 321 ,, XXX and 4X  are individual factors 
affecting respective incomes, such as personality traits or human capital. If switching 
costs is neglected, a rational entrepreneur ought to exit his own firm if  
 
.AE U<U            (2) 
 
Thus, inserting (1) in (2) and reorganizing to EEI on the left hand side leads 
to 
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Equation (3) shows that entrepreneurial exits depend not only on ,EI E  but also on 
,EI A API and EPI  (Gimeno et al., 1997). Within this framework, a definition of 
failure that links exits solely to the economic income from business ventures is too 
narrow. Instead, “…failure is the termination of an initiative that has fallen short of 
its goals” (McGrath, 1999, p. 14). Hence, beyond economic incomes EEI  and 
AEI and psychological incomes EPI  and API  determine entrepreneurial exit 
decisions, so that investigating exit reasons from a mere financial perspective is 
inadequate. In other words, different constellations of AEA PI,EI,EI  and EPI  lead 
to exits and, thus, various exit reasons ought to be investigated in order to draw 
meaningful conclusions.  
For simplicity‟s sake, I will assume that AEI  and API are fixed expected 
values which only will be disclosed after exits. This statement makes sense in the 
light of Jovanovics‟ (1982) claim that entrepreneurs learn ex-post about their 
entrepreneurial abilities. It is also in line with Jovanovics‟ (1979) job matching 
theory, according to which imperfect information regarding new jobs is prevalent. 
Thus, the qualities of a new employment are only disclosed after an employment 
switch. I control for those opportunity costs during exit in the process of making 
estimations. I examine the relationships between the entrepreneurs‟ personalities and 
various exit reasons, which are not only constituted by economic or financial drivers.  
What are the other reasons that cause entrepreneurial goals to fall short? 
Ronstadt (1986) suggests that, from the perspective of an entrepreneur, there are 
three main reasons for an entrepreneurial exit, which may be financial, personal or 
firm-related. However, even this classification might be too general in order to 
establish a proper explanation for an exit. Thus, I investigate specific examples of 
exits that may be attributed to these three main reasons.  
 
5.2.1 Exit due to overinvestment of own financial resources 
With regard to financial reasons, van Witteloostuijn (1998; see also De Tienne 
et al., 2008; Holland and Shepherd, in press) claims that firms often remain in 
operation even when their performance is poor. One reason for this is the escalation 
of commitment behavior (Staw, 1981). This behavior suggests the avoidance of exit 
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from an adverse course of action, especially if the decision unit is responsible for the 
adverse development. Escalation of commitment behaviour is related to the 
personality of individuals (Wong et al., 2006). Correspondingly, entrepreneurs who 
are prone to escalation commitment behavior may stick with their weak performing 
firms until they realize distress sale or distress liquidation (Wennberg et al., 2010). 
As a consequence, one financial reason for an entrepreneurial exit is the 
overinvestment of one‟s own financial resources. In this respect, entrepreneurs who 
not engaged in a “flight from losses” according to van Witteloostuijn‟s (1998, p. 503) 
classification may have particular personality characteristics (Kuhnen et al., 2011).  
In the case of financial overinvestment, for certain entrepreneurs the psychic 
income EPI  in (3) obtained from their venture might be higher than for others, given 
the same economic performance (Shepherd et al., 2009), which is due to their 
personal (Holland and Shepherd, in press) or risk characteristics (Forlani and 
Mullins, 2000). Studies of entrepreneurial persistence despite poor venture 
performance stress the importance of environmental munificence, investment in 
personal efforts, alternative options, previous organizational success, perceived 
collective efficacy, extrinsic motivation (De Tienne et al., 2008) and personal values 
(Holland and Shepherd, in press). 
Nevertheless, relatively little evidence exists regarding the relationship 
between personality and exit because of financial over-investment in an 
underperforming firm. I test whether personality is related to exit due to over-
investment of financial resources. 
 
5.2.2 Exit due to job dissatisfaction 
Personal problems drive entrepreneurial exits. In this context, personal 
problems may be related to family problems (Justo and DeTienne, 2008; Egeln et al., 
2010) and stress because of the responsibility for other people or conflicts with other 
stakeholders. If expectations and realities in managing a firm diverge, the 
entrepreneur may experience personal dissatisfaction, which may result in exit 
(Cooper and Artz, 1995; Cardon et al., 2005). Nevertheless, whether entrepreneurs 
have higher or lower job satisfaction in certain situations of managing a firm may 
depend on their personality profiles (Bradley and Roberts, 2004). With respect to 
exits, entrepreneurial job dissatisfaction causes low psychic income EPI in (3), 
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which perhaps is simultaneously affected by low economic venture 
performance EEI . Therefore, I test how personality relates to entrepreneurial exit 
caused by job dissatisfaction.    
 
5.2.3 Exit due to friction in the founder team 
Besides motives concerning financial and personal issues, problems related to 
a firm‟s structure can cause entrepreneurial exit. If the decision making structure of a 
firm is determined by an entrepreneurial team, conflicts may arise due to 
disagreements among the founder management team members (see Amason and 
Sapienza, 1997) concerning strategical or operational questions, which in turn can 
lead to entrepreneurial exit (Chandler et al., 2005). Founder team conflicts can 
mainly be attributed to team heterogeneity with regard to human capital (Ucbasaran 
et al., 2003), race, age, prior industrial experience or team size (Hellerstadt et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, even team members‟ personalities can cause founder team 
conflicts (Bono et al., 2002; Jong et al., 2011). Because conflicts may result from 
both poor venture performance (Ensley et al., 2002; Jong et al., 2011) or 
discontentment, exit due to disagreements in the founder team are fostered by low 
psychic income EPI  and/or poor economic performance, represented by EEI in 
equation (3), due to poor coordination among the founder team members. I 
investigate whether personality relates to exit because of disagreement in the founder 
team, given that a founder team exists. 
The next section introduces the Big Five personality traits. I employ this 
measure in order to test whether personality affects various exit reasons differently.  
 
5.3 The Big Five personality traits 
A widely accepted measure of personality is known as the Big Five taxonomy 
(Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990; Barrick and Mount, 1991; Barrick et al., 2003). The 
Big Five are considered to be independent from an individual‟s self-concept (McCrae 
and Costa, 1987), valid across different cultures (McCrae and Costa, 1997; John and 
Srivastava, 1999), largely time invariant (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Roberts and 
DelVecchio, 2000; Hampson and Goldberg, 2006) and partly genetically determined 
(Jang et al., 1997). Moreover, the Big Five relate to occupational behaviour 
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(Robertson and Callinan, 1996) and job turnover decisions (Zimmerman, 2008). 
The Big Five are part of a dynamic personality system (McCrae and Costa, 
1996; 1999). Particularly, the Big Five result from basic tendencies which develop 
throughout childhood, mature in adulthood and shape an individual. The link 
between personality and biographical outcomes is given by characteristic 
adaptations. Characteristic adaptations are dynamic motivational, social-cognitive 
and developmental manifestations, like aims, intentions, personal aspirations, 
concepts, abilities, relationships or even self-concepts resulting from perpetual 
personality-environment interactions (McAdams and Pals, 2006). I apply the Big 
Five to explain the differences in the relationships between personality and various 
exit reasons, because they form characteristic adaptations which affect practical 
behavior (McAdams and Pals, 2006).  
The Big Five taxonomy consists of conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism. Extraversion is defined as “…an energetic 
approach toward the social and material world and includes traits such as sociability, 
activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality” (John and Srivastava, 1999, p. 
121). Likewise, extraverted people favor the company of other people and possess 
surgency. However, this does not mean that extraverts are necessarily liked by other 
people (McCrae and Costa, 1987). Next, neuroticism “…contrasts emotional stability 
and even-temperedness with negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, 
sad, and tense” (John and Srivastava, 1999, p. 121). One main feature of neuroticism 
is the propensity to act impulsively and exhibit negative affect (McCrae and Costa, 
1987). Agreeableness is said to be “…a prosocial and communal orientation towards 
others with antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, 
and modesty” (John and Srivastava, 1999, p. 121). In contrast, less agreeable people 
try to oppose and master others (McCrae and Costa, 1987). Conscientiousness is 
attributed to a “…socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-
directed behaviour, such as thinking before acting, delaying gratification, following 
norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks (John and 
Srivastava, 1999, p. 121). Conscientiousness induces task- and goal-orientations 
(Gellately, 1996). Finally, openness covers “…the breadth, depth, originality, and 
complexity of an individual‟s mental and experiential life” (John and Srivastava, 
1999, p. 121). Accordingly, open individuals have broad interests and are dreamy and 
artistic (McCrae and Costa, 1987). 
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5.4 Personality and various exit reasons 
5.4.1 Personality and exit due to overinvestment of one’s own 
financial resources 
Entrepreneurial exit can occur as a result of financial overinvestment if 
entrepreneurs take too much risk (Forlani and Mullins, 2000) or if they do not set 
themselves a limit of affordable loss (Dew et al., 2009). Likewise, risk aversion 
increases the likelihood of exit compared to continuing a poor performing business 
with further investments (Wennberg et al., 2010). This phenomenon refers to 
escalation commitment behaviour (van Witteloostuijn 1998).  
The Big Five trait of neuroticism decreases the risk-taking propensity of 
individuals (Nicholson et al., 2005; Daly et al., 2010) and increases precautionary 
avoidance (Lommen et al., 2010). Additionally, neurotic people often react to adverse 
outcomes with negative emotions. In turn, negative emotions inhibit the escalation of 
commitment behaviour (Wong et al., 2006). As a consequence, instead of investing 
more financial resources, highly neurotic entrepreneurs high are more likely to exit if 
their firm performs poorly. Moreover, neuroticism relates to lower ex-ante 
investments when uncertainties occur (Kuhnen et al., 2011). Therefore, I would 
suggest that neuroticism negatively relates to exits because of financial 
overinvestment, compared to other reasons for exit. In that case the following 
hypothesis applies: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to other exit reasons, the likelihood of exit due to 
overinvestment of one‟s own financial resources is decreased by neuroticism. 
 
5.4.2 Personality and exit due to job dissatisfaction 
Neuroticism decreases the ability of people to cope with stress (Lahey, 2009). 
Stress relates to job dissatisfaction (Sullivan and Bhagat, 1992). Accordingly, 
neuroticism relates to job dissatisfaction (Tokar and Subich, 1997; Judge et al., 
2002), which in turn results in job turnover (Zimmerman, 2008). Likewise, 
neuroticism negatively correlates with well-being (McCrae and Costa, 1991; Weiss et 
al., 2007; Steel et al., 2008) and promotes negative affect based on negative mood 
inductions (Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991). Neurotic entrepreneurs are thus more likely 
to leave their firms because of job dissatisfaction, which is triggered by stress in their 
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job. In a similar vein, neurotic entrepreneurs tend to be more moody in cases of 
breakdown, which leads to job dissatisfaction. Negative emotions, which are strongly 
correlated with neuroticism (Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991), may then even accelerate 
the decision to exit. Thus, neuroticism possibly increases the risk of exit due to job 
dissatisfaction, compared to other exit reasons. 
Extraversion relates to well-being (McCrae and Costa, 1991; Weiss et al., 
2007; Steel et al., 2008) and job satisfaction (Tokar and Subich, 1997; Judge et al., 
2002). Nevertheless, extraversion is also a strong predictor of positive emotions 
(Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991; Mount et al., 1998; Srivastava et al., 2008). Thus, 
positive emotionality is identified to be a strong moderator of the relationship 
between job dissatisfaction and job turnover (Judge, 1992). Hence, if extraverted 
entrepreneurs sense job dissatisfaction, they are more likely to leave their firm 
voluntarily due to their tendencies towards positive emotionality. In other words, in 
the case of job dissatisfaction, their expected psychic income from alternative 
employment is likely to be lower. Hence, compared to other exit reasons, both 
extraversion and neuroticism increase the likelihood of exit due to job dissatisfaction. 
In line with the argument above, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to other exit reasons, the likelihood of exit due to job 
dissatisfaction increases if entrepreneurs exhibit more (a) neuroticism and (b) 
extraversion.  
 
5.4.3 Personality and exit due to friction in the founder team 
Mount et al. (1998) claim that agreeableness and neuroticism are strong 
predictors of cooperation and teamwork performance. In particular, agreeableness 
decreases the tendency to have prejudices (see Ekehammar and Akrami, 2007) and 
reduces interpersonal counterproductive work behavior, like swearing at co-workers 
(Mount et al., 2006). Agreeableness relates to efficient team work (see Mount et al., 
1998; Barrick et al., 2001) and a team member‟s contentment with his team (Peeters 
et al., 2006). Conflicts in the founder team hence are less likely if team members are 
agreeable, as they will have less prejudices and do not revealing interpersonal 
counterproductive work behavior. Furthermore, agreeable entrepreneurs may obtain 
higher contentment from working in a founder team. Agreeableness therefore 
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decreases the likelihood of entrepreneurial exit due to friction in the founder team, 
compared with other exit reasons.  
Neuroticism is related to mood swings, susceptibility to stress and inefficient 
coping behaviour. Also, it decreases emotional intelligence (Zeidner et al., 2004), 
which is the capability to recognize ones‟ own and other people‟s feelings in order to 
process this information as behavioral guidance (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). In 
addition, neuroticism decreases efficient team work (see Mount et al., 1998; Barrick 
et al., 2001) and team members‟ contentment with their fellow team members 
(Peeters et al., 2006). Neurotic lead founders are more likely to cause friction in the 
founder team, as they are likely to be moody, less stress resistant and low in 
emotional intelligence (de Jong et al., 2011). As mentioned above, neuroticism 
relates to negative emotions in the case of negative mood inductions (Larsen and 
Ketelaar, 1991). Owing to interpersonal problems and emotional actions, the 
likelihood to exit due to friction in the founder team is suggested to be increased for 
neurotic entrepreneurs, in comparison with other exit reasons.  
Thus, agreeableness relates negatively, while neuroticism is positively 
associated with exit because of friction in the founder team, compared to other exit 
reasons. I will therefore suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to other exit reasons, the likelihood of exit due to friction 
in the founder team increases if entrepreneurs are (a) lower in agreeableness, and (b) 
higher in neuroticism.  
 
5.5 Data and empirical methods 
5.5.1 Sample and data selection 
In order to test Hypotheses 1-3, I utilize data from the Thuringian Founder 
Survey. This is an interdisciplinary project regarding the success and failure of team 
and soloentrepreneurs in the German Federal State of Thuringia. The Thuringian 
Founder Survey focuses on entrepreneurs operating in innovative industries which 
use what the Centre for European Research (ZEW) classifies as “advanced 
technology” and “technology-oriented services” (Grupp and Legler, 2000). The 
population of the survey consists of 4,215 founders who registered their firms with a 
commercial registry in Thuringia between 1994 and 2006. 639 face-to-face 
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interviews were accomplished between January and August 2008. All in all, 219 
cases were dropped because of missing observations, lack of interview quality, or not 
being original start-ups. The remaining sample size comprised 425 observations, 
from which 98 (co-) founders ceased their entrepreneurial activity until 2008. If there 
was a founding team, the intention was to interview the main founder. 
From these 98 discontinuances, four specific reasons for discontinuance were 
identified
20
, namely exit because of: (1) overinvestment of own financial resources 
(23 cases), (2) job dissatisfaction (13 cases), (3) friction in the founder team (29 
cases), and (4) other reasons (75 cases). Descriptive statistics concerning 
simultaneous occurring exist cases may be seen in Table 5.1.  
 
1. 2. 3. 4.
1. Overinvestment of own financial resources 23
2. Job dissatisfaction 5 13
3. Friction in the founder team 9 8 29
4. Other reasons 17 11 18 75  
 
Table 5.1: Overlapping exit reasons 
 
5.5.2 Dependent variable: hazard rate 
I employed multivariate (stratified) hazard rate regressions (Wei et al., 1989; 
Lin et al., 1992) to test for the differing effects of the entrepreneur‟s personality on 
the three reasons given above for exits, namely (1) overinvestment of personal 
resources, (2) job dissatisfaction, (3) problems with other founder team members in 
comparison to (4) other exit reasons. The hazard rate equalled the probability for 
instantaneous entrepreneurial exit, given that the entrepreneur had been active until 
time t. The advantages of hazard rate models include the ability to recognize the 
correct censoring and nonnegative values of spell-data, which is not possible with 
logit or linear regression. The hazard rate of observation i and type of failure k can 
henceforth be expressed as: 
 
.exp )x'(β(t)λ=h(t) ikk0k         (4) 
  
The failure-type specific baseline hazard function (t)λ0k  and the vector of 
                                                 
20
 Multiple answers were possible in the questionnaire. The items are introduced in section 5.3. 
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coefficients kβ  may vary across types of failures. I exploit this feature in order to 
investigate differing relationships between the Big Five traits extraversion, 
agreeableness and neuroticism and various exit reasons. As the ”…dependence 
structure for related failure times is unspecified…” (Lin, 1994, p. 2234), this 
framework permits dependence among failure times without biased estimators. In 
other words, the marginal distributions of the related failure times are estimated. I 
employ robust stratum-specific standard errors, following Wei et al. (1989).  
In line with Lunn and McNeill (1995), I split up the sample 4 times to assure 
4 different exit hazards for each entrepreneur. Moreover, from 425 entrepreneurs in 
my sample, only those 289 entrepreneurs who participated in team foundations are 
considered under the risk of exit due to friction in the founder team. After this 
procedure, there are 1564 observations and 140 exits. In order to test the differing 
relationships between various exit reasons and extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism, I included reason specific interaction terms (see Lunn and McNeill, 
1995), which allow testing whether or not a common effect exists. The main effects 
then account for the relationship between personality and other reasons for exit. 
However, a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients is difficult in this case, 
as the relationship between the respective baseline hazard rates is not estimated 
(Lunn and McNeill, 1995). The controls in my models serve as average effects across 
all exit reasons (see Lin, 1994). All the models are estimated with Stata 11.  
 
5.5.3 Explanatory variables: The Big Five traits and reasons for 
failure 
The Big Five traits of extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness and openness of the investigated entrepreneurs were measured in 
terms of 45 standardized items, and, in particular, using 9 German bipolar adjectives 
on a six-point Likert-scale (0-5) (Ostendorf, 1990). The level of the Big Five traits 
was derived from the mean of each of the values on the corresponding bipolar scales. 
The traits of conscientiousness and openness served as controls, as the theory does 
not suggest that those might have an effect on exit reasons. 
With respect to the various exit motives, (1) exit due to overinvestment of 
one‟s own financial resources (EX_FIN) was measured by “I lost too much money”, 
(2) exit due to job dissatisfaction (EX_DISS) by “The work wasn‟t fun anymore” and 
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(3) exit due to friction in the founder team (EX_TEAM) by “I was not able to cope 
with my partners anymore”.  
 
5.5.4 Control Variables 
Entrepreneurial exit is not only affected by the personality of a founder 
manager. Also socioeconomic variables and firm features may have an impact on this 
decision. Beyond the personality of the founder manager, especially in highly 
innovative environments, human capital may explain exit (see Bates, 1990; Gimeno 
et al., 1997; DeTienne and Cardon, 2010). Likewise, industry related experience is 
linked to firm exit and this may also correspond to entrepreneurial exit (Klepper, 
2002; Buenstorf and Klepper, 2010b). Moreover, firm size has an effect on firm exit 
(Audretsch and Mahmood, 1993; 1994; 1995) and may also drive entrepreneurial 
exit. Bearing in mind that the firm environment (Baum et al., 2001) and industry 
structure (Chrisman et al., 1998) may have an effect on firm exit, these factors may 
perhaps also affect entrepreneurial exit. Also, the issue of whether the founder is 
involved in an entrepreneurial team ought to have an impact on entrepreneurial exits 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2003).  
 In conclusion, I control for the age of entrepreneurs at the time of starting the 
corresponding business (AGE), number of years in self-employment (SELFEMPL), 
industry related experience (IND_EXP; 1=Yes, 0=No), gender (GEND; 1=Female, 
0=Male), the number of other founder team members (NO_TEAM) and the NACE 
industry classification (1-digit, NACE2, chemical industry, 1=Yes, 0=No; NACE2, 
electrical engineering, fine mechanics, optics, 1=YES, 0=NO; NACE7, information and 
communication technology, 1=YES, 0=NO). In order to control for the expected income 
for the alternative employment, I included a variable indicating the number of other 
firms in operation while managing the firm (NO_FIRMS).
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.
1. Extraversion 1.00
2. Agreeableness 0.05 1.00
3. Neuroticsim -0.34*** -0.18*** 1.00
4. Openness 0.27*** 0.02 -0.24*** 1.00
5. Conscientiousness 0.19*** 0.10** -0.27*** 0.11** 1.00
6. AGE 0.05 0.14*** -0.02 -0.06 0.14*** 1.00
7. SELFEMPL 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.17*** 1.00
8. IND_EXP 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.05 1.00
9. GEND 0.09* 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.08* 0.11** 1.00
10. NO_FIRMS 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.17*** 0.41*** 0.01 -0.09** 1.00
11. NO_TEAM 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 1.00
12. NACE2 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.12*** 0.09* 0.15*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.09* 0.12*** -0.08* 1.00
13. NACE3 -0.07 -0.08* 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.15*** 0.04 0.11** -0.07 -0.01 0.09* -0.31*** 1.00
14. NACE7 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.12*** -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.41*** -0.42*** 1.00
15. EX_FIN -0.01 -0.03 -0.19* 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.33*** -0.04 0.10** -0.11 0.19* -0.17 0.10 -0.04 1.00
16. EX_DISS 0.16 -0.29*** 0.19* -0.05 -0.19* -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.21** 0.16 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.14 1.00
17. EX_TEAM 0.03 -0.14 0.10 0.07 -0.15 0.14 0.20** -0.17* -0.00 -0.07 0.26*** 0.05 -0.10 0.10 0.10 0.26*** 1.00
18. EX_OTH -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.01 -0.03 0.10** 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.26*** 1.00
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01  
 
Table 5.2: Correlation coefficients 
 
mean# mean* mean§ mean& mean) SD# SD* SD§ SD& SD) max# max* max§ max& max) min# min* min§ min& min)
1. Extraversion 3.21 3.16 3.41 3.19 3.17 .63 .695 .474 .602 .619 4.78 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.44 1.44 1.67 2.67 1.67 1.67
2. Agreeableness 3.11 3.01 2.58 2.92 3.14 .557 .78 .621 .589 .611 5 4.44 3.67 4.11 4.44 .889 1.22 1.44 1.44 1.22
3. Neuroticsim 1.36 1.2 1.63 1.46 1.35 .501 .609 .37 .53 .547 3.11 2.56 2.11 2.56 2.56 0 .222 .889 .375 .222
4. Openness 3.17 3.27 3.14 3.27 3.2 .536 .441 .409 .533 .562 4.89 4 3.78 4.38 4.56 1.56 2.33 2.44 2.11 2.11
5. Conscientiousness 3.62 3.71 3.45 3.59 3.69 .601 .615 .661 .548 .62 4.89 4.78 4.56 4.44 4.78 0 2.33 2.44 2.33 2.33
6. AGE 38.9 41.8 41.1 44.9 43.7 9.27 9.72 6.53 8.34 9.79 63 67 51 67 67 18 25 29 29 25
7. SELFEMPL 2.15 6.22 4.31 4.87 3.55 4.14 7.05 5.12 6.67 4.87 34 26 13 26 26 0 0 0 0 0
8. IND_EXP .84 .78 .69 .87 .72 .366 .422 .48 .346 .452 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
9. GEND .0734 .0174 .154 .067 0.067 .261 .388 .376 .254 .251 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
10. NO_FIRMS .352 .174 .615 .233 .293 .723 .388 1.04 .504 .588 5 1 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0
11. NO_TEAM 2.21 3.3 3.46 3.4 2.64 1.26 3.07 3.91 2.65 1.35 8 16 16 16 7 1 1 1 1 1
12. NACE2 .22 .13 .308 .3 .28 .415 .344 .48 .466 .452 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
13. NACE3 .235 .348 .231 .2 .227 .425 .487 .439 .407 .421 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
14. NACE7 .373 .261 .308 .367 .307 .484 .449 .48 .49 .464 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
#indicates censored observations
*indicates exit because of overinvesment of own financial resources
§indicates exit because of dissatisfaction with the job
&indicates exit because if friction in the founder team
)indicates exit because of other reasons  
 
Table 5.3: Summary statistics
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stratified non-stratified
Dep. Var: hazard rate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
EX_FIN -0.524
(0.432)
EX_DISS -7.733***
(1.859)
EX_TEAM 0.915
(0.998)
Extraversion -0.0893 -0.247 -0.193 -0.355 -0.356
(0.225) (0.232) (0.217) (0.226) (0.226)
Agreeableness -0.273 -0.536** -0.160 -0.414 -0.426
(0.242) (0.250) (0.257) (0.268) (0.266)
Neuroticism 0.0263 0.0746 -0.0634 -0.00746 0.00527
(0.293) (0.273) (0.275) (0.271) (0.268)
Openness 0.289 0.431** 0.302 0.452** 0.450**
(0.203) (0.218) (0.203) (0.220) (0.221)
Conscientiousness 0.172 0.158 0.192 0.169 0.176
(0.213) (0.284) (0.217) (0.285) (0.289)
AGE 0.0433*** 0.0440*** 0.0443***
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0115)
SELFEMPL 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0234)
IND_EXP 0.348 -0.360 -0.347
(0.283) (0.283) (0.286)
GEND 0.428 0.430 0.437
(0.512) (0.504) (0.513)
NO_FIRMS -0.535* -0.548** -0.551**
(0.274) (0.277) (0.278)
NO_TEAM 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.272***
(0.0434) (0.0444) (0.0459)
NACE2 -0.109 -0.124 -0.124
(0.361) (0.359) (0.363)
NACE3 -0.742* -0.759* -0.768*
(0.403) (0.405) (0.411)
NACE7 -0.517 -0.524 -0.522
(0.373) (0.373) (0.376)
EX_FIN*Neuroticism -0.614 -0.519 -0.524
(0.436) (0.352) (0.357)
EX_DISS*Extraversion 1.086*** 1.114*** 1.112***
(0.362) (0.385) (0.384)
EX_DISS*Neuroticism 1.673*** 1.550*** 1.550***
(0.487) (0.471) (0.459)
EX_TEAM*Neuroticism 0.137 0.0886 0.0293
(0.374) (0.336) (0.339)
EX_TEAM*Agreeableness -0.507* -0.549** -0.542**
(0.260) (0.258) (0.267)
N 1564 1564 1564 1564 1564
Events 140 140 140 140 140
AIC 1578.8 1482.2 1574.9 1478.5 1812.4
BIC 1605.6 1557.2 1628.4 1580.2 1930.2
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.1, ** p<.05, ***p<.01  
 
Table 5.4: Model 1-5 
 
5.6 Results 
Summary statistics for the variables that I use can be seen in Table 5.2 and a 
correlation of them is depicted in Table 5.3.  
113 
 
Table 5.4 depicts four multivariate hazard rate specifications. Models 1-4 are 
stratified, whereas Model 5 is a non stratified Cox estimation. In all of the models, 
the main effects represent the estimated effects of extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism on the hazard rate of other exit reasons. Therefore, the exit interaction 
terms render the effect difference between the respective exit reasons and other exit 
reasons. According to Wei et al. (1989), robust standard errors obtained from a 
covariance matrix allow the testing of whether the hypothesized effects of 
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism differ between exits due to friction in the 
founder team, overinvestment or dissatisfaction with the job and other exit reasons. 
Since in case of exit due to job dissatisfaction the number of exits at 13 was 
relatively low and Models 4-5 were close to the proposed minimum number of 5 
events per variable (Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007), even bootstrapped standard 
errors (see Efron and Tibshirani 1994) on the basis of 4000 replications were 
estimated (available upon request from the author). The bootstrapped standard errors 
show that the estimated robust standard errors are reliable.  
In Models 3-5, besides the main effects of the Big Five traits only hypothesized 
interactions between extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism with the regarding exit 
reasons are specified. Hypothesis 1 is not corroborated through the Models 3-5. 
Compared to the group of other reasons, the risk of exit due to overinvestment 
decreases with neuroticism, but the effect is non-significant. Models 3-5 show that, 
compared to other reasons for exit, the risk of exit due to job dissatisfaction 
positively relates to extraversion ,p 0.01)(   and neuroticism 0.01).( p These results 
are in line with hypotheses 2a and 2b. The risk of exit due to friction in the founder 
team decreases with higher levels of agreeableness ( 0.1p  in Model 3 and 
0.05p  in Models 4-5), which accords with Hypothesis 3a. As the interaction 
effects between exits due to friction in the founder team and neuroticism are not 
significant in Models 3-5, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. As mentioned above, these 
interaction terms only recognize entrepreneurs who started team ventures.  
Even though the stratified Cox Models 1-4 do not allow an easy interpretation 
of the relationship among the different failure types, they are useful for testing the 
hypothesis regarding whether a covariate has a diverse effect on different exit types. 
Because the relationship among the baseline hazard rates of the competing risks is 
totally unspecified, one cannot assess the exact effect of a covariate on the exit risk 
ratio among various exit reasons (Lunn and McNeill, 1995). However, if the 
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assumption of a proportional ratio among the baseline hazard rates of the competing 
risks is realistic, a simple Cox regression may be employed, which is shown in 
Model 5 in Table 5.4. Proportionality means that the underlying survival curve, 
which remains unspecified, is the same for all exit reasons. This permits a 
straightforward interpretation of the respective coefficients.  
In comparison to Models 1-4, in Model 5 dummies representing the different 
exit reasons are added (exit because of other reasons is the comparison group) in 
order to estimate coefficients for the relative risks of exit. Correspondingly, the risk 
of exit due to job dissatisfaction is significantly lower (by a factor of exp(-7.733)) 
than exit due to other reasons ),(p 0.01  but the risk of exit due to overinvestment 
or friction in the founder team is  not significant. The standard errors of the exit 
coefficients are relatively high, which indicates that the proportionality assumption is 
ambitious. However, the other coefficients and their significance changed only 
marginally compared to Model 4. All else being equal, an increase of the value in 
neuroticism by one unit increases the relative risk of exit due to job dissatisfaction at 
any time by a factor of exp.(1.550), while the relative risk of exit due to 
overinvestment at any time decreased by a factor of exp(-0.524). If these factors are 
respectively added to the main effect of neuroticism, exp(0.00527), the effect of 
neuroticism on the concerning exit reason may be obtained, given the baseline hazard 
rate.  
 
5.7 Discussion 
The present study investigates the relationship between personality and 
various motives of entrepreneurial exit. Hypothesis 1, which suggested that 
neuroticism is negatively related to exit due to financial overinvestment, is not 
supported by the empirical results. The findings indicate that, compared to the other 
reasons of exit, extraversion and neuroticism increase the risk of exit due to job 
dissatisfaction. These results are in line with hypotheses 2a and 2b. Finally, in 
comparison to other exits, the risk of exit due to friction in the founder team is 
significantly decreased by agreeableness, which corroborates Hypothesis 3a.  
As Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the above results, the present work offers 
no evidence that personality traits should be linked with exits because of 
overinvestment of one‟s own financial resources. Future research may investigate 
more narrow traits that may be linked with this particular exit reason, like risk 
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aversion.  
I found that exit due to job dissatisfaction was positively associated with 
extraversion and neuroticism, compared to other exit reasons. In this context, 
neuroticism therefore decreases the ability of people to cope with stress (Lahey, 
2009) and it is negatively correlated with general well-being (McCrae and Costa, 
1991; Weiss et al., 2007; Steel et al., 2008). Neuroticism also promotes negative 
emotions based on negative mood inductions (Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991). Neurotic 
entrepreneurs make exit decisions because they are more affected by their 
entrepreneurial responsibilities or personal conflicts, like the non-compatibility of 
leading an entrepreneurial firm and having a family (see Egeln et al., 2010). 
Therefore, my results provide evidence for the relationship between job 
dissatisfaction and neuroticism. It was previously expected that extraversion would 
positively relate to exits due to job dissatisfaction, compared to other reasons. My 
results thus show that positive emotions induced by extraversion can lead to 
entrepreneurial exits in case of job dissatisfaction. This might be explained in terms 
of the existence of more positive expectations about alternative employment if job 
dissatisfaction is sensed (Judge, 1992). 
Finally, compared to other exit reasons, exit due to friction in the founder 
team negatively corresponds with agreeableness. This finding is in line with 
Hypothesis 3a. My results therefore contribute to the evidence for the importance of 
agreeableness for the outcome of team occupations (see Mount et al., 1998; Barrick 
et al., 2001). Friction in the founder team is fostered by low agreeable lead founders. 
In turn, disagreements in the founder team can end up in both a lower economic firm 
performance (see Jong et al., 2011) and a lower psychic income from leading an 
entrepreneurial firm, which simultaneously affect exit.  
In Hypothesis 3b it was suggested that neuroticism has a positive relationship 
with exit because of frictions in the founder team. Although there is a positive effect 
across all the estimated models, neuroticism is not significantly related to exit due to 
friction in the founder team. Hence neuroticism does not enhance the likelihood that 
entrepreneurs will exit because of team disagreements. This finding is surprising, as 
neuroticism is shown to be positively associated with relationship conflict in founder 
teams (Jong et al., 2011). However, the present study does not account for the kind of 
conflicts which force exits because of friction in the founder team.   
This study has several limitations. Firstly, the Big Five personality 
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measurement was taken ex post. Although the effects are small, the experience of 
withdrawing from an entrepreneurial venture can lead to slight changes in personality 
(Vaidya et al., 2002). Similarly, in young adulthood, personality is still in its 
development and moderate changes in the Big Five measures over time occur 
(Roberts et. al., 2006). Nevertheless, the mean age of entrepreneurs who exited at the 
time of start-up was over 40 and for those entrepreneurs who continued it is 38. It is 
thus reasonable to assume that age induced personality changes are not a notable 
problem in this study. Another issue that concerns the measures utilized in this study 
are the items that measure the regarding exit motives. These motives are complex 
and thus a scale consisting of several items may enhance the validity of the 
constructs. A replication of this study may thus help to validate the present results.  
A third shortcoming concerns the neglect of the personality of the other 
founder team members in the case of frictions in the founder team. The frequency of 
conflicts is however also caused by dyadic personality constellations among team 
members (Bono et al., 2002). Future research into exits caused by frictions in 
founder teams should also attempt to recognize the personality of other founder team 
members. With regard to this problem, Jong et al. (2011) distinguish between task 
and relationship conflicts. The utilized data does not reveal whether entrepreneurs‟ 
withdraw from founder teams because of task or relationship conflicts. Furthermore, 
the relationship between personality and exit due to overinvestment might be 
mediated by extrinsic motivation (De Tienne et al., 2008) or values (Holland and 
Shepherd, in press), which are not considered in this study.  
Finally, Table 5.1 indicates that the exit motives under investigation are 
interrelated. The respective number of exits, however, is too small to account for 
interactions. In this work, the investigation of relationship between personality and 
the various exit motives treats exit decisions separately. Even this approach may fall 
short of grasping the whole phenomenon of entrepreneurial exit, but it still helps to 
draw conclusions about the relationship between personality and various exit 
motives, even if they occur simultaneously. For instance, the above results show that 
neuroticism is significantly related to exits caused by job dissatisfaction rather than 
exits caused by friction in the founder team. Future work should take these 
interrelationships into consideration. 
The present work makes several important contributions to this area of study. 
The above results demonstrate that entrepreneurial exit is not only affected by 
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economic considerations, but also by other factors, like well being, relationships and 
risk taking preferences. Viewing strategic exit decisions only from the point of 
economic firm performance may hence fall short of tackling the issue of 
entrepreneurial exit. This suggests that, as proposed by Gimeno et al. (1997), psychic 
income plays an important role in entrepreneurial exit decisions. In addition, I show 
that the personality of entrepreneurs is an important aspect in explaining various exit 
reasons. As a consequence, individual differences in explaining entrepreneurial exit 
decisions are not only related to human capital, opportunities or demographic factors 
(see Wennberg et al., 2010), but also with the personality of entrepreneurs.  In 
conclusion, investigating factors that affect various exit reasons is a more fruitful 
approach for understanding exit decisions than just considering exit as a one 
dimensional phenomenon.  
Moreover, the present findings contribute to the evidence that personality 
affects entrepreneurial outcomes (see Rauch and Frese, 2007; Zhao et al., 2010). In 
particular, the results point out that beyond human capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2003) 
and demographic or income determinants (Hellerstadt et al., 2007) various aspects of 
personality are related to entrepreneurial team exit. Investigating whether 
entrepreneurial team exits are mainly driven by relationship or task conflict (see Jong 
et al., 2011) is a possible future research avenue. The result that job dissatisfaction 
mediates between personality and entrepreneurial exit offers a contribution to the 
literature on job satisfaction and job turnover, which so far mainly focuses on 
employees rather than on entrepreneurs.  
The present study provides evidence of several implications. As I find no 
effect for the relationship between personality and exit because of overinvestment of 
financial resources, strategic choices may generally help in avoiding these exit 
reasons. In this vein, entrepreneurship researchers suggest the principle of affordable 
loss in order to deal with entrepreneurial investments under uncertainty (Sarasvathy, 
2001, 2005, 2008; Dew et al., 2009). Also, entrepreneurs are often advised to invest 
ex-ante a limited amount of money into a business venture, which they can cope 
with. In order to avoid job dissatisfaction, several measures have been proposed 
(Judge and Klinger, 2000). For instance, the entrepreneur may switch job positions, 
increasing tasks or job responsibilities within the entrepreneurial firm if possible. In 
order to avoid exits because of friction in the founder team, social skills may help 
entrepreneurs perform better in team settings (Morgenson et al., 2005). Less 
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agreeable entrepreneurs may need training in social skills (Baron and Tang, 2009), 
which could consequently decrease frictions in the founder team.  
Beyond those recommendations, entrepreneurs who are prone to certain 
personality-related exit motives may employ self-regulating efforts to constrain the 
(negative) effects of their traits (Bledow et al., 2009). Successful self regulation 
comprises of self-reflection and an active reduction of one‟s own weaknesses. In 
addition, entrepreneurs should establish long-term goals which accord to their own 
preferences (Frese, 2007). 
In conclusion, the present paper provides evidence that different motives 
drive the process of entrepreneurial exit and that those motives are related to the 
personalities of the entrepreneurs.  
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6 Chapter: Conclusion 
The present thesis deals with the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and 
exit. Four empirical studies examine the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and 
exit behavior. The data from the studies is either collected by the author of this thesis 
(Chapter 3) or taken from the Thuringian Founder Study (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4-
5). The perspective on entry and exit is at the individual or the firm level. In the next 
section, the findings are summarized and section 6.2. outlines several key 
implications. 
 
6.1 Summary of the results 
In Chapter 2, the determinants of the market novelty of entrepreneurial firms 
are in the focus. We develop a model which links a process perspective of markets 
with the nature of opportunities. Thereafter, at early stages of market development, 
opportunity creation is the dominant pattern of entrepreneurial behavior. In contrast, 
in relatively mature markets, opportunity discovery drives entrepreneurial action. 
Thus, we can test several hypotheses. As the distribution of market novelty is 
skewed, we utilize a quantile regression approach to account for that problem.  
We find, as expected, that industry related experience negatively relates to 
market novelty. Hence, existing cognitive frameworks may be counterproductive for 
opportunity creation. The anticipated positive relationship between entrepreneurial 
experience and market novelty was not corroborated. Interestingly, we find a positive 
relationship between the lead founders‟ entrepreneurial personality profiles and 
market novelty. However, this association was only significant at the upper level of 
the distribution of market novelty. Thus, indeed, as Schumpeter (2002) predicts, 
personality may play an important role for entrepreneurs who act as creative 
destructors. Finally, the results in Chapter 2 suggest that the innovation strategy of 
firms affects their degree of market novelty. Hence, product innovation positively 
relates to market novelty, while process innovation or non-innovation negatively 
relates to market novelty (the comparison group is a product as well as a process 
innovation strategy). 
In Chapter 3 of the present thesis, the relationship between technological 
discontinuities within an industry and the match between entry time, capabilities and 
survival is investigated. The empirical framework required to test this research 
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question is provided by the German farm tractor industry. The emergence of the 
multipurpose farm tractor around 1927 served as a technological discontinuity with 
competence destroying qualities within the German farm tractor industry.  
As hypothesized, entry into the German farm tractor market was carried out 
endogenously. Therefore, entry after 1927 took place mainly in Southern Germany. 
Also, producers with a pre-entry experience of agricultural implements production 
had had a higher likelihood for entering after 1927. This result implies that mainly 
producers with regional and market related knowledge entered the new submarket. 
Considering the endogeneity of entry into the multipurpose farm tractor market, we 
also find that the match between required submarket related capabilities and 
resources ensured firm survival instead of cohort effects.    
Entrepreneurial failure is investigated in Chapter 4. More precisely, we 
investigate the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure. In 
addition, we examine the moderating effect of the Big Five personality traits of 
extraversion, openness and conscientiousness on the innovation failure relationship. 
Entrepreneurial failure occurs when entrepreneurs leave their poorly 
performing firms, which they have (co-)founded. The question of whether 
entrepreneurs left their firms because of economic or other reasons is answered with 
the help of self reports and external bankruptcy data. We use both kinds of evidence, 
as firms which have not filed as bankrupt may still perform poorly (Wennberg et al., 
2010).   
Our findings suggest that innovation activities decrease the likelihood to fail. 
We consider observed endogeneity by a Cox regression stratified on the propensity to 
innovate.  An additional finding suggests that, as hypothesized, extraversion 
strengthens the negative relationship between innovation and entrepreneurial failure, 
while openness weakens it. Surprisingly, in contrast with our hypothesis, 
conscientiousness weakens the innovation entrepreneurial failure relationship. The 
study implies that innovation is a more promising strategy than non-innovation. 
Moreover, regarding the successful implementation of innovations, the personality of 
the lead founding entrepreneur has to be taken into consideration. Negative effects of 
the personality of the founder may be outbalanced by experienced business 
consultants or individual trainings (e.g. on social skills).   
Chapter 5 deals with the various motives for entrepreneurial exit. 
Entrepreneurial exit is here defined as when an entrepreneur leaves the firm that he 
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or she created. In general entrepreneurial exit is understudied (DeTienne, 2010). The 
chapter builds up on the model of Gimeno et al. (1997), which proposes that beyond 
financial rewards, even psychic income may be yielded from business ventures. 
Psychic income hinges on the personality of the entrepreneur. The main reasons for 
entrepreneurial exit are an overinvestment of one‟s own financial resources, friction 
in the founder team and exit due to job dissatisfaction.  
Regarding the first reason, I expected there to be a negative relationship 
between neuroticism and exit due to financial overinvestment. However, the data 
does not support this hypothesis. Entrepreneurial exit because of friction in the 
founder team is negatively related to agreeableness, which is an expected result. 
Finally, the hypothesized association between extraversion and exit because of 
friction in the founder team is supported. The study shows that entrepreneurial exit is 
not always reasoned by an economically poor performing firm. Moreover, 
personality may partly explain why entrepreneurs leave their firms for certain 
reasons.   
The next section offers some implications which may be derived from the 
studies which are introduced above.   
 
6.2 Implications 
As in the respective chapters the particular implications of the studies are 
discussed, in this section I focus on general implications of the present thesis. 
The present thesis offers several contributions. First of all, it demonstrates 
that entrepreneurial entry and exit are multidimensional phenomena, which have 
been quite neglected. Hence, using entrepreneurial entry or exit as dependent 
variable without considering the multidimensionality of those constructs may lead to 
the wrong conclusions. In other words, bi- or multidirectional effects of explanatory 
variables for various entry or exit phenomena may be neutralized in the case of 
looking on entry and exit only per se. For instance, taking only individual 
entrepreneurial exit as a performance measure can involve cases where entrepreneurs 
have left their firms because of retirement. However, certain individual or firm 
characteristics, which have an effect on economic firm performance, may not have an 
effect on retirement. The effect size of an explanatory variable is then biased. 
Consequently, future research into entrepreneurial entry and exit ought to consider 
multidimensionality in more depth.  
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This issue is especially relevant if policy measures to foster entrepreneurship 
or to avoid entrepreneurial failure are being designed. Some of the results in this 
thesis imply that different entrepreneurial determinants affect the market novelty of 
entrepreneurial firms or various exit motives. Thus, if policy goals concern the 
avoidance of economic entrepreneurial failure, the measures ought to focus 
particularly on failure. Similarly, if the policy aim is to foster ventures with a high 
degree of market novelty, different actions possibly have to be made other than 
supporting entrepreneurial entry in general.  
Another implication of this thesis concerns endogenous entry decisions in 
industry evolution and entrepreneurship research. The results of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
indicate that entry decisions are endogenous. Also, it is demonstrated that not 
considering endogeneity may result in strongly biased estimates. In particular, entry 
into industries or submarkets of industries strongly relies on resources and 
capabilities. However, the firm survival studies in industry dynamics research 
conducted so far hardly recognize that fact. In a similar vein, performance studies of 
individual entrepreneurs usually do not take into consideration that they may self-
select into innovative activities. Future research into both areas thus may be enriched 
by acknowledging endogenous entry decisions.  
In addition, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 suggest that individual and firm exits often 
consist of interaction between entrepreneurial characteristics and contextual factors. 
This falls short only observing entrepreneurial exit behavior from an environmental 
or an individual/firm perspective. Consequently, measurements that aim to influence 
exit behavior ought to account for both the individual/firm level and the context. 
Likewise, future research may need to focus in more depth on the interaction 
between environments and firms or individual aspects of entrepreneurial outcomes. 
In the words of Pierce and Aguinis (2011, p. 3): “everything in moderation, nothing 
in excess”. 
The studies in this thesis provide some new insights into entrepreneurial entry 
and exit behavior. However, further opportunities for research in this area certainly 
exist. With respect to endogeneous entry decisions, an instrument variable may 
outperform the utilized propensity score approach. This is especially valid if 
unobserved heterogeneity exists. However, a main drawback of such an instrument is 
the impossibility of testing for its correlation with the error term. Therefore, the 
researcher has to reason theoretically why an instrument is “really” exogenous 
123 
 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). One then may ask the question: “why test theory with 
theory?“     
Another rather sparsely investigated area in entrepreneurship research is the 
consideration of mediators between human capital or personal dispositions of 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial exit. For instance, the relationship between 
personality and exit because of friction in the founder team may be mediated by 
relationship conflict (see Jong et al,. 2011). Future research may gain insights 
theoretically and empirically regarding this research avenue. Likewise, there may 
exist mediators between individual dispositions and the market novelty or 
innovativeness of entering entrepreneurs. For instance, Amabile (1997a) proposes 
that (entrepreneurial) creativity moderates the relationship between personal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and market novelty or innovation. Again, those 
relationships may be investigate in future studies. 
A rarely investigated issue is the effect of cascades of entrepreneurial 
activities. This is relevant on the firm level, where mainly the effect of pre-entry 
experience on performance is investigated rather than different biographical firm 
patterns. Even at the level of the individual entrepreneur, studies of the effect of 
previous failure on entrepreneurial failure are scarce. Similarly, the effect of success 
of firms or entrepreneurs in one branch of entry and exit behavior in other branches 
can be understudied. Future research may thus shed some more light on necessity 
entry, opportunity entry and their consequences for market success. For instance, 
after World War II, many entrants into the German farm tractor industry entered the 
market because they were not allowed to become armament producers (see Bauer 
1987).  
In conclusion, this thesis provides new insights into entrepreneurial entry and 
exit decisions, which involve some interplay between individuals, firm 
characteristics and the environmental setting. 
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Appendix A to Chapter 2 
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Figure A.1: Lorenz curve of the dependent variable market novelty 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Histogram with kernel density estimation of the dependent variable 
market novelty 
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Figure A.3: Quantile regression with market novelty as dependent variable (vertical 
axes show coefficient estimates of named explanatory variable over the market 
novelty distribution; horizontal axes depict the quantiles of the dependent variable). 
Quantile regression error bars correspond to bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals 
(100 replications). Horizontal lines represent OLS estimates with 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Appendix B to Chapter 4 
 
Big-Five trait Item Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5
sparsam - verschwenderisch 0.351 -0.4353
ordentlich - unachtsam 0.7344
übergenau - ungenau 0.7309 0.2312
gründlich - unsorgfältig 0.8002
Conscientiousness geschäftstüchtig - verspielt 0.2974 0.3351 -0.3822
strebsam - ziellos 0.4486 -0.3725
geordnet - ungeordnet 0.6488
fleißig - faul 0.6538
gewissenhaft - nachlässig 0.8445
gesprächig - schweigsam 0.6826
anschlußbedürftig - einzelgängerisch 0.4665 0.3118 0.3817
direkt - taktierend 0.2479
offen - zugeknöpft 0.7381
Extraversion impulsiv - selbstbeherrscht 0.3344 -0.4545 0.5764
aktiv - passiv 0.3765 -0.3366
kontaktfreudig - zurückhaltend 0.8165
freimütig - gehemmt 0.6752
gesellig - zurückgezogen 0.7461
nachsichtig - barsch 0.6515
friedfertig - streitsüchtig 0.719
leichtgläubig - zynisch 0.5577 -0.2175 0.3718
gutmütig - reizbar 0.6732 -0.227
Agreeableness weichherzig - rücksichtslos 0.5589 0.2324
höflich - grob 0.2755 0.4483 0.3531
selbstlos - selbstsüchtig 0.3374
vertrauensvoll - misstrauisch 0.2385 0.4898
zustimmend - gegensätzlich 0.2238 0.4177
künstlerisch - unkünstlerisch 0.3624 0.2068
komplex - einfach -0.2458 0.4849
phantasievoll - phantasielos 0.2117 0.3029 -0.2667
originell - konventionell 0.347 0.3897
Openness kreativ - unkreativ 0.2083 0.3987
modern - traditionell 0.4289
intelligent - unintelligent 0.3731 -0.3911
gebildet - ungebildet 0.3632 -0.2279
liberal - konservativ -0.2769 0.55
überempfindlich - entspannt 0.2318 -0.3592 0.4672
labil - gefühlsstabil 0.648
selbstachtungslos - überzeugt -0.2246 0.4042
verletzlich - robust 0.597
Neuroticism furchtsam - mutig -0.4047 0.2833
ängstlich - ruhig 0.223 0.6679
hilflos - selbstvertrauend 0.4878
selbstmitleidig - selbstzufrieden 0.3465
unsicher - sicher -0.2839 -0.3354 0.3813
Only  |loads|>.2 are indicated; values in bold show the highest load per item
 
 
Table B.1: Principal component factor analysis with promax rotation with the 
employed items  
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